Changing Media, Chaning Minds: The Lesbian and Gay Movement, Television, and Public Opinion by Garretson, Jeremiah J
 CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING MINDS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY 
MOVEMENT, TELEVISION, AND PUBLIC OPINION 
By 
Jeremiah J. Garretson 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Political Science 
December, 2009 
 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
 
Approved: 
 
Professor Marc J. Hetherington  
 
Professor John G. Geer 
 
Professor Bruce I. Oppenheimer 
 
Professor Christian R. Grose 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 by Jeremiah Garretson 
All Rights Reserved 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work would not be possible without a Vanderbilt University summer 
research grant that provided needed resources for research which is now Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
It would impossible to understate the impact that the faculty and students in the 
Department on Political Science have had on this dissertation and particularly the Chair 
of the Dissertation Committee, Marc Hetherington.   
 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………..vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………...vii 
 
Chapter 
 
I.INTRODUCTION: CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING MINDS? ................................ 1 
 
          A Broad or Narrow Liberalization? .......................................................................... 8 
          Additional Factors in the Liberalization of Attitudes toward Homosexuality ........ 11 
          Outline of the Dissertation ...................................................................................... 14 
 
II.THE THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF  
      THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT ................................................................ 19 
 
          The Nature of Research on the Lesbian and Gay Movement ................................. 20 
          The Conception of Homosexual Identity ................................................................ 22 
          World War II, the Kinsey Report, and the Homophile Movement ......................... 23 
          The 1960s and the Creation of the Modern Lesbian and Gay Movement .............. 28 
          Why Identity Politics?: Social Identity Theory and Movement Development ....... 32 
          Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 35 
 
III.THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ..... 37 
 
          Bill Clinton, Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Tell, and the Republican Revolution ..................... 48  
          Estimating Lesbian and Gay Rights Support in Congress ...................................... 49 
          The Ideal Point Model ............................................................................................. 53 
          Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 60 
 
IV.THE CAUSE OF PUBLIC OPINION SHIFTS ON LESBIAN AND GAY  
       ISSUES....................................................................................................................... 62 
 
          Research on Public Opinion involving Lesbians and Gays .................................... 68 
          Hypotheses Regarding Opinion Change towards Identity Groups ......................... 72 
                    I. The Partisan Effect ..................................................................................... 72 
                    II. The Media Effect ...................................................................................... 73 
                    III. The Cohort Effect .................................................................................... 75 
v 
 
                    IV. Religion and Demographic Effects ......................................................... 76 
  
V. THE POLITICAL PROCESS, ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA, AND 
      PUBLIC OPINION CHANGE ................................................................................... 78 
 
          Data and Methods.................................................................................................... 78 
          The Individual Level Analysis ................................................................................ 82 
          Results and Discussion ............................................................................................ 87 
          Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 103 
 
VI. THE EFFECT OF MEDIA CONTACT WITH LESBIANS AND GAY: AN  
      EXPERIMENTAL CONFIRMATION..................................................................... 104 
 
          Observational vs. Experimental Studies................................................................ 105 
          Experimental Studies and Public Attitudes towards Lesbians and Gays .............. 108 
          The Control and Treatment Conditions ................................................................. 109 
          The Subjects and Their Characteristics ................................................................. 113 
          Results and Discussion .......................................................................................... 120 
          Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 125 
 
VII. TAKING THE BAIT: BELIEFS ABOUT LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES  
       AND THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ...................................................... 127 
 
          Media-led Priming and Its Effect on Vote Choice ................................................ 130 
          Ground Zero: Ohio in 2004 ................................................................................... 137 
          An Individual Level Analysis of Ohio .................................................................. 141 
          Local vs. National Effects ..................................................................................... 143 
          Determining Causation: The 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel ................................ 148 
          Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................... 156 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION: BUSH, OBAMA, AND THE FUTURE OF LESBIAN AND  
        GAY PUBLIC ATTITUDES .................................................................................. 158 
  
          Obama: A Difficult Position ................................................................................. 162 
          The Annihilation and Creation of Tolerance ......................................................... 165 
 
I. APPENDIX I:  QUESTION CODING FOR SECOND POOLED  
      CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA SET .......................................................................... 167 
II. APPENDIX II:  TREATMENT AND CONTROL CONDITIONS FOR   
      EXPERIMENT.......................................................................................................... 172 
III. APPENDIX III: QUESTION WORDING FOR EXPERIMENTAL LESBIAN  
      AND GAY RIGHTS SCALE ................................................................................... 178 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 180 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table                                                                                                                              Page 
 
1-1. Summery of Questions Used to Construct Abstract Equality Measure .................. 18 
 
3-1. The Changing Basis of Support for the Gay Rights Bill in Congress .................... 42 
 
5-1. Multi-Level Logistic Regression for All Respondents and Democrats .................. 88 
 
5-2. Multi-Level Logistic Regression for Republicans and Independents ..................... 91 
 
5-3. Multi-Level Logistic Regression for All Respondent and Democrats Only  
      Controlling for Knowing Lesbians and Gay and Attribution of  
      Homosexuality over Time ................................................................................. 95 
 
5-4. Multi-Level Logistic Regression for Republicans and Independents Only  
      Controlling for Knowing Lesbians and Gay and Attribution of  
      Homosexuality over Time ................................................................................. 96 
 
6-1. Regression Analysis of Experimental Data .......................................................... 124 
 
7-1. Predicting Change in Bush Vote in Ohio (County-Level) .................................... 140 
 
7-2. 2004 Ohio Exit Poll .............................................................................................. 144 
 
7-3. 2004 National Exit Poll ........................................................................................ 145 
 
7-4. Gay Adoption and the 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel Study................................ 152 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
 
1-1. Stability and Political Issues ..................................................................................... 2 
 
1-2. Social Issues and Public Opinion ............................................................................. 3 
 
1-3. Public Opinion Towards Same-Sex Relationships ................................................... 4 
 
1-4. The Number of Lesbian and Gay-Related Television News Stories and  
       Major Fictional Characters on NBC, ABC, and CBS: 1968-2000..................... 7 
 
1-5. Abstract Support for Lesbian and Gay Equality over Time ..................................... 9 
 
1-6. Interpersonal Contact with Lesbians and Gays and the Belief in a Origin  
                 of Homosexuality ............................................................................................. 13 
 
3-1. Changing Effects of Race and District Urbanicity in Predicting  
                 Cosponsorship of the Gay Rights Bill: 1974-1992 .......................................... 41 
 
3-2. Changing Effects of Party and District Presidential Vote in  
        Predicting Cosponsorship of the Gay Rights Bill: 1974-1992 ........................ 41 
 
3-3. Density Estimates of Gay and Lesbian Policy Support for the Pre-Clinton House  
      (1986-1992) and Contemporary House (1999-2000) ....................................... 57 
 
3-4. The Gay and Lesbian Policy Dimension in Congress Across Time ....................... 58 
 
3-5. The Marginal Effect of Ideology (DW-NOMINATE) in Predicting Pro-Lesbian 
      and Gay Policy Support in Congress by Party and Time Period ..................... 59 
 
5-1. Public Opinion Towards Same-Sex Relationships ................................................. 79 
 
5-2. Partisan Change on Attitudes towards Same-Sex Relations ................................... 81 
 
5-3. Cohort Effects on Attitudes Towards Same-Sex Relations .................................... 90 
 
5-4. The Marginal Effect of an Additional Lesbian or Gay Television Character on  
       Same-Sex Relation Attitudes Given TV Consumption ................................... 93 
 
5-5. Estimated Probability of Support for Lesbian and Gay Job Protections by 
       Period, Birthyear, and Party ............................................................................ 98 
 
viii 
 
 
5-6. The Estimated Proportion of Public Opinion Change Due to Changes in  
Television, Demographics, Contact with Lesbians and Gays, and the 
Biological Attribution of Homosexuality ........................................................ 99 
 
5-7. Random Effects for Second Multilevel Model of Policy Attitudes towards  
Lesbians and Gay  ......................................................................................... 100 
 
6-1. Party Identification, Spring 2009 Study ............................................................... 114 
 
6-2. Ideology, Spring 2009 Study ................................................................................ 115 
 
6-3. Lesbian and Gay Rights Support Scale Histogram, Spring 2009 Study ............... 115 
 
6-4. Histogram of Obama Feeling Thermometer, Fall 2008 Study ............................. 116 
 
6-5. Histogram of Feeling Thermometer for John McCain, Fall 2008 Study .............. 116 
 
6-6. Histogram for George W. Bush Feeling Thermometer, Fall 2008 Study ............. 117 
 
6-7. Histogram of Feeling Thermometer for Sarah Palin, Fall 2008 Study ................. 117 
 
6-8. Mean Lesbian and Gay Rights Support Across by Experimental and Control  
Groups ........................................................................................................... 121 
 
7-1. Number of New Stories involving Gay Marriage by States with and without  
        Ballot Measures on the Issue ......................................................................... 134 
 
7-2. The 2004 Presidential Vote and the Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Ohio  
(Counties) ...................................................................................................... 137 
 
7-3. Shift in Probability of Bush Vote Based on Gay Marriage Position .................... 147 
 
8-1. Timeline of Factors in Liberalization of Gay Rights Attitudes ............................ 160 
 
8-2. Television, the 2004 Election, and Declining Acceptance towards Same-Sex  
Relations among Youth ................................................................................. 161 
 
AII-1.  Image in “Obama” Condition .............................................................................. 172 
 
AII-2.  Image in “McCain” Condition ............................................................................ 174 
 
AII-3.  Image in “Ellen” Condition ................................................................................. 175 
 
AII-4.  Image in Control Condition................................................................................. 176 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING MINDS? 
 
 
 
In the mid 1990s, a dramatic wave in the normally calm waters of public opinion 
began to form.  The American public's attitudes towards lesbians and gays were changing 
and this change over the next fifteen years would be rapid.  Immediately preceding this 
change, lesbians and gays began demanding the right to be portrayed in a positive 
light in the news, on television, and on film.  This wave of change happened most heavily 
among the nation's youth who normally inherit their parent's political positions and it 
mirrored prior changes in opinion that have occurred in thinking on racial equality 
and the role of women in society. Why, when most research shows that changes in what 
the public thinks are weak and ephemeral (Page and Shapiro 1992, Stimson 2004), did 
these issues change rapidly and in a single direction toward greater toleration?  Why do 
we see differences between the young and old on these issues and not others (MacManus 
1996)? 
The key difference between trends on public opinion involving policy and 
governmental issues, or political issues, and trends in public opinion on social issues 
which involve attitudes on racial equality, gender roles, and minorities can be gleaned 
from examining Figures 1-1 and 1-2.  Figures 1-1 and 1-2 contain examples of both of 
these two distinct types of public opinion issues.  Figure 1-1 plots the change in attitudes 
on government spending levels for three different policy areas.  Although these 
preferences do change significantly over time, they do not appear to move towards a 
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point of broad consensus among the public.  Contrast this with the issues displayed in 
Figure 1-2.  Figure 1-2 shows attitudes on women working outside the home and attitudes 
on race-based integration of schools.  Both issues show a sharp upward trajectory over 
time as a liberal public consensus slowly emerged.  This trend toward liberal consensus is 
the key difference between political issues and social issues as discussed here. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Stability and Political Issues 
 
 
 
These changes in public opinion that took place towards women and African-
Americans in the 1960s and 1970s are similar to the shifts that took place towards 
lesbians and gays and their rights later in the 1990s.  Figure 1-3 shows one of the earliest 
repeated survey questions on lesbian and gay rights over time asked by the General 
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Social Survey (GSS).  The survey asked respondents if they thought sexual relations 
between members of the same-sex were wrong.  From 1973 through 1990 the number of 
respondents who answered the most liberal category, “not wrong at all” was small and 
stayed small.  Started in 1990s, however, a liberalizing trend emerged.  More and more 
people started answering that there was nothing wrong with same-sex relations on the 
GSS during the 1990s and 2000s.  In the most recent round of GSS interviews nearly 
40% of the respondents stated that there was nothing wrong at all.  In fact, among those 
under age 30, this has become the majority response.   
 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Social Issues and Public Opinion 
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Figure 1-3: Public Opinion towards Same-Sex Relationship  
Source: the General Social Survey. 
 
 
This presents a puzzle?  Why do these social attitudes behave differently from 
other political attitudes?  Why is it that social change has pervaded society since the 
1960s and prior, heralding greater social liberalism with each generation, while political 
and economic issues have shifted back and forth between liberal and conservative eras 
and administrations with no consensus emerging (Stimson 1999, 2004)?  Why has there 
been a marked liberalization in attitudes towards women, blacks, lesbians, gays and other 
minorities since the 1960s?  The answer to this question has two parts.  The first has to do 
with where the public receives some of their information on social identities and minority 
groups as opposed to their information on politics and political issues.  Instead of relying 
merely on hard news---newspapers and television news programming---for information 
on most political issues, the public can extract social information on people in different 
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identity categories—minorities and women---from other media sources.  Television 
portrayals, films, literature, or any other mass transmitted source, fictional or reality-
based, can serve as information on the lives and beliefs of minorities.  Positive portrayals 
can humanize individuals and erase the psychological barriers constructed between 
groups just as negative portrayals or silence can strengthen the misperceptions and 
misunderstandings that lead to animosities between minorities and majorities.   
Most television and film relies on portraying the lives of individuals in novel 
situations in order to garner viewers.  This presents a contrast to educating the public on 
government programs, policies, or political events and issues which is the purported goal 
of the news media.  This gives opinion change on social issues a major advantage over 
opinion change on harder political and policy-related issues.  Citizens can get information 
from pure entertainment, like a situation comedy, a drama or even a cartoon, rather than 
take time out of their busy lives to study an issue or watch a less entertaining and more 
difficult news program.  Changes in public opinion can occur when there is a systematic 
and permanent change in the way the media, entertainment and news, presents the lives 
and issues of minorities.  When women are shown working outside the home in films, the 
public ought to become more receptive to women working.  When gays and lesbians 
appear on television in positive roles, the public ought to become less likely to view them 
as abominations.  When African-Americans are shown as real people dealing the best 
they can with economic problems, thinking of them as inherently inferior becomes more 
difficult. 
To describe permanent attitude change as if it where merely a construction of 
media and generational change, however, would result in missing a large piece of the 
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driving forces behind the social change process.  Political parties and their leaders play a 
crucial role in advancing the interests of minorities.  This role is as crucial as that of the 
media.  The pronouncements and utterances of their leaders shape partisan identities in 
the mass public (Zaller 1992).  When minorities gain some nontrivial amount of 
resources through which to affect the political process, they can leverage it into coalitions 
with political leaders and particularly in places where they can affect electoral outcomes 
(McAdam 1999; Armstrong 2002; Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).  Political elites can, 
in turn, move their adherents towards supporting the rights of the minority by openly 
embracing the minority though political communications.  This effect of leaders on their 
followers’ attitudes about minorities has been a key finding of political science (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989).  The approval of political elites signals to the television media that 
the mass public may be more receptive to a greater number of portrayals of that minority 
in fiction.  For example, support for the rights of African-Americans and women at the 
political elite level were followed by a surge in liberal portrayals of African-Americans 
and women in the 1970s like George Jefferson on All in the Family or Mary Richards on 
The Mary Tyler Moore Show.  While it is possible that the opposing party’s adherents 
may become less friendly towards the new group, eventually the intergenerational schism 
created by the media will force concessions in order for the more conservative party to 
appeal to young voters.  This is the political process of social change.  The interaction 
between political parties and the change in the media is crucial.  Without each, change 
would not be possible.   
Contrast Figure 1-3 with Figure 1-4.  Figure 1-4 shows the number of television 
news stories on the big three network news channels, ABC, CBS, and NBC, which relate 
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to lesbian and gay issues for most of the later half of the 20th century. It also shows the 
rise in the number of lesbian and gay television characters on these same channels over 
the same time period.  The number of television stories spikes in 1992 and 1993, with a 
sharp and sustained rise in television characters in 1995.  These shifts take place at the  
 
Figure 1-4: The Number of Lesbian and Gay-Related Television News Stories and Major 
Fictional Characters on NBC, ABC, and CBS: 1968-2000 
 
 
start of the public’s wider attitude liberalization on lesbian and gay issues displayed GSS 
question in Figure 1-3.  I will demonstrate that the more characters people watched and 
became comfortable with, the more tolerant their attitudes became.  These shifts in 
television, along with the shifts in the Democratic Party’s support of lesbian and gay 
rights ultimately caused social change.   
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A Broad or a Narrow Liberalization? 
Establishing that the GSS question above is representative of attitudes involving 
lesbian and gay rights in general and that all issues involving lesbian and gay equality are 
related would greatly aid this analysis.  What do I mean when I say ‘public opinion 
towards lesbians and gays’?  Public polling only sometimes asks questions over time on 
opinions as abstract as liking or disliking of a group and broad or narrow support for its 
rights.  To create a more complete measure of support for lesbian and gay equality than 
any specific question, I would need to combine several different issues and questions that 
pertain to lesbian and gay rights as opposed to focusing a single specific issue that might 
go beyond lesbian and gay equality.  For instance, a question involving employment 
protections for lesbians and gays might also reflect attitudes towards such laws for all 
groups, not just support for job protections for lesbians and gays.  If a question, like the 
GSS above had a similar trend to a more abstract measure of support created from a 
broader range of issues, it specifically can used as a window to more complete 
understanding of public opinion towards lesbians and gays generally in an analysis.   
In order to do this, I created a measure of public affect towards lesbians and gays 
similar to Stimson’s “public mood” (1999).  The ‘public mood’ related to changes in the 
aggregate policy liberalism and conversativism of the public generally (1999, 2004).  
Kellstedt (2003) has also found an underlying similarity in change on racial policy 
attitudes similar to the one demonstrated below on gay rights issues, although Kellstedt’s 
measure examines support for government intervention in erasing racial inequality rather 
than abstract support for that same equality. 
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Figure 1-5: Abstract Support for Lesbian and Gay Equality over Time 
 
 
Figure 1-5 displays this abstract support for lesbian and gay equality in United 
States over time.  This was derived by taking 17 questions concerning gay rights issues 
which were repeated over time and polled by the same organization.  These polls are 
listed in Table 1-1 and involve attitudes towards job protections for lesbians and gays, 
support for same-sex marriage and adoption, support for gay teachers, support for a gay 
cabinet secretary, and many other issues involving some sort of equal social treatment for 
lesbians and gays.  These questions represent a diverse source of issues and polling 
organizations.  The mean of each specific question across time was subtracted from the 
percentage of respondents taking a pro-gay rights position.  This mean-centered measure 
for each individual question is plotted on the graph using a gray circle for each year.  
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Although each of these issues has greater or lesser support among the public at any given 
time due to a variety of factors (Mucciaroni 2008), with the mean removed from each 
question we obtain a measure of the trend other time.  The support for abstract equality 
obtained from these trends, and graphed using a black line in the figure, represents a 
LOWESS curve, or locally-weighted regression, fitted to the individual data points.  The 
LOWESS curve fit shows the aggregate trend in the 17 repeated survey questions over 
time and adjusted for outliers.  The trend on the General Social Survey’s question asking 
about public approval of same sex relations mentioned above is also overlaid in Figure 1-
5 and closely matches the overall trend in lesbian and gay equality support.  
The public’s support for gay rights, as described by the abstract equality measure, 
remains static from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s.  During the AIDS epidemic, 
negative shifts in questions concerned with affect towards lesbians and gays offset 
positive shifts in questions regarding employment protections and broader civil rights.  
However, in the early 1990s the public’s support for lesbian and gay rights increased 
rapidly and that support continues to grow into the present.  Similarly, the aggregate mix 
of responses on the GSS question involving same-sex relations is static for over the first 
decade and a half of the survey’s run.  Nearly 80 percent of the public choose the 
response that same sex relations were “always wrong” until 1991.  After 1991, the 
number of people choosing the opposite response, “not wrong at all”, started to increase 
significantly and it mirrors the change in abstract equality.  The GSS question is thus a 
representative question of the broader attitude change that occurred.   
Except for some initial liberalization in the early 1990s, around the time of the 
election of Bill Clinton, the abstract equality measure closely matches that of the 
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television characters measure in Figure 1-4.  The rise in television characters is a very 
much a plausible cause of the rise in abstract equality. 
 
Other Factors in the Liberalization of Attitudes toward Homosexuality 
While media is key to my story of the public’s shift in public opinion towards 
lesbian and gays, several other alternative hypotheses have also been proposed, which I 
account for throughout the dissertation.  However, each of these other factors likely also 
has changes in media and the behavior of political elites at their core.   
The widely know delisting of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has been created with causing 
attitude change towards lesbians and gays.  These medical elites’ changing attitudes 
towards lesbians and gay are thought to have impacted the public (Zaller 1992).  
However, the shift in the APA predated the larger shift in public opinion by twenty years, 
as illustrated by the shift in abstract equality.  It is highly unlikely that it would take that 
long for the public to get the message.  The shift in the APA’s attitudes is similar to the 
shift in medical thinking about intrinsic differences between the races that took place in 
the 1920s (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Gould 1996), but few would argue that a large scale 
liberalization on racial issues happened during that time period.  Most would argue that 
events in the 1940s through the 1960s had more of a lasting impact on public opinion.  
The changes of medical elites did have an impact, but the impact was likely the political 
cover they provided for the decisions of other elites in the political sphere. 
Another potential factor has great normative appeal and has been embraced by 
the lesbian and gay movement.  That factor involves lesbians and gays themselves being 
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responsible for change in public opinion through interpersonal contact and social 
networks.  Lesbians and gays are more comfortable today revealing their sexual 
orientation to family and friends and this increased contact may result in a liberalization 
of attitudes towards lesbians and gay.  The number of people reportedly knowing gays 
and lesbians has increased.  Also, research has shown that knowing someone gay has a 
positive effect on support for lesbian and gay rights (Altemeyer 2001; Lewis 2007).   
The question that must be asked is why are gays and lesbians more likely to be 
out to more friends and family in the first place?  It is likely that the increase in this 
phenomenon is also a function of media coverage.  An increase in media portrayals likely 
increases the probability that gays and lesbians will feel comfortable ‘coming out’ and 
thus any interpersonal effect is an indirect effect of the media as well.  Interpersonal 
contacts may also result from selection bias problems: gays and lesbians are more likely 
to come out to people whom they know are already supportive of lesbian and gay 
individuals and lesbian and gay rights (Lewis 2007).  The number of ‘out’ gays and 
lesbians may also change over time, although it is equally difficult to assess whether this 
is due to an actual change in the number of people who think of themselves as gay and 
lesbian, or merely a change in the number who feel comfortable identifying on a survey 
(Villarroel et al. 2006).  Fluctuations in the number of lesbian and gay (or homosexual) 
identified people in the U.S. are usually also within the margin of error of a standard 
survey (such as the GSS).  This makes an assessment of the effect of a change in 
aggregate number of ‘out’ gays and lesbians on public opinion even more problematic.  
However, the media climate does affect how lesbian and gay identities are constructed.  
Historical evidence, which will be discussed in the next chapter, points to the late 1960s 
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and 1970s as the time when the lesbian and gay movement shifted their strategic focus to 
identity building activities including ‘coming out’, but public opinion change did not start 
shifting until the early 1990s.  It seems unlikely that interpersonal contact alone would 
only start to be effective in the 1990s, since the gay and lesbian movement had 
experienced more growth prior to those years.  It took something else to make lesbians 
and gays more comfortable revealing their identity to others, and that was media 
representation. 
 
 
Figure 1-6. Interpersonal Contact with Lesbian and Gays and the Belief in a Biological 
Origin of Homosexuality 
 
Another alternative theory to explain attitude liberalization has been proposed by 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2008).  They examine the relationship between those who 
believe in a biological or an ‘essential’ cause of homosexuality and find a strong 
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relationship between those holding this attitude and individual level support for lesbian 
and gay rights.  They also find a strong aggregate level correlation. 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn’s thesis has strong merit.  A large number of medical 
articles and research on biological causations of homosexuality emerged in the early 
1990s concurrent with the start of attitude liberalization, giving the thesis strong validity 
(Levay 1996).  It is hard to imagine that this medical research is not exogenous to other 
forces, however.  Figure 1-6 shows the rise in the percentage of people reporting contact 
with lesbians and gays and those believing in some sort of biological causation.  Both of 
these hypotheses will be tested in the later chapters along with the hypothesis that social 
change was caused by the changing behavior of politicians and the rise of lesbians and 
gays in news and fictional media. 
 In sum, medical elites, contact with gays, and attitudes towards a biological cause 
of homosexuality all may contribute to the liberalization in attitudes towards lesbians and 
gays, but the primary factors are likely shifts in political elite and the media.  Increases in 
‘coming out’ are likely caused by media shifts.  The timing of the APA decision doesn’t 
match the time that attitude liberalization became.  The biological cause argument has the 
most merit, but the fact that only 40% of the public hold this attitude, as illustrated in 
Figure 1-6, means that even it is unlikely to be the cause of the bulk of the liberalization. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
Although I argue public opinion in partially elite led, attention needs to be paid to 
the factors that cause, and sometimes force, these elites to lead.  The owners of television 
networks would not allow characters on the air that would offend public sensibility and 
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thus harm their ratings and profits.  Politicians, likewise, are reluctant to change their 
public positions on issues.  A politician’s shifting to support the civil rights of a very 
unpopular minority, especially one associated with immorality, would be anathema to 
winning reelection.  A number of changes needed to take place in American politics 
before lesbian and gay rights could find support at elite levels.  I demonstrate that for 
these changes to take place, a shift in the behavior of the lesbian and gay movement and 
the internal psychology of its members needed to take place.  The change from a 
mentality of advocating for lesbian and gay integration into American culture to a 
mentality of creating a separate subcultural social identity occurred in the 1960s.  Once 
the gay and lesbian movement started developing a shared collective identity, liberal and 
Democratic politicians in cities that contained a sizable number of lesbians and gays 
could fashion appeals for votes based on advocacy for that identity.  Chapter 2 explains 
some of the history of the lesbian and gay movement and its paradigmatic shift in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  The defining moment of this shift was the 1969 Stonewall Riots 
in Manhattan.   
The change in the behavior of politicians seeking elected office and reelection is 
the focus of Chapter 3.  In order to gain votes, activists, and funds, Democratic politicians 
in the urban districts of San Francisco and Manhattan started supporting lesbian and gay 
rights.  Later as the lesbian and gay movement institutionalized in the 1980s, interest 
groups developed which tried to provide the same resources not based on urban 
geography, but based on party.  In addition, Republicans, some of which had supported 
lesbian and gays partially in the 1980s, shifted rightward on gay rights in the 1990s to 
appeal to the social conservative activists emerging as one of their core constituencies.  
16 
 
The election of a pro-gay Democratic president in 1992 cemented the partisan cleavage 
thereafter. 
Chapter 4 provides a background on previous research on public opinion change, 
and then draws on this previous research to form hypotheses regarding public opinion 
change on social issues.  Partisanship and media exposure are major factors in 
liberalization.  In addition, young people are particularly susceptible to changes in media 
due to the lack of a reference frame about socially appropriate behavior that older 
individuals have based on past media exposure.  I test this theory in the later chapters. 
Using a wide variety of survey data, Chapter 5 then determines why public 
opinion shifted.  I find that the shift in elite attitudes triggered the start of public opinion 
change.  Democrats in the public started liberalizing after Bill Clinton, who supported the 
lesbian and gay minority, was elected president.  Furthermore, Clinton’s convincing win 
signaled to Hollywood that putting a substantially larger number of lesbian and gay 
characters on television would no longer deeply offend the public since Clinton’s support 
had not damaged his candidacy in 1992.  This sustained and diversified the liberalization 
of attitudes beyond Democrats and also concentrated it in those whom had never 
encountered any information on lesbians and gays before: the nation’s youth.   
Of course, casual direction is a potential problem in Chapter 5.  Did media cause 
or reflect public opinion change?  In Chapter 6, I confirm using an experimental design 
that messages are causally prior to a change in attitudes.  When individuals are exposed 
to a lesbian-identified individual via a mock interview, I find attitude change.  This 
chapter demonstrates that more lesbian and gay television characters cause attitude 
liberalization. 
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Chapter 7 examines on potential consequence of opinion liberalization. As 
support for same-sex marriage increased, President George W. Bush used his position 
against same-sex marriage to appeal to voters.   Although the media focused on states 
with ballot propositions banning same-sex marriage, I find evidence that same-sex 
marriage had a national effect on vote choice in the 2004 presidential election, which 
challenges previously published research (Donavan et al. 2005; Campbell and Monson 
2005).  Clinton’s election in 1992 helped liberalize lesbian and gay attitudes in the 1990s.  
More liberal attitudes towards lesbians and gays may have helped reelect George W. 
Bush by making lesbian and gay rights a partisan issue that Democrat can no directly 
oppose or anger their base. 
Chapter 8 contains my conclusion and final thoughts on media and elite led social 
change in the wake of Barack Obama’s election as a purportedly pro-gay president and 
the nation’s first president with an African heritage.  Barack Obama could lead on lesbian 
and gay issues as Clinton had attempted to do in 1993 and inspire greater liberalization, 
but risk his greater agenda if a backlash emerges.  Else, he could attempt to bury his 
support for lesbian and gay rights under other pressing issues like the economic crisis and 
healthcare in order to avoid the backlash Clinton faced. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of Questions Used to Construct Abstract Equality Measure
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
THE THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT  
 
 
 
 Political elites have an impact on the attitudes of their followers (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989; Zaller 1992).  But they are also beholden to those followers for votes and 
reelection.  They are thus averse to taking positions that would endanger their jobs as 
elected officials (Mayhew 1974).  For instance lesbians and gays have traditionally been 
one of the least liked groups on the National Election Study’s battery of feeling 
thermometers which ask individuals to rate groups and people on a scale from 0 to 100 
with 100 being warm and 0 being cold.  The mean rating of lesbians and gays was 28.5 
even as late as 1988, which placed them well below Hispanics, Blacks, Christian 
fundamentalists, people on welfare, and even illegal aliens (Yang 1997).  How is it 
possible that an unpopular minority, like lesbians and gays, could eventually gain the 
support of political elites whose electoral interests seem so opposed to being associated 
with a disliked social group? 
 The solution to this riddle is complicated, but crucial to understanding how an 
unpopular group can change the public’s attitudes about them.  In this chapter I trace the 
history of the lesbian and gay movement to determine how it first gained the support of 
elected officials and eventually became a valued constituency of the Democratic Party.  
The outcome required a shift in the ideology (or social movement frame) of the lesbian 
and gay movement from one of integration into the existing social order to one of 
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articulating a collective lesbian and gay identity.  Except for a brief period in early 1950s 
Los Angeles, this did not happen until the late 1960s. 
  
The Nature of Research in the Lesbian and Gay Movement 
An old Indian legend can easily illustrate the ways in which academics from 
diverse disciplines have tried to establish the origins of the gay and lesbian movement.  I 
shall now take great creative license in retelling it.   
Three blind men walk into a room with an object they are trying to identify.  
Without sight to see the object, they reach out their hands and feel the texture and shape 
of it.  One man says, “It’s a wall”.  He then describes a wide, rubbery surface a few feet 
off the ground.  The second states, “No, No, It has to be a spear”.  The second man then 
tells of a long cylindrical object he feels coming to a distinct and sharp point.  The third 
man is dumbfounded at the first two.  “It’s clearly a hose,” he replies.  He relays to the 
other two that he has grasped a long flexible tube a few feet off the ground.  The object, 
which none of the men could identify from their own limited perspectives, was an 
elephant.  It announced its presence with a distinctive trumpeting sound emanating from 
its trunk.   The three men had been focusing on the elephant’s side, tusk, and trunk, 
respectively, all parts of the same whole. 
The same phenomenon of limited individual perspectives repeats itself over and 
over every time a problem as complex as social change or a social movement becomes an 
object of analysis for the social sciences and humanities.  Psychologists focus on the 
cognitive changes taking place in individuals in a social movement at any given time.  
The ways in which members of minorities and majorities think about their social status 
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and the attribution of that status is paramount.  Rational choice theorists look at the 
complex costs and benefits that actors in a social movement deal with in determining 
their actions.  Sociologists look at cultural changes spawned by movements and how or 
why formal organizations spin off from them.  Historians chronicle events and the lives 
of individual leaders of movements.  Political Scientists focus on the interaction between 
the various branches of government and social movements.  Philosophers and political 
theorists read the documents produced by movements and study how they establish their 
legitimacy and the validity of arguments they make for their brand of social change.   
Because the origin of the lesbian and gay movement has been told from so many 
different perspectives, this chapter will be necessarily incomplete.  My goal here is to 
give an overview of the historical events that lead to the modern lesbian and gay 
movement, the theoretical understandings of a legitimate society that motivated activists, 
and some of the psychological theories that might lead to better scientific understanding 
of those who participated and continue to participate and which led to movement success.  
These aspects of the lesbian and gay movement are crucial to understanding why 
politicians would eventually court their votes actively despite public opinion.  Several 
books and articles have already been written that go into these events and theories into 
greater detail (Armstrong 2002; D’Emilio 1998, 2000; Clendinen and Nagourney 1999; 
Engel 2001; Jagose 1996; Mucciaroni 2008; Rimmerman 2000, 2002, 2008; Bull and 
Gallagher 1996; Duberman 1993).  I will try to go into enough detail to illuminate the 
historical background of the following empirical chapters, but not to go into so much 
detail so as to delay the analysis of the effects that the lesbian and gay movement had on 
the party system, culture, and ultimately public opinion outlined in the coming chapters. 
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The Conception of Homosexual Identity 
Germany in 1871 is an unlikely place to start a dissertation on American attitudes 
toward lesbians and gays.  But it was in this year the German Empire adopted paragraph 
175, a law criminalizing consensual sex between men (Jagose 1996).  Laws had existed 
prior to this banning homosexuality, but the adoption and debate concerning 
homosexuality shifted during this time period.  The justification for such laws prior to 
this one had been religious in nature.  What the debate concerning paragraph 175 
emphasized, however, was not sin and the act of sodomy itself, but some sort of long-
term characteristic of the individuals who engaged in sodomy. 
The origins of this shift, its relation to the industrial revolution and urbanization, 
and its precise timing, have been much debated.  The rise of the medical community and 
the enlightenment notions of sickness and treatment of disease are major causes of this 
shift (Foucault 1978).  Over the centuries homosexual behavior had been considered at 
most a sinful act and probably something on par with an extramarital affair.  Now with 
the rise of the medical community and concept of treatable disease, the justifications for 
laws against homosexuality had shifted to protecting the community from a sickness.  
Homosexuality was no longer just considered an act engaged in by an individual.  The 
emphasis was now on those who engaged in that act.  They were now suspected of being 
different from other people and, by the medical community, of having a chronic 
biological or mental defect.  As the justification for laws shifted during the enlightenment 
from those justified by religious reasons or by the whims of a monarch, the public good 
became the paramount reason for legislation (Jagose 1996; Foucault 1978).   
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This marks the beginning of the notion of essentialism with regard to 
homosexuality.  The essentialist theory states that homosexuality is not just acts of 
sodomy, but a long term characteristic of the individual who engages in those acts.    
What was a short term moral lapse had now morphed conceptually into a homosexual 
identity for the polity.   An important aspect of essentialism is that the identity has been 
decoupled from the act of sodomy.  An individual could be completely celibate, but still 
be considered a homosexual.   This disjunction marks the birth of the modern notion of 
homosexuality: homosexuality as identity. 
 
World War II, the Kinsey Report, and the Homophile Movement 
Enclaves of homosexuals developed as the population of the country relocated to 
urban areas and immigration swelled most large cities in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in the US.  D’Emilio (1998) cites these changes as the cause of modern 
homosexuality.  Interpersonal contact between homosexuals increased over this time 
period.  As certain bohemian areas became known for having many lesbians and gays, 
more lesbians and gays moved in due to the reputation.  According to D’Emilio, “a small 
but stable group life was forming (p. 22)”. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively World War II effectively gave this process a shot in 
the arm.  Traditional gender roles were ripped asunder as males left for overseas and 
women were mobilized into industry.  The same-sex environment was freeing for many 
homosexuals both in the military and on the home front.  Lasting friendships and 
relationships survived the hostilities (D’Emilio 1998).  These were the social webs that 
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lead to the first rumblings of the lesbian and gay movement (Scagliotti, Schiller, and 
Rosenberg 1985). 
Biological research would soon aid these social webs and deeply undermine the 
justification of laws criminalizing same-sex relations.  In 1948, zoologist Alfred C. 
Kinsey, with Wardell B. Pomeroy and Clyde E. Martin, published the widely read Sexual 
Behavior in the Human Male based on a set of 12,000 interviews performed by the 
authors.  A volume on women followed soon after (Kinsey et al. 1953).  The original 
study argued that the percentage of the public with a homosexual predisposition was 
close to 10%, a figure much greater than previously thought.  Although the study had 
severe methodological flaws, and modern surveys have placed the percentage closer to 
5% (Levay 1996), that number became greatly significant to the homosexual community 
in the United States.  It signified to those who would form the movement that they had a 
potentially large group of compatriots similar in size to that of the Jewish community or 
the size of the Latino community in the United States during that time period.   
The distinctive feature of the Kinsey study was the tone in which the article 
discussed same-sex behavior.  Kinsey theorized sexual behavior as a continuum using a 
seven point scale between exclusively homosexual and exclusively heterosexual.  This is 
different than the previously thought of as discrete identity categories of homosexual and 
heterosexual, although Freud (1995) had theorized that all individuals were bisexual by 
nature (Jagose 1996).    But the larger issue in Kinsey’s work is the normative break he 
makes from the older medical literature. 
The opinion that homosexual activity in itself provides evidence of a 
psychopathic personality is materially challenged by these incidence and 
frequency data.  Of the 40 or 50 per cent of the male population which has 
homosexual experience, certainly a high proportion would not be considered 
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psychopathic personalities on the basis of anything else in their histories.  … 
psychiatrists and clinicians in general might very well re-examine their 
justification for demanding that all persons conform to particular patterns of 
behavior.  As a matter of fact, there is an increasing proportion of the most skilled 
psychiatrists who make no attempt to re-direct behavior, but who devote their 
attention to helping an individual accept himself, … (p.660) 
 
He concludes the chapter entitled ‘Homosexual Outlet’ with the following paragraph: 
 
If all persons with any trace of homosexual history, or those who were 
predominantly homosexual, were eliminated from the population today, there is 
no reason for believing that the incidence of the homosexual in the next 
generation would be materially reduced.  The homosexual has been a significant 
part of human activity ever since the dawn of history, primarily because it is an 
expression of capacities that are basic in the human animal (p.666). 
 
Although Kinsey’s work was scientifically flawed, it affected both the medical 
establishment, where some individuals began to reevaluate the notion of homosexuals as 
holding psychopathic tendencies, and a large number of homosexuals going into 1950s.  
Dr. Evelyn Hooker would later specifically study differences in the psychopathology 
between heterosexuals and homosexuals at the urging of a gay individual and confirm 
Kinsey’s hypothesis (Marcus 2002; Zaller 1992). 
Not long after the Kinsey Report was released, the first formal lesbian and gay 
organizations began forming on the West Coast.  This set of organized and mostly local 
lesbian and gay organizations became known as the homophile movement.  They began 
when a former member of the Communist Party named Harry Hay met with a group of 
his gay friends specifically about creating a political organization for homosexuals 
(D’Emilio 1998).  Although Hay was no longer active in the Communist Party, he drew 
loosely both on the theoretical arguments of Marxism and the organizational skills he had 
learned from the party.  Hay and the early members of his organization developed a class-
based analysis of a society divided by sexual orientation.  ‘Liberation’ would come only 
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from concerted action by the oppressed, in this case homosexuals in place of the 
proletariat.  The organization also believed in educating homosexuals to think of 
themselves as an oppressed minority (D’Emilio 1998; Scaglioitti, Schiller, and Rosenberg 
1985; Engel 2002).  This conceptual innovation adopted from Marxist philosophy is 
similar to the consciousness raising that would later take place in the women’s movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  It would prove later to be crucial in the broader lesbian and gay 
movement that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Their organization became known as the Mattachine Society.  It developed as an 
underground, centralized society based around the Communist Party model.  Members 
would join a cell, and when one cell got too large it would split (D’Emilio 1998).  For an 
unpopular minority that could blend into society easily, this organizational model proved 
extremely effective.  As it developed, it came to thrive throughout most of Southern 
California and branched into the Bay Area.  As time went on, it eventually branched out 
to other major population centers like Chicago and New York City.  Although the 
organization was predominantly male, women were included as well.  Soon a separate 
organization formed in San Francisco for lesbians, the Daughters of Bilitis, and published 
a newsletter, The Ladder (Jagose 1996).  The homophile movement largely became sex 
segregated at least at a local level due to problems incorporating gender differences as 
women left for other homophile organizations (D’Emilio 1998; Clendinen and 
Nagourney 1999).   
More important than the new members’ geographic locations were the different 
backgrounds and demographics of the new members.  Although the early members had 
been leftists and hence outside the political mainstream, newer members were much more 
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diverse in their political views and professions (if not their race and gender).  The new 
membership in Southern California created a schism in the organization.  This was 
between the original members who favored more radical social change on one hand and 
those who believed more or less in the preexisting social order in the United States with 
the exception of the inferior place of homosexuals within that order.  A series of changes 
started to take place within the organization.  First it went above ground and radically 
changed its structure.  Instead of separate cells, the organization now had a traditional 
president, executive committee, and meeting times like most traditional community 
organizations today (D’Emilio 1998). 
The major divergence in outlook between the newcomers and older members 
revolved around what the preferred social identity that the organization should advocate 
for should be.  Should the organization try to articulate the homosexual as a distinct 
social and political identity from mainstream society, one that believes in radical social 
change involving sexual liberalization, non-traditional gender-roles, a more equal society 
between all individuals, and a broad advocacy for social justice?  Or should the 
Mattachine Society try to advocate that homosexuals were no different from other 
members of society except for their choice of sexual partners?  The older and more 
liberal members tended to take the former position, while the newcomers and more 
conservative members (not necessarily in a political sense) tended believe in the later 
(Rimmerman 2002; D’Emilio 2000).  In the end, perhaps because of the conservative 
nature of the 1950s and the political need to distance itself from its communist origins, 
the latter members won out.  Considering the McCarthy hearings would soon take place 
and that homosexuals in general were suspected of aiding communists (Johnson 2004), a 
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change that helped distance the organization from its former communist founders may 
have helped the organization survive (nominally) into the 1960s. 
As an above ground, traditionally-minded advocacy organization, however, the 
Mattachine society proved to be less successful with membership retention and 
recruitment than in the earlier below ground period.  Without a clear message of 
liberation from gay oppression or an affirmative identity and life to advocate for, the 
Mattachine Society survived but stagnated throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  It would 
take an interaction with a much broader network of social movements to rekindle the 
potential of a nationwide lesbian and gay rights movement. 
 
The 1960s and the Creation of the Modern Lesbian and Gay Movement 
 Lesbians and gays could not claim a single national elected official that was 
openly supportive of their rights during the 1950s and 1960s.  Something needed to 
change for the movement to lobby elites effectively.  The activity that changed the 
movement was the development of a collective identity.  This grew its ranks and pushed 
sexuality into a more central psychological role for those involved in it. 
While the 1950s was a conservative decade that inhibited the lesbian and gay 
rights movement, the 1960s would provide a number of factors conducive to a 
widespread surge in its activity.  Chief among these were the tactics developed by other 
identity-based movements like the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement 
(Scagliotti, Schiller, and Rosenberg 1985).  These tactics would help the movement grow 
into a network of organizations capable of lobbying the leaders and elites that held 
influence over public opinion.  The normalization of identity-based advocacy politics in 
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the 1960s made the ideas which proved successful for the radicals in the early Mattachine 
Society less controversial.  In addition, the 1960s had led to a marked liberalization in the 
sexual attitudes of America’s youth.  Although this did not always directly affect social 
mores toward homosexuality, it provided a crucial link between freedom, which all 
Americans support on an abstract level, and sexuality. 
 The Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, and later the Black Power 
movement that emerged all contributed to the lesbian and gay rights movement 
specifically.  A number of tactics that proved successful for these movements spread to 
the lesbian and gay rights movement as new and more radical local organizations formed.  
Most notable, civil disobedience tactics would be used by the new Gay Activists Alliance 
(GAA) which formed in lower Manhattan (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).  In 
Washington, DC members of one of the more liberal branches of Mattachine picketed the 
White House to lobby for an end to discrimination in the civil service against lesbians 
and gays (Engel 2002; Johnson 2004).   
 The key innovation that defined this newer wave of organizations was a devotion 
to articulating a collective identity different from the mainstream.  Feminist, Black, 
Native-American, lesbian, gay, disabled, Latino, Baptist, Irish, or any other category that 
can have social or political meaning could form th basis of an identity movement.  
‘Consciousness raising’ was a crucial part of the movement for gender-based equality and 
was an attempt to make women self-aware of the disadvantages they have in society 
solely due to their identity as woman.  As the black power movement developed, ‘Black 
is Beautiful’ became a simple slogan of affirmation stating that being African-American 
was something of value and an identity that should be respected in society.  Much of the 
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success of an identity-based lesbian and gay movement in the late 1960s can be attributed 
to these other new identity-based social movements.  They rendered the identity-based 
politics that failed in the 1950s for Mattachine more intelligible and adoptable for would-
be activists in the late 1960s.   
 Unlike the conservative message of no-difference between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals that the later Mattachine adopted, identity articulation involves embracing 
the differences and advocating that holding the specific identity is a good thing for 
individuals.  This made it easier to create a subculture among activists that strengthened 
the interdependence of individuals with the activist group and raised its members’ self-
esteem.  For instance, those who claimed ‘Black is Beautiful’ were in most cases 
asserting that being African-American and being proud of being African-American were 
good things for psychological health.  They would also not advocate abandoning Black 
subculture for mainstream American culture in general.  Gay activists even developed a 
similar slogan to ‘Black is Beautiful’ in the late 1960s, ‘Gay is Good’.  The words lesbian 
and gay themselves became popularized in the lesbian and gay subculture as an act of 
identity articulation. 
 Examples of cultural symbols relating to the gay and lesbian movement also date 
to this period, including the intra-movement usage of the terms lesbian and gay and the 
rainbow symbol.  However, the largest evidence of a surge in the lesbian and gay 
movement involves a sharp increase in the number of lesbian and gay organizations that 
developed in this time period and during the 1970s.  These organizations marked the 
expansion of the movement and the growth of a potential for a larger impact on politics. 
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 Elizabeth Armstrong, a sociologist, catalogued the ideological social movement 
frames of several lesbian and gay organizations operating in San Francisco during this 
time period (2002).  Her classification scheme involves categories for the more 
conservative homophile organizations, the more liberal gay liberation organizations that 
emphasized a shared struggle with other identity-based movements of the New Left 
(including the women’s and black power movements), and organizations that specialized 
in developing a shared identity among lesbian and gays without a broader political goal.  
She found that nearly all lesbian and gay related organizations operating in the early and 
mid 1960s San Francisco were homophile organizations.  However, in 1969 and 1970 
organizations affiliated with gay liberation and identity-based politics emerged in San 
Francisco.  By 1971 the numbers of these three different types of organizations were at 
parity.  By 1973, the identity based organizations clearly outnumbered the other two 
types.  As both the conservative homophile movement and the radical New Left declined 
in the late 1970s, the number of lesbian and gay organizations affiliated with these two 
movements evaporated, leaving only the identity-based organizations in their wake.   
Meanwhile, the number of identity-based organizations not affiliated with the 
New Left in San Francisco exploded.  Armstrong noted a few dozen organizations in the 
1970s.  By the 1980s, San Francisco had several hundred.  Accounts of movement 
activity in the urban centers of Manhattan and Los Angeles point to similar patterns, with 
radical gay liberation organizations associated with the New Left (including the GAA 
mentioned above) developing in the late 1960s alongside the remaining homophile 
organizations, and both giving way to less political organizations that emphasized a 
shared social and political identity (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999; Armstrong 2002; 
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D’Emilio 2000; Marcus 2002).  The Stonewall Riots in Manhattan, which took place on 
June 28th, 1969, were both an outpouring of the new collective consciousness of lesbians 
and gays and also a symbol that strengthened that identity and solidified the idea of a 
shared struggle (Duberman 1993; Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).  The rioters were 
identified as lesbians and gays and were demanding an end to police harassment of 
lesbians and gays.  This would have not been possible without a collective identity shared 
by a massive number of individuals. 
 
Why Identity Politics?: Social Identity Theory and Movement Development 
Something had truly changed in the urban centers.  When the number of 
individuals and organizations associated with a group explodes in a short period of time, 
entrepreneurial politicians and leaders take notice.  These organizations and the collective 
identity they created and expanded make them successful and brought more individuals 
into that identity.  Appeals for political support and promises of issue advocacy by 
elected officials become possible.  Why would organizations that emphasized a shared 
identity be so successful in establishing a large social movement that endured, while 
other types of organizations such as the conservative homophile movement and the New 
Left gay liberation movement collapsed?  Understanding the psychological gains versus 
the costs of participation would help us to understand how identity-based movements and 
the individuals involved within those movements are capable of producing lasting and 
dramatic shifts in public opinion, while advocacy organizations involving political issues 
like the redistribution of wealth or government services cannot.  A viable explanation 
comes from social identity theory. 
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Social identity theory and its successor, self-categorization theory, were 
developed by Tajfel and Turner (1986) in an effort to describe human behavior 
concerning the relationship between collective (or group) identities and personal 
individual identities.  They sought to understand when individuals sometimes act as 
interchangeable members of a group (soldiers in an army, rioters in a crowd, or members 
of a political party) and when they act as individuals divorced from the groups that they 
are members in.  Turner and Tajfel originally proposed social identity theory as a solution 
to understand the collective behavior of groups. 
 The key aspect of social identity theory involves thinking of a specific collective 
identity and an individual’s personal identity as if they were at two ends of a continuum 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986).  Depending on the salience of the social identity to the 
individual in a specific context, they will think and behave as if they were a stereotypical 
member of a group, or, if their collective identities were not salient, as an individual.  
Individuals also seek a positive social identity, one with prestige and esteem.  A positive 
social identity is based on favorable comparisons between social groups.  When an 
individual is a member of a group viewed as unfavorable by society, she or he will either 
seek to leave the group, compare their group with the other group on a different 
dimension, or engage in a social conflict in order to change the social value of their 
group.  To the extent that a society is marked by a belief system that incorporates 
mobility between groups based on effort, hard work, or luck, group membership and 
identities should be less central to the society.  If individuals believe that there is little to 
no social mobility between groups then identity categories, and stereotypes based on 
them, will pervade and dominant social life.   
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 Turner (Turner et al. 1987; Turner 1991) proposed self-categorization theory as a 
refinement on social identity theory.  While social identity theory, as it was originally 
proposed, was an effort to describe intergroup relations, self-categorization theory is an 
attempt to describe the psychology of individuals and their relationship to shared 
collective identities.  It maintains the idea of a continuum between social and personal 
identities for individuals.  Collective identities are shared social categories that an 
individual can classify himself or herself as.  To the extent that a self-classification as a 
member of a shared collective identity is made salient, an individual will behave as if a 
stereotypical member of that group.  Which self-category is salient is related to its fit to 
the situation a person is in.  There are two aspects to fit, comparative and normative.  
Comparative fit is defined by the meta-contrast principle.  When the differences between 
groups on a specific dimension are larger than the differences inside a group, there is a 
high meta-contrast, and group identity has a higher comparative fit.  When the 
differences within groups are larger than the differences between groups there is a low 
meta-contrast and group identity is less likely.  Normative fit involves the 
correspondence between the stereotypical aspects of the groups and the individuals’ 
expectations of those stereotypes from past experiences.  When fit is high and the 
collective identity of a group is made salient, we should see the behavior of the group 
converge as compared to situations when personal identity is salient. 
 Social identity theory appears to explain the successful nature of an identity-based 
gay and lesbian politics in the following way.  Recall that individuals seek a positive self-
identity.  By emphasizing that gays and lesbians have a significant shared social and 
political identity, and a positive shared identity, the lesbian and gay movement was able 
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to raise the self-esteem of its individual members (“Gay is Good”).  Once the identity was 
established and reinforced in small social groups, it spread in a rapid fashion both during 
the early period of the Mattachine Society in Southern California and later in the major 
urban centers in San Francisco, Manhattan, and West Los Angeles in the late 1960s (the 
Stonewall Riots) and early 1970s.  The New Left gay liberation organizations and the 
more insular gay-identity organizations that developed immediately after them both 
thrived on an identity-based politics.  However, gay liberation organizations required a 
more active membership devoted to a wider range of social justice issues than just 
articulating a lesbian or gay identity.  As the new left collapsed, only the more narrow 
organizations that focused solely on a gay identity survived and thrived.  The New Left 
organizations required much more activity than the other identity-based organization but 
had a similar payoff in self-esteem. 
 The identity based organizations proved so successful that lesbian and gay 
subcultures developed almost overnight in the major urban centers.  Homosexuals 
interacting and going to bars in these places were nothing new.  However what had been 
an underground of informal social and sexual networks spread and transformed into 
something more.   
 
Conclusion 
The late 1960s and the rise of lesbian and gay-based organizations in that time 
period likely increased the salience of that identity for homosexuals.  This was especially 
the case in the urban centers that housed the majority of these organizations.  This 
strengthened identity would led to more organizations which would strengthen the 
36 
 
identities of more individuals in a cycle that reinforced itself until nearly all homosexuals 
who were not completely predisposed against thinking of themselves as lesbian or gay for 
religious or moral reasons had adopted a lesbian or gay identity in San Francisco, 
Manhattan, and west Los Angeles.  
With a shared identity, an identity that could provide a basis for activism, politics, 
and political mobilization, politicians in these regions could now make appeals to those 
who held the new identity for money, support, volunteers, and, most important to 
politicians, votes.  The focus of the next chapter involves the changing behavior of elites 
in urban centers in response to this new identity. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 
 
The shift in focus by lesbian and gay activists to an identity-based movement built 
on the examples of the Civil Rights movement, the women’s movement, and other 
movements of the New Left has resulted in the creation of a lesbian and gay subculture 
now self-aware of its minority and subordinate status.  This shared collective identity 
gave politicians in urban centers a new tool through which to appeal for votes in return 
for advocating for the group’s interests.  This chapter analyzes support for lesbian and 
gay issues among members of Congress and, in particular, the House of Representatives.   
 It should be keep in mind that although a number of representatives became 
supportive of lesbian and gay issues in the 1970s, the broader public’s attitude towards 
lesbians and gays had not yet begun to liberalize.  Politicians, even those in San 
Francisco and Manhattan, would be taking a risk by coming out in favor of lesbian and 
gay rights.  In the atmosphere of the 1970s, such support, even if it resulted in winning a 
local election, may come back to haunt a politician if they desired to run for statewide 
office even in New York and California.  In fact the first two politicians to seek the 
lesbian and gay vote actively would both run for statewide office later in their careers.  
 Because of the group’s unpopularity, the lesbian and gay community itself was 
surprised when Diane Feinstein showed up at a candidate’s night for the Society for 
Individuals Rights (or SIR), a gay organization, and affirmed her support for the equal 
rights of lesbians and gays in 1969.  Feinstein was running for the board of supervisors of 
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San Francisco (Armstrong 2002; Bailey 1999).  Similarly, Bella Abzug, a women’s rights 
advocate in Manhattan, went as far as to campaign in gay bath houses during a run for 
New York’s 19th congressional district in 1970 (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).  Both 
were ultimately successful.   
Something had changed in Manhattan and San Francisco  A collective identity 
among gays and lesbians now allowed politicians to target appeals specifically towards 
this emerging identity group by promising support for lesbian and gay rights.   Because of 
the shift to an identity-based politics in the lesbian and gay community, they would 
receive a sizable bloc of votes in return.  This was simply not possible prior to the shifts 
that took place in the movement in the late 1960s.  In this earlier era, seeking support of 
gays and lesbians would have been interpreted by the broader public (and even by some 
homosexuals) as akin to campaigning for the votes of felons or psychopaths.  Although a 
scattered number of activists had adopted a lesbian or gay identity prior to the late 1960s, 
the number was likely small enough so as not to motivate a change in behavior by liberal 
activists running for political office.   
The concentration of homosexuals in New York City and the Bay Area of 
California—in combination with the shift to an identity-based movement—drastically 
expanded the number of members of Congress susceptible to such appeals.  Although 
western Los Angeles also had a large number of homosexuals and a spike in movement 
activity (Clendinen and Nagourney 1999), the geographical and demographic vastness of 
the city likely diluted the impact of potential lesbian and gay votes.  This may explain the 
lack of a candidate like Feinstein or Abzug in Los Angeles, although a successful 
political action committee had developed in L.A. to support lesbian and gay friendly 
39 
 
candidates by 1977 (Clendinon and Nagourney 1999).  San Francisco and Manhattan, in 
contrast to Los Angeles and Chicago, are bordered on three sides by bodies of water.  
Geographic concentration led to a greater per capita density of gays and lesbians in the 
electorate. 
 It was from New York and San Francisco that support for lesbian and gay rights 
would spread among other federal elected officials.  In 1975, Abzug introduced the first 
gay-rights bill.  The introduction itself was primarily symbolic.  Most observers knew 
that gay rights were nowhere near popular enough to survive a House roll-call vote.  The 
original bill, in fact, only had 23 co-sponsors.  The most notable and interesting part of 
the co-sponsors was their complete lack of geographic diversity.  Of the 23, 10 hailed 
from New York City and 6 from the San Francisco Bay Area.  Of those from outside 
these cities, one was from Minneapolis, two from Massachusetts (including Rep. Gerry 
Studds, who would later be outed as the first openly gay member of the House), one was 
from west Los Angeles, one was from Denver, and one was from Philadelphia.  District 
urbanicity seemed to dominate early support for the bill (Endean and Eaklor 2006).  This 
also explains why the Abzug gay rights bill found little support in the rural-dominated 
United States Senate. 
 For the next decade the only legislation involving lesbian and gay rights in the 
House was the gay rights bill which was introduced in every Congress until 1993.  The 
various bills were nearly identical to the original Abzug bill (Endean and Eaklor 2006).   
To more systematically examine the propensity for legislators to co-sponsor this 
gay rights bill, I estimated a logistic regression of cosponsorship from the period 1974-
1992 for every separate congress.  As implied above, I hypothesize that urban legislators 
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are more likely to co-sponsor gay rights bills, though I also anticipate that other factors 
will be important like Black Caucus membership, party, and the Democratic percentage 
of the presidential vote.  Figures 3-1 and 3-2 present the results of several logistic 
regression model used to determine what factors led to cosponsorship of the bill over 
time (for the full model, please consult the appendix).  The dependent variable is coded 1 
if the legislator cosponsored the bill, and coded 0 if the legislator did not. The 
independent variables at the district level used in the analysis were the percentage of the 
congressional district classified as urban, the percentage of individuals over age 65 in the 
district, the median district family income (in thousands), and the percentage vote for the 
Democratic nominee in the last presidential election.  Variables specific to the member of 
Congress include membership in the black caucus, party, seniority, and civil rights 
support as measured by the LCCR (or Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) score for 
the member.1  The black caucus variable is coded 1 if the legislator was in the CBC 
(Congressional Black Caucus) and 0 otherwise.  The party variables codes Democrats as 
1 and others as 0.  The seniority variable is the total number of terms served by the 
member of Congress.  The civil rights support variable ranges from 0 to 100, with larger 
values indicating greater support for civil rights legislation as defined by the LCCR.  
A different regression was estimated for each Congress from the 94th Congress 
(1975-76) to the 102nd Congress (1991-1992).  The regressions are displayed in Table 3-1 
and Figures 3-1 and 3-2.  The upper panel of Figure 3-1 plots the magnitude of 
coefficient of black caucus membership over time for each regression.  The lower panel  
                                                          
1 The majority of the Democraphic Data came from E. Scott Adler’s website: 
http://sobek.colorado.edu/~esadler/Congressional_District_Data.html. Presidential election data was 
coded from various editions of the Almanac of American Politics. 
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Figure 3-1: Changing Effects of Race and District Urbanicity in Predicting 
Cosponsorship of the Gay Rights Bill: 1974-1992 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Changing Effects of Party and District Presidential Vote in Predicting 
Cosponsorship of the Gay Rights Bill: 1974-1992 
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Table 3-1: The Changing Basis of Support for the Gay Rights Bill in Congress 
Congress Intercept   Urbanicity   Black Rep.   Party   
 Param. S.E  Param S.E.  Param. S.E  Param S.E.  
94th -11.82 3.083 *** 0.074 0.027 ** -0.985 0.851  0.984 1.253  
95th -16.98 3.592 *** 0.06 0.027 * 1.017 0.81  0.012 1.083  
96th -11.05 2.607 *** 0.039 0.014 ** 1.201 0.826  -1.238 0.808  
97th -11.98 2.182 *** 0.046 0.016 * 2.274 0.988 * 2.2 0.957 * 
98th -13.14 2.493 *** 0.033 0.011 * 0.842 0.72  0.595 0.909  
99th -12.29 1.803 *** 0.025 0.011 * 0.241 0.804  3.114 0.795 *** 
100th -13.64 2.046 *** 0.02 0.01 * -0.263 0.759  2.095 0.92 * 
101st -13.39 2.103 *** 0.012 0.01  -0.021 0.734  0.694 0.696  
102nd -17.31 2.11 *** 0.025 0.01 * -1.45 0.857 @ 3.525 0.705 *** 
             
Congress Dem 
Pres. 
Vote 
  District 
Education 
  District 
Income 
  LCCR 
Score 
  
 Param. S.E  Param S.E.  Param. S.E  Param S.E.  
94th 0.047 0.022 * 0.235 0.064 ** -0.537 0.193 ** 0.038 0.02 @ 
95th 0.057 0.029 * 0.141 0.057 * -0.001 0.191  0.058 0.021 ** 
96th 0.016 0.023  0.077 0.053  -0.141 0.172  0.086 0.18 *** 
97th 0.006 0.022  0.209 0.056 *** -0.159 0.162  0.044 0.011 *** 
98th 0.054 0.029 @ 0.154 0.039 *** -0.075 0.071  0.058 0.014 *** 
99th 0.073 0.021 *** 0.147 0.039 *** -0.008 0.066  0.009 0.004 * 
100th 0.069 0.021 *** 0.151 0.038 *** -0.062 0.064  0.053 0.016 *** 
101st 0.074 0.023 *** 0.119 0.038 ** -0.038 0.067  0.064 0.015 *** 
102nd 0.151 0.025 *** 0.188 0.041 *** 0.073 0.067  0.002 0.005  
             
Congress Seniority   Cox and 
Snell 
  % Correctly      
 Param. S.E  R^2   Predicted   Years   
94th -0.109 0.041 * 0.186   94.9%   75-76   
95th -0.035 0.031  0.236   92.5%   77-78   
96th -0.035 0.028  0.302   90.0%   79-80   
97th -0.006 0.024  0.327   90.2%   81-82   
98th -0.02 0.022  0.343   87.3%   83-84   
99th -0.019 0.021  0.335   87.6%   85-86   
100th -0.008 0.019  0.341   86.8%   97-88   
101st 0.005 0.019  0.363   87.6%   89-90   
102nd -0.071 0.22 ** 0.449   87.2%   91-92   
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plots the effect of district urbanicity over time.  Figure 3-2 is similar.  The upper panel 
plots the effect of the party affiliation of the member overtime, while the lower panel 
looks at the change in the effect of district partisanship as measured by Democratic  
presidential vote.   
As the bottom panel of Figure 3-1 shows, the effect of district urbanicity was 
most pronounced when the gay rights bill was first introduced during the 94th Congress.  
The magnitude of the coefficient declines almost monotonically until the 101st Congress.  
Membership in the Congressional Black Caucus, while not being significant when the bill 
was first introduced, has a sizable effect in favor of support in the late 1970s and peaks in 
the early 1980s (even when controlling for civil rights support and district urbanicity).  
This is likely due to the association between the lesbian and gay rights movement and the 
later period of the African-American civil rights and Black Power movements as allied 
movements of the New Left.  Some of the earliest support for gay rights came from Black 
members of Congress, which testifies to the linkages between the two movements, at 
least among elites. 
 However the association between the New Left, district urbanicity, and 
congressional support for lesbian and gay rights wanes in the later part of the 1980s.  
Another set of factors surges in importance.  In Figure 3-2 we see what replaces these 
factors.  Partisanship, both at the district and member level, appears to profoundly effect 
support for the gay rights bill in the 1980s. 
 To understand this shift, we need to consider how the lesbian and gay movement 
changed from the early 1970s to the 1980s.  The nexus of lobbying for support of the gay 
rights bill was no longer taking place within the world of the liberal, urban districts.   The 
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gay liberation movement of the New Left had withered at a mass level and had been 
replaced by the more insular identity-articulation based organizations during the mid-to-
late1970s.  Urban members susceptible to lobbying by identity-based organizations in 
urban enclaves were, for the most part, already co-sponsors of the gay rights bill by this 
time.  However, a different type of organization rose up to replace the gay liberation and 
homophile organizations as they lost membership.  These new organizations no longer 
needed a broad membership base to function, but instead required only a smaller base of 
donors to operate.  These organizations were no longer social movement organizations, 
but were spun off by the movement.  They were classic Washington based interest groups 
and they had changed the relationship between members of Congress and the lesbian and 
gay movement. 
 The first of these was the National Gay Task Force founded in 1974, and later 
renamed the National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce (NGLTF) (Clendinen and Nagourney 
1999).  This organization would become more of a think tank, and was eclipsed by the 
currently largest pro-lesbian and gay lobbying operation, the Human Rights Campaign 
(HRC).  The Human Rights Campaign Fund, the original name of the HRC, was founded 
in 1980 and by 1982 had given $140,000 to candidates (Endean and Eaklor 2006).  Of the 
118 candidates given money in that cycle, the overwhelming majority were Democrats.  
This trend continued and by 2008, $1,215,425 of the $1,268,464 given out by HRC to 
candidates went to Democrats.  This represented funds given to 187 Democrats and only 
6 Republicans.  Indeed, from 1990 to 2008 the level of organizational giving of the HRC 
to Democrats never dropped below 84% (Opensecrets.org 2009).   
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 If the HRC gave to candidates based on party explicitly or if another factor that 
distinguished Democrats from Republicans led to this behavior, it would be difficult to 
tell.  Several factors may have led to an illusion of partisan-based giving.  In terms of 
ideology, most of the supporters who cosponsored the gay rights bill were solidly liberal 
in terms of their DW-NOMINATE scores.  Giving donations to individuals who were 
moderately liberal in hopes of swinging members neutral on lesbian and gay rights would 
involve giving donations to Democrats.  Furthermore, the election of President Reagan 
brought a number of socially conservative activists into the Republican Party base.  
While the relationship between social conservatives opposed to lesbian and gay rights 
and the Republicans strengthened, it may have resulted in a tactical decision by 
organizations like the NGLTF and HRC to focus on the Democratic Party due to its 
tradition of support for minority rights after the 1960s.  The AIDS crisis and the Reagan 
Administration’s slow response to the crisis intensified these perceptions.  What had 
started as an urban issue in the 1970s was increasingly becoming a partisan issue by the 
1980s. 
 Changes in the gay and lesbian movement outside of Washington likely 
intensified this divide.  As the years went on, the lesbian and gay identity-based 
movement that had started and thrived in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York 
branched out to homosexuals across the country.  Smaller pockets of lesbians and gays 
now voted their identity and voted in Democratic primaries across the country because of 
the same political forces that led the HRC to give most of their money to Democrats 
(Hertzog 1996).  In the 1970s, local gay organizations in New York, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles had provided funds and volunteers to local candidates.  By the 1980s and 
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early 1990s lesbian and gay volunteers could likely be found all over the country among 
activist Democrats, and the HRC and NGLTF provided campaign funds to Democratic 
candidates nationally.  The gay subculture could also spread more effectively outside of 
the cities through specialized magazines and newsletters.  Bars and community centers 
outside of the urban centers had also become less secretive and more political. 
 The collective behavior of elected Democrats shifted in response to the increase in 
interest group activity and the geographic spread of the lesbian and gay identity.  In terms 
of the gay rights bill introduced in each Congress, Figure 3-2 shows this rise of 
partisanship among members of Congress in support for lesbian and gay rights.  Although 
gay rights were still unpopular with the public, Democrats knew if they supported lesbian 
and gay rights they would be rewarded with concrete resources for their campaigns.  
Furthermore, the Democrats were likely reassured by the very low salience of the issue 
among most but not all of the public (Hillygus and Shields 2004). 
 Although the shift in congressional behavior was important, the most important 
shift was in the behavior of presidential candidates.  In 1988, the lesbian and gay 
movement donated money to the campaign of Michael Dukakis, the Democratic nominee 
for presiden.  In displaying how Democratic candidates who faced a national 
constituency reacted to lesbian and gay support prior to the 1990s, he returned the 
donation rather than accept the money and be linked to an extremely unpopular minority 
(Clendinen and Nagourney 1999).   
By 1992, however, something had changed.  In his quest to win the Democratic 
nomination and reach out to liberals who may be turned off by a Southern governor, Bill 
Clinton not only accepted campaign funds from lesbians and gay, but promised if elected 
47 
 
to champion lesbian and gay rights.  He even went so far as to appoint a gay man to his 
campaign’s National Executive Committee.  Clinton went on to win the nomination with 
the support of lesbians and gays in the primaries.  In his acceptance speech at the 1992 
convention, Clinton mentioned his support for AIDS funding and his opposition to the 
cultural politics starting to develop within the Republican Party at the time.  Support for 
lesbians and gays had now reached the highest level of the Democratic Party. 
 At the same time, the Republicans went in the opposite direction.  The moderate 
George H.W. Bush had won his primary in 1992 after a tough contest from the right 
wing.  Patrick Buchanan, his primary opponent, was allowed to speak at the Republican 
National Convention as part of an attempt at bringing the conservative and moderate 
wings of the party together after the divisive primary. In what is regarded as one of the 
opening salvos of the culture war, he said the following to the convention: 
Yes, we disagreed with President Bush, but we stand with him for freedom to 
choice religious schools, and we stand with him against the amoral idea that gay 
and lesbian couples should have the same standing in law as married men and 
women. … There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of 
America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as 
was the Cold War itself. And in that struggle for the soul of America, Clinton and 
Clinton are on the other side, and George Bush is on our side. And so, we have to 
come home, and stand beside him. 
 
 The 1992 election and the coming don’t-ask-don’t tell (DADT) controversy had 
permanently linked the lesbian and gay identity to the Democratic Party.  Likewise social 
conservatives had a clear home with the Republican Party after 1992.  From this point on, 
it would be very difficult to  turn back from the process towards a secular Democratic 
Party and Religious Republican Party that had begun after the rejection of the spiritual 
southern Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1980 and prior. 
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Bill Clinton, Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Tell, and the Republican Revolution 
The election of Bill Clinton later that year created the first real opportunity for 
lesbian and gay rights to become law at a federal level.  Both chambers of Congress were 
controlled by the increasingly pro-gay Democratic Party.  A president who had taken a 
pro-gay position in front of the electorate had triumphed at the polls.  Because of this, 
beginning in the 103rd Congress (1993-95), the gay rights bill, which had always been a 
symbolic piece of omnibus legislation, was subdivided into many separate bills with a 
better chance of passing.  The core of it, employment protections for lesbians and gays, 
became the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).  Other separate parts 
included an end to the ban on gays in the military and legislation inserting protections 
based on sexual orientation into existing hate-crimes laws. 
Earlier in the chapter, I analyzed a basic logistic regression model to predict the 
likelihood of cosponsoring the one gay rights bill introduced in every Congress from 
1974-1992.  While few gay and lesbian rights bills came up for a floor vote during the 
1990s, many more bills emerged during the rest of the 1990s than in the pre-Clinton era.  
Because of this increasing diversity of legislative behavior and the legislative agenda 
involving lesbian and gay rights policy, support can no longer be measured 
dichotomously just by cosponsorship of the one gay rights bill in each Congress.   
Thus, I introduce a new measure of legislative ideology based on the propensity 
of legislators to co-sponsor the multiplicity of gay rights bills in Congress.  This new 
measure is derived using a Bayesian statistical procedure.  Using this procedure I 
estimated relative legislative policy liberalism along a lesbian and gay dimension for 
three time periods for each member of the House.  The three time periods were prior to 
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the 1992 election (the 100th Congress through the 102nd Congress or 1987-1992), after the 
1992 election (the 103rd through the 105th Congress or 1993-2000), and the remaining 
years of Republican control of the House (the 106th through 109th Congress or 2000-
2006).  These time periods were selected to get a sense how members of congress voted 
on lesbian and gay rights issues before the election of Bill Clinton and his leadership on 
lesbian and gay rights, after the election of Clinton when attitude liberalization was 
taking place, and after Clinton had left office. 
 
Estimating Lesbian and Gay Rights Support in Congress 
 The rise of ideal point estimation techniques, which can be used to measure 
policy support in Congress more accurately, has revolutionized the study of roll-call 
voting.  Ideal point estimates are based on the spatial model of voting by members of 
Congress, and are often used by scholars as proxy measures for legislator ideology in a 
particular issue space.  Because the number of roll-call votes in each two year Congress 
may run into the hundreds or thousands, the accuracy of the estimation of a single 
dimensional ideal point (or measure of policy liberalism or conservatism) for each 
member of Congress on every roll call in a given Congress is very high (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997, 2007; Poole 2005).  A problem can develop, however, when an attempt 
is made to estimate ideal points on issue dimensions in which the number of votes in each 
congress is limited or non-existent.  Examples of these issue domains might be trade 
policy, women’s rights, support or opposition to unions, or any other limited subset of the 
congressional agenda.  This problem is compounded by possible shifts in the legislative 
agenda from year to year.  These shifts, while having a small impact on ideal points 
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estimated from the entire roll-call matrix over a congress, may have a rather large impact 
on the estimation of ideal points using the handful of votes in a specific policy domain 
per year.  While scholars have identified that problems with the conventional ideal-point 
models exist in small legislatures (e.g., Peress forthcoming), no one has provided an 
ideal-point model suitable to issue areas with an extreme paucity of roll-call votes. 
 I solve this small-votes problem by introducing a new ideal point estimation 
procedure that incorporates information on legislators’ revealed preferences based on (1) 
roll calls, as other models have done; and (2) based on cosponsorship, which other ideal-
point models have not considered.  The decision to vote ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ on a floor vote and 
the decision to co-sponsor a bill reveals information about where the legislator lies on an 
issue dimension, yet previous ideal-point models have only relied upon roll-call data. 
 I use a second data source here, co-sponsorship information, in order to estimate 
ideal points on a narrow policy domain over time more accurately.   This is because few 
votes occur on lesbian and gay rights issues each congress.  The estimation of ideal points 
solely from a roll-call voting matrix is thus problematic.  While I apply my ideal-point 
model to an analysis of gay and lesbian rights votes, it can be used to estimate ideal 
points for any issue dimension in which there are few roll calls.  This method is likely to 
be of use to a number of scholars interested in specific issue dimensions in Congress. 
 Incorporating co-sponsorship information into an ideal point model solves 
several problems, or at least mitigates them.  First and most importantly, it provides an 
additional behavioral manifestation of the underlying ideal point or level of policy 
support for usage in the statistical estimation.  The act of cosponsoring a piece of 
legislation and actively being listed in support of the legislation can contain every bit as 
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much information as a roll-call vote.  Second, any member can introduce legislation and 
gather cosponsors.  This means that, unlike roll-call votes, the introduction of bills is not 
regulated by the majority party, congressional leadership, or similar agenda setters within 
the chamber.  Because co-sponsorship is not as subject to agenda setting as roll-call 
voting, it theoretically should provide a more reliable and stable source of data for the 
estimation of dynamic, or time-varying, ideal points.  Consider an admittedly extreme 
example. If the majority party only allows bills that every majority party member 
supports to the floor for a vote, all majority party members would have the same ideal 
point.  The set of all introduced and co-sponsored legislation is less vulnerable to a shift 
in agenda setting as compared to the roll-call record.  This is especially important for 
narrow issue areas with limited numbers of roll-call votes per congress.   
 Most measures of policy support for individual members of Congress are 
created by interest-groups.  These scores, such as those created by American for 
Democratic Action (ADA), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), or the National Organization for Women (NOW), are created from a 
subset of roll-call votes in order to signal to constituents, activists, and donors which 
members of Congress are supportive of policies favored by that interest group. 
 Lacking a more objective measure, political scientists began using these scores 
compiled by interest groups as measures of congressional ideology on a liberal-
conservative dimension, particularly those compiled by the ADA and Congressional 
Quarterly.  However, several problems existed with these measures (Poole 2005).  First, 
interest groups were the sole arbitrators of which specific subset of votes were used in the 
creation of the scores.  Interest groups could easily select votes and add bias to their 
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scores by selecting votes in such a way as to reward and punish specific members 
regardless of their policy support (Fowler 1982).  Second, the policy agenda could shift 
from year to year creating problems in the reliability of the scores. In some years, there 
may be few extremely liberal bills, while in other years a large number of extremely 
liberal bills may be used.  Moderately liberal members who do not always support 
extremely liberal legislation would see their scores shift more conservative based on the 
number of extremely liberal bills used in the measure, even if their was no change in their 
underlying preferences for liberal legislation.  This is an artifact of the additive method of 
compiling scores typically used by interest groups.  Lastly, these scores contain no 
uncertainty estimates based on either their measurement or estimation. 
 For these reasons, political scientists moved beyond raw interest group scores 
and began developing their own methods for assessing the revealed ideology of members 
of Congress using the complete set of roll-call votes.  The complete set of roll calls was 
not susceptible to the decisions of an interest group and spanned a much wider number of 
issues than any specific score.  These new sets of scores were based on item response 
theory (IRT), which was developed to simultaneously assess student ability and question 
difficultly (Johnson and Albert 1999) on standardized tests.  The two most seminal of 
these techniques are those developed by Poole and Rosenthal (DW-NOMINATE) and 
those developed by Jackman, Clinton, and Rivers using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) IRT model (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2005; Clinton, Jackman, 
and, Rivers 2004; see also Bailey 2007; Bertelli and Grose 2009 and Martin and Quinn 
2002).  These models and the ideal points they produced solved many of the problems 
associated with interest-group ratings above, and today they have largely replaced the use 
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of interest groups scores as measures of voting ideology for members of Congress in the 
academic literature.   
 However, these techniques become more susceptible to error as the number of 
roll-call votes analyzed becomes smaller.  Although contemporary roll-call voting 
behavior is marked be a strong unidimensionality (Poole 2005), smaller policy domains 
are often of great substantive importance and may not be captured completely by the 1st 
dimension DW-NOMINATE score or the 1st dimension from another roll-call derived 
measure estimated from the entire roll-call voting matrix for a specific Congress. 
 
The Ideal Point Model 
 In order to estimate policy support scores from both cosponsorship information 
and roll-call votes, the model begins with the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
method outlined by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004).  If a member is liberal and a 
bill is liberal, we should expect a relatively high probability that that member will 
cosponsor that bill and vice-versa for conservative members and bills.  In order to 
estimate the model, I use the number of days from the introduction of a bill to when a 
specific member cosponsors a bill as my dependent variable, and modeled it as an event 
history: 
#Days ~ exp(Propensity) 
Propensity =  γh*(Bill Liberalism*Member Liberalism+ 
  Bill Conservativism*Member Conservativism) 
 
where exp is the exponential distribution.  γh is a parameter measuring the non-
ideological factors specific to a bill leading a member to cosponsor.  The exponential is 
used for count data where each time period has an equal probability of a cosposorship, in 
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this case days.  The majority of cosponsorships occur on the first day a bill is introduced, 
meaning this affects the ideal point estimates derived only slightly. 
 By defining Bill Liberalism ≡ [1- Bill Conservativism] and Member Liberalism ≡ 
[2µx-Member Conservativism], we can estimate this model easily using the Bayesian 
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm.  µx is a number close to the mean of the ideal 
points chosen to keep all the terms positive for use in the exponential distribution which 
cannot take negative arguments mathematically. 
 More formally the model for cosponsorhip data along with my specification for  
 
Bayesian priors is:  
 
   #Daysih ~ exp(Pih) 
   Pih= γh*((Lh*xi)+(1-Lh)*(200-xi)) 
    xi~normal(100,.1) 
    Lh~uniform(0,1) 
    γh~uniform(0,1) 
   i signifies legislators, h signifies bills to cosponsor 
 
Lh and γh are all Parameter specific to the bill relating to their propensity to be 
cosponsored in a partisan and non-partisan manner respectively.  Pih is the propensity of 
the ith legislature to cosponsor the hth bill. They are both given a uniform prior 
distribution.  The xi are the bill points for the legislature and are given a normal prior 
distribution.  This model was coded into the BUGS language used by the program 
WinBUGS for and this code was inserted into the preexisting model published by 
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers for the estimation of an ideal point model based on roll-call 
data.  The ideal points based on the two types of data were then estimated based on my 
exponential model for cosponsorship and Clinton, Jackman, and River’s logit model for 
roll-call votes simultaneously.  I estimated 20,000 MCMC iterations (with 1000 burn-in) 
in WINBugs for the three time periods listed above.   
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Data on cosponsorship were obtained from James Fowler’s website, 
http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosposorship.htm.  Data on roll-call voting were obtained from 
www.voteview.com.  A list of roll-call votes involving lesbian and gay issues came from 
Haider-Markel (1999), the Human Rights Campaign scorecards for various years, and a 
search of THOMAS, the library of Congress’s online legislative database, for keywords 
involving lesbian and gay issues.  The same search of THOMAS for keywords was used 
to determine what bills should be selected for inclusion in the set of cosponsored 
legislation introduced in Congress that involved lesbian and gay issues.  Any bill that 
came up for a roll-call vote that included cosponsors was also added to the list. 
 Finally, in order to bridge between Congresses, I assume that Rep. Nancy Pelosi, 
who represents San Francisco in the House and always supports lesbian and gay rights 
had a policy support score of 105.  This was the time period prior to her becoming House 
Speaker.  Likewise I assumed that two conservative members from Arizona, Rep. Jeff 
Flake and Rep. Bob Stump, who tend to nearly always vote against gay rights, had a 
score of 95.  This allows for a weak comparison of the scores over time, as long as these 
members did not shift their positions sharply on gay rights issue and the difference 
between Stump and Flake, who represented the same conservative district, are small.  
Thus, the ideal point estimates will range from approximately 95 to 105, with larger 
values being more liberal.  However, point estimates for each legislator can lie outside of 
the 95 to 105 range as Flake and Pelosi are simply used as baselines by which to estimate 
a comparable scale over time and across legislators.  These values of 95 and 105 are akin 
to the poles of +1 and -1 used in other ideal-point models (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2009; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997). 
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These ideal point estimates (which I also call legislative support scores) display 
remarkable face validity.  For instance, the most liberal member on gay rights in the first 
and last period was Rep. Pete Stark from the San Francisco Bay Area.  Stark is a self-
declared atheist.  Rep. Barney Frank, an openly gay Democrat from Massachusetts, is 
among the most liberal members on gay rights in each time period.  Furthermore, Rep. 
Jim Kolbe, a Republican from Arizona who declared he was gay in 104th Congress, 
showed a increased liberalization on gay rights after this event.  In the earliest time period 
he was at the middle of the scale on lesbian and gay rights issues.  This corresponds to 
being moderate on gay rights for a Republican, but still conservative when compared to 
Democrats.  However, by the latter period he had become markedly more liberal on 
lesbian and gay rights and his behavior was indistinguishable from that of a liberal 
Democrat.  In fact, it is not even statistically different from that of Rep. Stark in the later 
period. 
The top half of Figure 3-3 shows the density of policy support for the two major 
parties for the first time period (1986-92), while the bottom half of the figure shows the 
density for the last time period (2001-2006).  Blue signifies the Democratic legislators 
and red signifies the Republican legislators.  Figure 3-4 plots the legislative support of 
each member of Congress on lesbian and gay rights on the vertical axis for the three  
periods in question.  A blue line connects a specific Democratic member’s support from 
one time period to the next.  In a similar fashion, Republicans are plotted using red lines.  
In this way aggregate change in the parties’ support for lesbian and gay rights could be 
analyzed by looking at this figure.  
The two figures show a marked change in the behavior of Republicans and 
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Figure 3-3: Density Estimates of Gay and Lesbian Policy Support for the Pre-Clinton 
House (1986-1992) and Contemporary House (1999-2006) 
 
 
 
conservative Democrats from their behavior prior to the 1992 election.  The Republicans, 
while very heterogeneous in their support prior to the 1992 election, had consolidated at 
an anti-gay position thereafter.   
Two major reasons likely led to this consolidation.  The first is the desire to 
appeal to the growing base of religious and social conservative activists who were 
flocking to the party after the 1992 campaign.  Republican members running for 
Congress had incentives to move their individual support rightward on gay issues to 
appeal to these activists in a similar manner to the Democrats’ leftward movement in 
the1980s.  The second factor took place at the start of the 104th Congress (1995).   
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Figure 3-5: The Marginal Effect of Ideology (DW-NOMINATE) in Predicting Pro-
Lesbian and Gay Policy Support in Congress by Party and Time Period 
 
 
Republicans had won control of Congress in the 1994 election in a small part due to 
backlash over Clinton’s association with lesbians and gays due to DADT2.  As stated 
above, they also had a strong need to appeal to religious activists not as individual 
members but now as a party.  Now that Republicans had control of the House, moderate 
bills that divided the GOP on gay rights issues could be keep off the floor.  The result of 
keeping moderate bills on gay rights off the floor would be an image of the Republican 
Party as more conservative on lesbian and gay rights than it had been prior to Republican 
                                                          
2 Other factors included healthcare, the budget bill, etc… 
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control.  This party image could be used to appeal to new social conservative activists.  
The net result is a clearer party position on lesbian and gay issue for the Republicans.   
Figure 3-5 shows this shift more quantitatively.  It shows the association between 
ideology, as measured by DW-NOMINATE, and lesbian and gay policy support for each 
party in each of the three time periods.  The association controls for district Democratic 
presidential vote, district urbanicity, district black percentage, district percentage of 
college graduates, district median income, and member seniority.  The large positive 
slope in the bottom left box displays a significant relationship between ideology and 
support for lesbian and gay rights in the pre-1992 time period for Republicans.  In the last 
two time periods, however, the slope significantly flattens out, signifying a decrease in 
the relationship.  Party had replaced ideology as the dominate force on lesbian and gay 
rights support for Republicans, just as party had replaced urbanicity for the Democrats in 
the 1980s. 
 
Conclusion 
 The 1980s and 1990s showed a rapid rise in party in predicting congressional 
support for lesbian and gay rights.  The events that solidified this division in 1992 and 
1993—namelythe election of Bill Clinton, the 1992 Republican Convention, and 
DADT—would prove key in starting the process of public opinion change.  In the next 
chapter I move from the elite level of politics to the mass level.  Now that the lesbian and 
gay movement had support among elites in Congress, and ultimately the presidency in 
1992, those elites’ positions would persuade members of the public to change their 
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positions.  They would also impact entertainment television via a signal that it was ok to 
put more lesbian and gay portrayals into America’s living rooms through the air waves. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE CAUSE OF PUBLIC OPINION SHIFTS ON LESBIAN AND GAY ISSUES 
 
 A firm discussion of the nature of public opinion and what causes it to shift is 
crucial to the following chapters and especially that of Chapter 4.  The rise of an identity 
based lesbian and gay movement created a constituency that was ultimately courted by 
elected Democrats.  Likewise, the Republican Party shifted rightward in order to appeal 
to religious and social conservative activists.  Several threads of research suggest that this 
polarization of political elites should affect public opinion.  This chapter presents a 
summary of this research and then uses it to draw hypotheses regarding the shift in public 
opinion towards lesbians and gays in the 1990s.   
The most useful theory of public opinion for my purposes is John Zaller’s RAS 
model (1992).  Zaller developed his RAS model of survey response and attitude change 
in order to explain mass behavior among respondents of public opinion surveys.  He 
attempts to explain why members of opposing political parties in the mass public shift 
their opinions based on news coverage in systematic ways.  His model is based on a 
conception of party identification developed at the start of the behavioral revolution in 
political science by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes in their classic text, The 
American Voter (1960).  Party identification is characterized as a static aspect of an 
individual, resistant to change, and mostly inherited from the family in early childhood 
socialization.  It is a central component to understanding and predicting political 
behavior.  Individuals without a party identification or with a weak identification were 
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shown to have lower political knowledge and sophistication, participate less in politics, 
and behave more in accordance with short-term political forces rather than a standing 
predisposition as opposed to those with strong party identification. 
 In 1992, Zaller published his now classic book The Nature and Origins of Mass 
Opinion, in which he built on The American Voter’s model of party identification (Zaller 
1992).  The theory is a psychological model of how a member of the public uses the 
information she has come in contact with in the past to answer a survey question or vote 
on an issue or candidate.  While this is the primary behavior the model seeks to explain, it 
can easily be broadened to all acts of political decision making, such as deciding to sign a 
petition or voice an opinion in a focus group. 
 The fundamental assumptions of the model are as follows.  RAS stands for 
Reception-Acceptance-Sample.  The individual acts, politically, as if she has a storehouse 
of social and political knowledge in the memory that she views as accurate.  The 
individual elements stored in this storehouse are called considerations.  A “consideration” 
is any idea that pushes the individual in one direction towards a decision on a political 
issue.  Considerations are primarily transmitted to the individual through political and 
scientific elites in political communications.  A political speech on welfare, a scientific 
paper on poverty, and a news report on AIDS in Africa are all prime examples of 
Zallerian considerations. 
The major theoretical mechanism of the model is how the considerations get into 
the storehouse in the first place.  First, an individual must be “receptive” to the 
consideration.  For instance, an individual might be apolitical and thus ignore all political 
considerations.  The individual effectively blocks them from entering into the storehouse 
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by avoiding them in the first place.  Even if they do receive the information, they do not 
have a firm knowledge base regarding politics to render it intelligible. 
Second, if the individual is “receptive” to the information, she must then evaluate 
it.  If a conservative politician provides the consideration, a liberal individual in the 
audience may block the consideration and not allow it to enter into their storehouse.  
Likewise, a conservative would not trust information from Michael Moore.  The political 
identity of the individual (in this example the identity as “liberal” or “conservative”) is 
constituted by the previous considerations that have made it into the storehouse.  Let’s 
say an individual has encountered no political information.  She would have no 
considerations in her storehouse and thus politically be a tabula rasa.  However, if she 
has accepted only “liberal” considerations, these could condense into a political identity, 
and block “conservative” considerations from being accepted into the storehouse.  In this 
way, the individual uses the previous considerations within her storehouse to evaluate 
whether or not the newer consideration of information should be allowed to enter or be 
accepted.  Very few individuals except among political elites, however, consider 
themselves completely liberal or conservative.  Zaller calls the ideologies here “partisan 
screens”.  Many individuals have no static political identity or ideology and “accept” all 
knowledge that they are presented with if they are “receptive” in the first phase.   
In the final stage of the RAS model, the “Sample” stage, the individual is 
presented with a political decision or question they must decide.  The way the individual 
determines a political position is to take a sample of the considerations in their storehouse 
that are relevant to the issue.  The more recent a consideration has been active, the more 
likely it is to be drawn from the storehouse.  For instance, when an individual views a 
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newscast on “the problem of racism” the night before she answer a survey with a 
question about racism, the knowledge from that newscast is more likely to be sampled.  
Once the individual has sampled these considerations, she decides her position “by 
averaging across the considerations” (Zaller 1992, p.58).  If there are more considerations 
in the sample they move the individual in the “liberal” direction and she will voice a 
“liberal” political position and vice-versa.   
The self-categorization theory of social identity explained in Chapter 2 and 
Zaller’s theory of survey response are very similar, but stress different aspects of the 
behavioral puzzle.  For instance, identity plays a central role in both theories.  In self-
categorization theory, a social identity is a self-aspect that describes and predicts 
behavior when it is made salient, while in Zaller’s theory it is schema for determining the 
validity of incoming information.  The origins of identity for individuals are somewhat 
obscure in both theories.  For Zaller, the origin of a political (or social) identity is likely 
in childhood, when enough information of a liberal or conservative variety condensed, 
while for Tajfel and Turner, the creation of identity comes when one classifies oneself 
internally as fitting that identity based on the situation.  Zaller’s theory does not stress the 
salience of a specific identity, but more salient pieces of information in the sample stage 
of his theory can lead to a greater probability of being sampled if those considerations 
were primed.  Those primed considerations may relate to identity categories in the mass 
public.  In the end, Zaller’s theory is very much a cognitive theory, while Tajfel’s and 
Turner’s is a social psychological theory. 
The RAS model is more adept at explaining the role of political elites in shaping 
public opinion and political behavior.  Political leaders of a shared identity category 
66 
 
produce valid information for their adherents in a straight forward manner.  If they 
change their message, members associated with their party should change their beliefs.  
Indeed, when analyzing political change among Democrats and Republicans, Carmines 
and Stimson discovered that Democrats and Republicans in Congress shifted their 
attitudes on racial issues prior to the shift in mass attitudes.  Carmines and Stimson 
coined the phrase ‘issue evolution’ in explaining a shift in elites’ political attitudes 
directly causing a similar shift among their adherents in the mass public.   
While Zaller focuses more on individual cognitive processes, others have 
looked at the dynamics of public opinion at the aggregate level.  Research on public 
opinion has found that the nation’s aggregate attitudes as revealed by surveys are very 
resistant to change.  Page and Shapiro (1992) find little change in public opinion across 
nearly all issue domains in The Rational Public with the exception of racial issues and 
views on proper gender roles.  When changes in political and social issues do occur, often 
in response to sudden and systematic changes in the mix of news stories being reported 
on, they decay rather quickly.  Opinions tend to return to their previous levels.  Page, 
Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) examined the effects of news reporting on several issues 
both before and after political events reported through media and they found that experts, 
commentators, and other pronouncements of government officials tended to cause 
change.  They determined that coverage has small effects on public opinion and that these 
media effects decay quickly. 
Importantly, Page and Shapiro examined aggregate data.  Determining 
individual level behavior from aggregate data is a major problem in the social sciences 
(King 1997).  Fortunately, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) used several experimental designs 
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to determine convincingly that media coverage has effects on individuals’ opinions and 
this is work that Zaller would later build on.  By showing people news stories on specific 
topics, these researchers were able to manipulate which issues the viewers believed were 
most important to the country.  They also were able to use similar experiments to change 
the issues used by voters when evaluating candidates in an election.  Voters who saw 
stories on an issue, like race or inflation, were more likely to use that issue when 
choosing a candidate in an election to vote for.  Similar experiments using mock news 
stories have found that manipulating the way the press talks about a story can affect the 
conclusion that individuals reach on the issue (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Brewer 
2003a; Stenner 2005).  For instance, when people read stories that emphasized civil rights 
that described a white supremacist rally, they were more likely to be supportive than 
when they read an article that stressed the law and order aspects of the story (Nelson, 
Clawson, and Oxley 1997).  Similarly, experimental manipulation of priming has been 
applied to gay rights issues in a limited fashion (Brewer 2003a, 2008).  These 
experiments have found positions on gay rights can be manipulated based on the frame of 
a story. 
More permanent changes on political issues than the nearly ephemeral changes 
caused by priming and framing occur over the span of decades and are caused by changes 
in reporting habits in the news media.  These changes tend to reverse themselves when 
new presidents enter office or when the nation’s political ‘mood’ shifts.  Stimson (1999) 
found that the public’s ‘mood’ tends to get more liberal during conservative political 
periods and administrations and more conservative during liberal administrations and 
periods.  This is likely due to the choices of individual newsmakers.  They criticize 
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liberal excesses when liberals hold the reins of government and conservative 
overreaching during Republican eras.  However these shifts on policy issues never reach 
a magnitude greater than a dozen percentage points or so (Stimson 1999) and importantly 
they swing back and forth.  For instance in Figure 1-1, attitudes on environmental 
spending and social security spending became more liberal during the Reagan years and 
more conservative during the early Clinton years when the Democrats had unified 
government. 
This research has at times labeled the changes on social issues as different and 
separate from those taking place on political issues because of the degree of change that 
has taken place (Stimson 2004).  This is a mistake.  The same processes that affect public 
opinion on political issues affect public opinion on social issues and cause social change.  
The real distance between the two is shifts in elites and the media which eventually move 
towards a consensus on social issues.  On political issues, disputes do not move towards 
consensus. 
 
Research on Public Opinion involving Lesbians and Gays 
Why, when public opinion on most issues is stable, have issues involving gays 
and lesbians changed drastically and in a one-sided fashion?  Theories of public opinion 
change and American institutions point to two major mechanisms that can lead to attitude 
change: contact with the media and a change in elite attitudes.  Previous research into 
liberalization of attitudes towards gays and lesbians has focused on demographic changes 
within the public or changes in the effects of abstract psychological variables (Loftus 
2001; Hicks and Lee 2006; Herek 2002; Olsen, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Treas 2002; 
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Wolpert and Wilcox 2000).  These studies are informative, but fail to determine why 
change happened.  For instance, why did the effect of having a specific attitude change 
over time?  Did a factor relating to the population change in the aggregate? Many of these 
studies simply state that variables had a static effect in a single cross-sectional survey, but 
fail to state how the variable, for instance an attitude or a demographic category’s 
aggregate measure, changed in the mass public over time.   Loftus (2001) looked 
specifically at the General Social Survey (GSS) over time and tried to determine why 
aggregate change happened by examining demographic changes as well as changes in 
attitudes toward pre-marital and extra-marital sex.  She found that only about half of the 
change over time could be explained by these changes in these variables.  Brewer (2003b, 
2008) examined the National Election Study and found that some variables, such as 
partisanship, exhibit different effects in different years.   
The effect of contact with gays and lesbians has been explored and has a positive 
effect on attitudes towards gays and lesbians (Altemeyer 1988, 2001; Lewis 2007).  
However, lesbians and gays can choose not to reveal whether they are gay or lesbian to 
others.  ‘Coming out’ is likely a function of the current political and social climate 
towards gays and lesbians and thus this cannot be a complete solution to explaining 
change in attitudes over time.  Para-social contact, or contact with fictional or real 
lesbians and gays through the media, has been explored in experimental settings (Riggle, 
Ellis, and Crawford 1996; Mazur and Emmer-Sommer 2002; Schiappa, Gregg, and 
Hewes 2006).  The results of these studies are mixed (Ticker and Potocky-Tripodi 2006), 
and are recapped in Chapter 6, which reports the results of an original experiment.  
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The way issues involving gays and lesbians are framed in the media may have an 
effect of public attitudes.  Framing is when different aspects of a story are emphasized in 
a way that influences the conclusions an audience reaches about that issue (Iyengar 1991; 
Nelson, Clausen, and Oxley 1997).  There is some evidence that framing can change 
attitudes towards gay and lesbian issues in an experimental setting (Brewer 2003a).  
However, changes that have taken place in pro-gay behavior among political elites and 
changes in media have never been fully explored to determine if they are responsible for 
attitude liberalization.  These framing studies have relied on (often flawed) experimental 
designs rather than assessing if the net change in lesbian and gay media portrayals that 
occurred in the 1990s actually corresponds to the change in public attitudes that took 
place. 
Zaller himself talks about attitudes towards lesbians and gays in the last chapter of 
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992). He suggests that the change in elite 
signals on homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1973 was 
responsible for attitude liberalization.  The APA had removed homosexuality from their 
list of mental illnesses when updating their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. However, 
broad based attitude liberalization on lesbian and gay rights issues did not start to occur 
until roughly the time that Zaller’s book went to press in 1992.  It is clear that something 
more than the changing behavior of experts is required to effect opinion change.  Other 
elites besides psychiatrists had to change their attitudes before public opinion change 
would start. 
I suspect that issues involving lesbians and gays, African-Americans, and women 
exhibit massive change because they involve groups explicitly and these groups have 
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formed identity-based movements that have allied themselves with political elites.  These 
issues involve individuals with a self-categorization or social identity which has locked 
them into an inferior position in society with respect to social esteem and prestige (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986; Turner 1991; Turner et al. 1987).  In a liberal society that claims that all 
people are created equal, the gradient created by the unequal esteem between these 
categories and dominant groups (males, whites, and heterosexuals) provide these groups 
with an advantage in changing public opinion.  They also have enough members so that 
they can ally themselves with political elites in order to become part of an electoral 
coalition.  Once allied with the elites in a political party, politicians shift their rhetoric 
towards the formerly disliked group.  Other elites in entertainment and news also shift 
their behavior.  These shifts snowball over time, until monumental change occurs in 
public opinion.  Other unpopular groups, for instance atheists, have the potential for 
political alliances and public opinion change, but lack a collective identity based on 
categorization in that group strong enough to serve as a basis for political behavior and 
influence. 
In the previous chapter, I showed that this is precisely what has happened among 
political elites.  They polarized by party on lesbian and gay issues in the 1980s and early 
1990s.  This provided a clear signal to mass partisans about what their opinions ought to 
be.  This polarization combined with changes in television portrayals should have 
resulted in predicable changes in different segments of the public over time. 
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Hypotheses Regarding Opinion Change towards Identity Groups 
These theories offer three major mechanisms that affect the liberalization of 
attitudes toward homosexuality that occurred in the 1990s as well as a few minor 
mechanisms.   
 
I. The Partisan Effect 
I theorize that the political identity of respondents will greatly affect liberalization 
in opinions toward homosexuality.  This relates directly to the effect that political leaders 
at the elite level have in shaping the opinions of the adherents of their parties in society.  
The parties had been drifting apart on lesbian and gay rights during the 1970s and 1980s 
as shown in Chapter 3.  The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 and the focus on gays in the 
military in 1993 clarified the partisan dimension involving attitudes towards gays and 
lesbians for the mass public.  Clinton’s campaign in 1992 courted lesbian and gay voters 
while the Republican convention that year featured denunciations of lesbians and gays on 
the convention floor.  In addition the first major issue Clinton addressed in office was a 
bungled attempt to lower the military’s ban on gays serving openly in the military.  
Clinton’s election and don’t ask don’t tell also triggered further polarization on gay rights 
issues among members of the U.S. House.  A liberalization of partisans in response to 
elite signals is also consistent with an issue evolution theory of opinion change (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989).  In an issue evolution, elites polarize on an issue causing their mass 
adherents to develop increasingly polarized views over time on that issue. 
As the two political parties’ elites have moved toward internal consensus 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the masses of each party should also have shifted 
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towards their elites, especially after 1992.   For Republicans the effect may be canceled 
or mitigated by rising media portrayals or a low level of support going into the 1990s. 
 
II. The Media Effect 
The 1992 presidential election created a large burst of media attention on gay 
rights that continued into 1993 in the form of the debate surrounding Clinton’s adoption 
of don’t-ask- don’t-tell.  Recall Figure 1-4, which showed the number of news stories 
involving gays and lesbians on the major network evening newscasts over this time 
period.3  It showed a large spike in 1992 and 1993.  This large spike in television news 
likely represents the communication of a polarization in elite attitudes to the public, 
which is itself crucial to communicating the elite polarization on lesbian and gay rights to 
the public.  It represents the communication of the partisan dimension of gay rights issues 
by the conveying the events of don’t ask don’t tell and the 1992 election the year before.  
After Clinton’s 1992 campaign, the 1992 Republican convention, and the 1993 
prominence of gays in the military, being a Democrat became linked with being pro-gay, 
while Republicans and being Republican became linked with being against gay and 
lesbian rights.  This is supported by the evidence of elite polarization on lesbian and gay 
rights presented in the last chapter. 
Although being Republican had become linked with being anti-gay, something 
else occurred that prevented Republicans outside of elite circles from moving in an anti-
gay direction.  Two years later Hollywood had a similar boom in gay related 
                                                          
3 This measure over time was constructed by searching the Vanderbilt Television News Archive for 
newscasts on the ABC, CBS, or NBC evening news that contained “gay” or “lesbian” or “homosexual” or 
“same-sex” in addition to a mention of “rights”, “movement”, “discrimination”, “adopt”, “adoption”, 
“teachers”, “military”, “armed”, “activists”, “groups”, “army”, “unions”, “marriage”, or “issues”. 
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programming.  Recall that Figure 1-4 also showed the number of major lesbian and gay 
characters on the three major television networks from 1971 to 2001.4  From 1994 to 
1995 the number of characters doubled from 6 to 12 and stayed high through the end of 
the century.   
This major increase in media exposure and fictional portrayals of lesbians and 
gays should have a direct effect on public opinion towards gays and lesbians.  It is 
through the media that people learn about other individuals outside of their day to day 
activities.  Turning on the television can expose an individual in an all white suburb to 
Bill Crosby, an anti-feminist male to Roseanne Arnold, or someone with no gay 
acquaintances to Ellen DeGeneres.  If these shows are even mildly entertaining to an 
individual, people will watch and passively absorb messages about the way society 
functions for minorities.  Changing the media is an important way to change society, 
especially for people in identity categories that are not primarily visual (i.e., easy to 
detect when meeting someone).  Lesbians and gays need not disclose their orientation and 
open themselves up to prejudice.  Fictional characters and media coverage both present 
new information to the public without anyone needing to face discrimination.   
New sources of information present new considerations for the public to use when 
evaluating their positions on issues.  The new attention paid to lesbians and gays can have 
effects on members of the mass public, but only if their political identities are not 
opposed to the new information (Zaller 1992).  For instance, white supremacists may 
have such an overt reaction to Bill Cosby strictly because of his race that they may forgo 
any potential entertainment from his show in order to avoid media contact with an 
                                                          
4 This measure was based on a list taken from Stephan Tropiano’s book The Prime Time Closet: A History 
of Gays and Lesbians on TV (2002). 
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African-American.  Consequently we should expect Democrats to respond more 
favorably to gays and lesbians as media coverage increases, and Republicans to respond 
less favorably after the events that took place in 1992 and 1993.  Independents could 
theoretically go either way.  They consume less news, but filter information less 
compared to those with a party identity.  They may or may not be responsive to the rise in 
television characters in the mid-1990s.   
 
III. The Cohort Effect 
The cohort effect on issues involving gay rights seems to be one of the most long 
standing findings surrounding public opinion on gay rights issues (Treas 2002, Hicks and 
Less 2006).  It has been taken as given that younger people tend to be more liberal with 
respect to gay rights, while older people tend to be more conservative.  However, this 
empirical finding has never been adequately explained.   
Different generations have different experiences.  These experiences determine 
what each respondent or individual determines to be an appropriate behavior given a 
certain stimulus.  Older individuals have more experiences to draw from, meaning they 
are less susceptible to influence from experts when the direction of the message of the 
communications differs from those experiences.  Similarly, young individuals are more 
susceptible to elite influence because they lack knowledge on what is an appropriate 
response for their identity category.   
If the mix of considerations transmitted by the media changes quickly and in a 
systematic way, younger individuals will have a different mix of considerations or 
experiences as compared to those older individuals who lived both before and after the 
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shift.  This is particularly true of ‘soft’ programming that younger individuals are more 
receptive to as opposed to ‘hard’ news.  This variation in the mix of considerations or 
memories should give rise to the cohort effect.  The cohort effect appears to be significant 
on social issues, while nonexistent or small on political issue (MacManus 1996).  It is the 
interaction of the time a person lives in and their memories of news and television 
experienced throughout their lives. 
 
IV. Religion and Demographic Effects 
While I theorize that the three major factors above will affect individual opinions, 
other identities are likely to affect opinions toward lesbians and gays.  For instance, those 
with strong religious identities, particularly evangelical Christians, are often found to be 
more opposed to gay rights (Wolport and Wilcox 2000; Olsen, Cadge, and Harrison 
2006).  Education also plays a major role in shaping public opinion towards gays and 
lesbians (Treas 2002).  People with more years of education are often more supportive of 
gays rights in general.  People on the West Coast and Northeast may have higher levels 
of support for lesbian and gays rights due to either increased contact with gays and 
lesbians or a greater number of pro-LGBT political leaders and elites (Loftus 2001).  
African-Americans have been shown to display lower support for gay rights, while 
women consistently have a higher level of support (Herek 2002).  People that have 
contact with lesbians and gays and believe that individuals are born gay or cannot change 
their orientations also should be more supportive of gay rights (Lewis 2007; Haider-
Markel and Joslyn 2008). 
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In the next two chapters these hypotheses will be tested against data.  Historical 
survey data can establish the changing effects over time, while an experimental design 
can look directly for an explicit media effect and establish the direction of causation. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS, ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION 
CHANGE 
 
 
Opinions in the United States towards lesbians and gays have undergone a rapid 
shift over the last few decades (Loftus 2001; Yang 1997, 1999).  Major shifts in opinion 
over time have been rare (Stimson 1999).  However, on issues involving minorities and 
women, they have not been uncommon since the 1960s (Schuman et al. 1997).  Mass 
opinion still appears to be in a state of flux on issues involving lesbian and gay rights, 
especially with the introduction of same-sex marriage as a national political topic during 
the 2004 presidential campaign.  This change is illustrated graphically in Figure 5-1, 
which displays respondents to the GSS question discussed in Chapter 1, and Figure 1-5.  
I explore two pieces of the process of political and social change in this chapter: 
the elite-led nature of the shift in mass opinion on gay rights issues and a sharp rise in 
lesbian and gay representation on television in other to test the hypotheses generated 
from public opinion theory.  
  
Data and Methods 
 To test my hypotheses about public opinion change, I use both the GSS time 
series and the individual-level data of the GSS for a more robust analysis. In addition, I 
construct a second data set comprised of a set of surveys that ask respondents their 
opinions on biological attributions of homosexuality and interpersonal contact with gays  
 
79 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Public Opinion towards Same-Sex Relationship  
Source: the General Social Survey. 
 
 
or lesbians.  This provides for a second test of the effects of contemporaneous media on 
attitudes relating to lesbians and gays. 
The GSS contains four questions relating to lesbian and gay rights over time.  The 
survey asks these four questions nearly every year or every other year from 1973 until 
2006.  Three of these, however, are related to civil liberties.  Support for civil liberties in 
general has increased over this time independently of its relation to gay rights due to 
increasing levels of education (Loftus 2001).  Due to the potential for civil liberties 
support to be less directly related to support for gay rights, I rely on the question 
involving support for same-sex relations graphed over time in Figure 5-1 as my key 
dependent variable.  The actual question reads “What about sexual relations between two 
adults of the same sex--- do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong 
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only sometimes, or not wrong at all?”  Very few people over time pick the two middle 
responses.  This being the case, I focus my analysis on the proportion of respondents who 
pick the category “not wrong at all” since it is the category that increases most over time.   
 Figure 5-2 displays the breakdown of the proportion of respondents choosing “not 
wrong at all” over time separately by party identification.  Democrats and those 
individuals leaning to the Democrats are in medium grey, Independents in light gray, and 
Republicans and those leaning to the Republican Party are in dark grey.  Several events 
thought to affect public opinion are labeled on Figure 5-2, including the American 
Psychiatric Association’s de-classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder which 
occurred in 1973, the peak of the AIDS epidemic, the rise in television portrayals that 
occurred from 1994 to 1996, and the same-sex marriage debate that occurred in 2003 
after the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts legalized same-sex marriage.  Also, 
the large vertical black line marks 1992.  This is when major partisan effects should 
theoretically start to be seen due to the 1992 presidential campaign and the gays-in-the-
military issue that took center stage in 1993.  Independents appear most supportive of 
same-sex relations over most of the 1970s and early 1980s.  Their support falls below that 
of Democrats during the AIDS epidemic.  Independent support rebounds in 1992 after the 
presidential election, then further increases after 1995 when the number of gay and 
lesbian television characters increases.   
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 While independents appear quite responsive to non-political events---AIDS, gay 
marriage politics, and television characters, Democrats appear to be very responsive to 
the 1992 campaign, at least in the aggregate.  Democrats also tend to increase their 
support throughout the rest of the 1990s including in response to the rise in television 
characters after 1995.  Republicans, however, have a lower level of support across the 
entire time-series.  The difference between the parties’ aggregate opinions expands after 
1992 when the Democrats at the elite level to liberalized as predicted. 
  
The Individual Level Analysis 
Having looked at the data aggregated by party, I now turn to an individual-level 
analysis using a multi-level logistic regression clustered by the survey year.  I use a 
multi-level model for two reasons:  1) Different survey years may have varying effects 
for some of the independent variables; 2) some of my independent variables take on 
constant values for every individual case in a given year.  For instance, the number of 
lesbian and gay television characters in 1996 is 13.  All respondents surveyed in 1996 
therefore have the same value for the variable measuring lesbian and gay television 
characters.  A multi-level model is appropriate when some of the dependent variables are 
clustered and constant in this way over time or space for segments of the data.  The 
model allows variables to have different effects in different time periods if an exploratory 
analysis or theory specifies the effects should be changing over time.   On preliminary 
analysis, none of the variables showed much evidence of varying drastically over time.  
That being the case and in pursuit of parsimony only the intercept of the model was 
allowed to vary by year for the results presented below. 
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 My aggregate independent variables for the upper (time-series) level of the model 
are the number of major lesbian and gay television characters in each year and the 
number of lesbian and gay related television news stories for each year measured by 
searching the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  Party identity is measured on the 
traditional seven-point scale running from zero to six, with zero being a strong Democrat 
and six being a strong Republican.  I also included a measure of self reported political 
ideology on a five point scale running from 1 to 5, and measures of approval and 
disapproval of pre-marital sex and extramarital sex constructed on a scale running from 1 
to 4 in a similar fashion from questions on the GSS.  A 4 indicates that the respondent 
strongly disagrees with premarital and extramarital sex while a 1 indicates there is 
nothing wrong at all with these activities.  The region of the country the respondent lives 
in and the birth cohort by year were measured by several dummy variables which take the 
value of 1 if a respondent lives in that region or was born in that cohort and 0 otherwise.  
Variables measuring the oldest cohort, those born before 1926, as well as those living in 
New England, were excluded from the model for identification purposes.  Independent 
variables measuring if a respondent was black, another race other than white or black, 
female, catholic, a liberal or moderate protestant, a fundamentalist protestant, Jewish, or 
if the respondent indicated a belief that the Bible was the word of God were added to the 
model, as were scale variables measuring self-reported church attendance, and the 
number of years of formal education.   
The GSS also includes a variable asking the respondent to indicate how many 
hours of television they watch per day.  Because respondents are likely to misreport 
television usage, I created a dummy variable equaling one for respondents that report 
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watching more than six hours of television per day and zero otherwise.  I choose six 
chosen because A.C. Nielsen reports that the average television in the U.S. is on six hours 
per day, and respondents who report above average usage of television are probably less 
likely to be underreporting their usage for social acceptability reasons as compared to 
someone who reports less than the U.S. mean.  I interacted this variable with the 
aggregate number of major lesbian and gay television characters on the three major 
channels in each year and the aggregate number of television news stories and included 
both interactions in the model, along with the un-interacted dummy variable.  Again my 
dependent variable equals one is a respondent believes that same-sex relations are always 
wrong and zero otherwise. 
 My expectations are that identifying with the Democratic Party or as a liberal will 
be associated with greater probability of support for same-sex relations, especially after 
the increase in lesbian and gay television characters.  I expect that television news will 
have an effect on partisans, but not on Independents because television news reflects the 
communication of the partisan dimension of lesbian and gay issues to the public.  I expect 
that younger cohorts will be more supportive of same-sex relations due to the lack of 
previous information prior to elite liberalization conflicting with signals from medical, 
political, and media elites signaling support of same-sex relations over the time period, 
especially those born after 1970 and came of age after the early part of the AIDS crises.  
Finally, I expect that those who consume more media in times when more pro-gay signals 
are being broadcast to liberalize in regards to gay rights.  Although my expectations of 
the effects stated above are characterized regarding a direct effect of each variable, I also 
expect that only interactions between these variables, and not direct effects, may be 
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significant.  As an example, media effects may only be present in Democrats, or cohort 
effects may only be present in those who consume high levels of television.  Therefore, 
any analysis should proceed with caution.  This is because a specific political identity, or 
signals from elites with political identities that correspond to the identity of the 
respondent may predispose individuals to accept information from other sources later on. 
 Even with this impressive list of explanatory variables, missing regressors could 
still be an issue.  Although the GSS has a robust battery of demographic variables and a 
large number of survey years, it lacks two key variables necessary to assess competing 
explanations for opinion liberalization.  The GSS does not ask if respondents know a 
lesbian or gay male or if the respondent thinks that homosexuals cannot change their 
orientation or if people are born gay.  Both of these variables have changed massively in 
aggregate over the 1990s.  In August of 1985, a Newsweek poll found that only 22% of 
respondents reported having a friend or close acquaintance that are gay or lesbian.  In 
2000, Newsweek found that percentage had risen to 56%.  Similarly, a Gallup poll taken 
in June of 1982 found that only 17% of respondents thought that people were born gay, 
while in May 2001 Gallup found that 41% reported that belief.  Since these questions 
have a large positive shift in aggregate over the time period under consideration and 
previous research has found that both have a large effect on public opinion (Lewis 2007; 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008) controlling for them in a study of public opinion at the 
individual level will go a long way in confirming the period effects of political elites and 
media exposure. 
 To assess the effects of knowing a lesbian or gay male and attitudes towards the 
immutability of homosexuality, I constructed a second data set by pooling 9 surveys 
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taken over two decades that ask respondents if they know a gay person, if they think 
people are born gay or cannot change their orientation, and if they support either job 
protections for gays or lesbians or allowing gays serving openly in the military.  These 
nine surveys were taken in 5 years: 1983, 1985, 1993, 1998, and 2000.  All the surveys 
also asked some basic demographic categories: education, sex, race, age, and if the 
respondent identifies as a Democrat, Republican or independent.  One survey in 1998 
reported age on an ordinal scale, and this variable was transformed so that each category 
was recoded so as to lie at the medium of the range of that category.  For instance, if a 
respondent was coded as having an age between 25 and 34, the respondent was coded as 
having an age of 30.5.  Respondents over the age of sixty-five were coded as having an 
age of 71.  Appendix I reprints the question wording in these surveys and how each 
variables was coded. 
For surveys not asking support for job protections for lesbians and gays, support 
for gays in the military was used as the dependent variable and a dummy variable was 
added in order to allow for a shift in the intercept since this question has lower support 
over time as compared to support for job protections.  Since I showed in Chapter 1 that an 
underlying factor uniting gay rights attitudes exists, this is not problematic.  All years that 
contained a gays-in-the-military question also contained a job protections question, 
meaning period effects can easily be separated from question wording effects.   
The same multilevel analysis for the GSS data set was performed by clustering 
samples by survey and including the aggregate television characters and television news 
measures as variables.  Reproducing the analysis below without questions that use gays-
in-the-military as the dependent variable does not change the results substantively.  The 
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results presented below allow only the intercept to vary by year.  Figure 5-7 displays 
results allowing all coefficients to vary by year for this model.  The results presented in it 
are briefly summarized below.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 The 1st column of numbers in Table 5-1 displays the results for the combined 
multi-level model analyzing the GSS.  Party behaves as expected; identification with the 
Democratic Party is associated with a greater probability of support for same-sex 
relations.  More recent cohorts provid greater support.  The number of gay television 
characters appears to have a large direct effect.  Its interaction and marginal effect given 
high TV usage are significant at the .95 level for a one tailed test.  The effect is about one 
and half times greater for high usage than low usage.  High television usage has no 
statistically significant effect absent the number of lesbian and gay television characters 
on television.  Television news and its interaction with TV usage appear to have no 
discernable effect.  Other variables, including those tapping religious identity, race, 
gender, views regarding sex and the Bible, and region all behave as predicted by previous 
research (Loftus 2001).  Women are more likely to support same-sex relations as are 
those with more liberal views regarding sex.  Those who attend church more, are non- 
white, lack education, are born in rural areas, are fundamentalist protestants, or believe 
that the Bible is the word of God are less likely to support same-sex relations.  Jews are 
more likely to support same-sex relations.  Being Catholic or a moderate or liberal 
Protestant seems to have no effect independent of other attitudinal variables or church 
attendance. 
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Table 5-1: Multi-Level Logistic Regression for All Respondents and Democrats 
(Dependent Variable = Same-Sex Relations "Always Wrong") 
  
All 
Respondents     
Democrats 
Only     
  Est. S.E   Est. S.E   
constant 4.32487 0.29768 *** 4.79509 0.49982 *** 
Church 
Attendance 0.11551 0.01134 *** 0.09664 0.01896 *** 
Party ID 0.05251 0.01485 *** N/A N/A   
Ideology                    0.24217 0.02148 *** 0.25536 0.03535 *** 
Black 0.48789 0.08917 *** 0.54871 0.12386 *** 
Catholic 0.00034 0.06737   0.02193 0.11545   
Jewish -0.82365 0.2014 *** -1.06883 0.29657 *** 
Bible = Word of 
God 0.83381 0.07802 *** 0.93496 0.12509 *** 
Other Race 0.3863 0.14536 ** 0.07636 0.23205   
Birth Place -0.26366 0.05454 *** -0.38362 0.09279 *** 
Education -0.16432 0.01059 *** -0.15726 0.01727 *** 
Liberal/Moderate 
Protestant -0.08409 0.15302   -0.32138 0.27979   
Fundamentalist 
Protestant 0.33023 0.15865 * 0.04685 0.28595   
Premarital Sex -0.34387 0.02003 *** -0.35754 0.03291 *** 
Extramarital Sex -0.44879 0.03064 *** -0.59466 0.0547 *** 
Cohort 1926-
1935              -0.22031 0.10483 * -0.19087 0.16275   
Cohort 1936-
1945              -0.30902 0.09747 ** -0.3568 0.15322 * 
Cohort 1946-
1955              -0.43575 0.08912 *** -0.41214 0.14406 ** 
Cohort 1956-
1960              -0.41347 0.10232 *** -0.25897 0.17097   
Cohort 1961-
1965              -0.59234 0.11373 *** -0.49085 0.19976 * 
Cohort 1966-
1970              -0.56117 0.12773 *** -0.71212 0.21811 ** 
Cohort post-1971             -0.8939 0.14109 *** -0.98915 0.26856 *** 
Female                     -0.55272 0.05438 *** -0.66297 0.09334 *** 
Hours of TV > 6                0.361 0.33538   0.69892 0.52061   
Gay TV 
Characters             -0.07198 0.00945 *** -0.079 0.01186 *** 
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Table 5.1 (cont.) 
Gay TV News 
Stories            -0.00778 0.00399 @ -0.00747 0.0051   
Middle Atlantic 0.23451 0.1295 @ 0.59564 0.24089 * 
East North 
Central 0.34185 0.12719 ** 0.49822 0.23784 * 
West North 
Central 0.50461 0.14739 *** 0.65384 0.27045 * 
South Atlantic 0.49046 0.13129 *** 0.78939 0.24439 *** 
East South 
Central 1.04844 0.17283 *** 1.42339 0.31234 *** 
West South 
Central 0.62739 0.14796 *** 0.90649 0.27122 *** 
Mountain 0.2999 0.15578 @ 0.50709 0.28698 @ 
Pacific 0.15477 0.13246   0.39791 0.24582   
(Hours of TV > 
6)X Gay TV 
Characters -0.04389 0.02618 @ -0.07727 0.03964 @ 
(Hours of TV > 
6)X Gay TV News 
Stories -0.01735 0.01353   -0.02506 0.02188   
σ (Year) 0.08942     0.00002     
AIC 9055.5 
  
3322.5 
  DIC 8981.5 
  
3250.5 
  N(Individuals) 9642     3793     
 
 
 Since the cumulative GSS has a very large sample size (nearly ten thousand for 
the preceding analysis) and interactions between party identity and other variables are 
likely, I split the file by political party and re-estimated the model independently for 
different party groups.   
The second column of results in Table 5-1 displays the result for Democrats, 
while Table 5-2 displays the results for Independents and Republicans.  Region appears 
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Figure 5-3: Cohort Effects on Attitudes towards Same-Sex Relations 
 
 
 
to be a more important predictor for members of a political party, especially for those 
living in the South.  Those in the South are less likely to support same-sex relations.  
Being born in a rural area seems to have the greatest effect for Democrats and no 
statistical effect for Republicans with Independents falling between the two.  Differences 
in the estimates of the effects for race and being Jewish by party are likely due to a small 
number of respondents for those categories in the GSS within certain partisan groups. 
Figure 5-3 plots the coefficient estimates for the cohort effects for all four models 
(all respondents plus the three partisan groupings).  All 4 models display cohort effects, 
but a clear linear effect of age and birth year is more pronounced for the Democrats and 
Independents.  With the exception of the 1946-1955 birth cohort for the Democrats and 
the 1961-1965 birth cohort for the independents, age seems to act in a linear fashion.   
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Table 5-2: Multi-Level Logistic Regression for Republicans and Independents 
(Dependent Variable = Same-Sex Relations "Always Wrong") 
  
Independents 
Only     
Republicans 
Only     
  Est. S.E   Est. S.E   
Constant 4.40361 0.46758 *** 4.17015 0.63616 *** 
Church 
Attendance 0.13735 0.01892 *** 0.10846 0.02247 *** 
Party ID N/A N/A   N/A N/A   
Ideology                    0.26456 0.03552 *** 0.20082 0.04371 *** 
Black 0.4721 0.15261 ** -0.07597 0.30162   
Catholic -0.15756 0.10935   0.20012 0.13389   
Jewish -0.47854 0.35717   -0.73564 0.45627   
Bible = Word of 
God 0.72807 0.1275 *** 0.95543 0.16228 *** 
Other Race 0.59761 0.22071 ** 0.86462 0.39051 * 
Birth Place -0.2107 0.08881 * -0.14178 0.10786   
Education -0.19275 0.01773 *** -0.14168 0.022 *** 
Liberal/Moderate 
Protestant -0.06813 0.2185   0.06155 0.35267   
Fundamentalist 
Protestant 0.32421 0.23147   0.52168 0.36157   
Premarital Sex -0.33539 0.03361 *** -0.3441 0.03939 *** 
Extramarital Sex -0.3441 0.04524 *** -0.40931 0.06461 *** 
Cohort 1926-
1935              -0.10505 0.19355   -0.40805 0.1996 * 
Cohort 1936-
1945              -0.23452 0.17476   -0.22111 0.19391   
Cohort 1946-
1955              -0.2193 0.1568   -0.70179 0.17711 *** 
Cohort 1956-
1960              -0.34518 0.17524 * -0.59141 0.19897 ** 
Cohort 1961-
1965              -0.63507 0.19064 *** -0.45715 0.21856 * 
Cohort 1966-
1970              -0.43155 0.21514 * -0.46372 0.24581 @ 
Cohort post-1971             -0.91934 0.22314 *** -0.62054 0.28369 * 
Female                     -0.49261 0.08754 *** -0.5423 0.10894 *** 
Hours of TV > 6                0.91991 0.61523   -0.75105 0.70552   
Gay TV 
Characters             -0.06281 0.01251 *** -0.06972 0.0161 *** 
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Table 5.2 (cont.) 
Gay TV News 
Stories            -0.00626 0.00561   -0.01137 0.00667 @ 
Middle Atlantic -0.06008 0.18582   0.27857 0.29616   
East North 
Central 0.21683 0.1788   0.41886 0.29344   
West North 
Central 0.38872 0.21472 @ 0.6453 0.32694 * 
South Atlantic 0.07011 0.18982   0.78871 0.29919 ** 
East South 
Central 0.58264 0.25935 * 1.36022 0.3815 *** 
West South 
Central 0.24731 0.2143   0.92395 0.33461 ** 
Mountain 0.03334 0.22669   0.54558 0.34264   
Pacific -0.1497 0.19393   0.36429 0.30022   
(Hours of TV > 
6)X Gay TV 
Characters -0.03348 0.04248   -0.02952 0.06746   
(Hours of TV > 
6)X Gay TV News 
Stories -0.04769 0.02558 @ 0.0243 0.02505   
σ (Year) 0.07614     0.12394     
AIC 3411.5 
  
2377.8 
  DIC 3339.5 
  
2305.8 
  N 3283     2566     
 
 
Earlier cohorts all appear to be less supportive of gay rights than more recent cohorts.  
For the Republicans, however, age seems to have more of a binary effect.  Those born 
after 1946 are more liberal than those born before that year irrespective of actual age. 
The most interesting variation in effects involves the media-related variables.  The 
number of television characters has a strong direct effect unrelated to television usage for 
all three categories, but the differential effect of the number of lesbian and gay 
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Figure 5-4: The Marginal Effect of an Additional Lesbian or Gay Television Character on 
Same-Sex Relation Attitudes Given TV Consumption 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
television character is only significant for Democrats.  The results for the interaction are 
displayed in Figure 5-4 for the model with Democrats only.  The differential effect 
between low TV usage and high TV usage is significant at the 95% confidence level for a 
2-tailed test.  The magnitude of lesbian and gay characters is nearly double that for high 
TV versus low TV.  Since the main effect is an aggregate time series variable, its effect 
may be spurious---other specific factors that changed over time unrelated with television 
character, yet correlated with television characters and un-modeled here, may be 
responsible for the effect.  However, since the marginal effect is greater for those who 
consume more television and we have controlled for the effect of TV news, we can be 
reasonably confident that more television characters are having a liberalizing effect for 
Democrats since the interaction is itself an individual level variable.  Moreover, there is 
no direct effect of high TV usage.  Independents also show some mixed evidence of a 
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significant effect for TV news stories when this television usage is high. (The marginal 
effect is non-zero statistically, but not statistically different from the estimated effect of -
.006 for TV news stories for those with low TV usage.)   
The results presented above suggest that Democrats were more likely to adopt 
favorable attitudes towards same-sex relations when the number of gay and lesbian 
television characters increased.  The most likely scenario is that the polarization of the 
Democrats and Republicans over the 1980s and 1990s, the 1992 presidential campaign, 
including Bill Clinton’s generally pro-gay positions, the Republican Party’s 
denunciations of lesbians and gays at their convention in 1992, and the gays-in-the-
military debate that took place after, made Democrats receptive to opinion change when 
the increase in the number of lesbian and gay television characters in the mid and late 
1990s occurred.  Without the support of Democratic Party elites for same-sex relations in 
the early 1990s, elites with a shared political identity as a large segment of the public, the 
rise in lesbian and gay characters would have likely had a diminished effect (or not have 
happened at all). 
The results for the second data set confirm the period effects of the television 
news and lesbian and gay television characters controlling for attitudes involving whether 
homosexuals can change their orientations or are born gay and interpersonal contact with 
gays and lesbians.  The 1st column in Table 5-3 contains the estimated model for all 
respondents.  The 2nd column in Table 5-3 contains the estimates for all Democratic 
respondents and Table 5-4 contains the estimated models for independents and 
Republicans.  Because attitudes involving the biological innateness of homosexuality and 
contact with lesbians and gays likely vary by age, higher order terms for birth year were 
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Table 5-3: Multi-Level Logistic Regression for All Respondent and Democrats Only Controlling for 
Knowing Lesbians and Gay and  Attribution of Homosexuality over Time 
 (Dependent Variable = Support Job Protections for Gays or Support for Gays in the Military) 
  
All 
Respondents     
Democrats 
Only     
  Param. Est. S.E   Param. Est. S.E   
Constant -5.664 2.379 *** -13.206 4.110 *** 
Knowing a  
Gay or Lesbian 0.549 0.049 *** 0.668 0.085 *** 
Born Gay or Cannot 
Change Orientation 1.009 0.053 *** 1.028 .092 *** 
Birth Year   
(starting at 1850)             0.153 0.080 @ 0.405 0.139 ** 
Birth Year^2 -0.0018 0.0009  * -0.004 0.001 *** 
Birth Year^3 0.000007 0.000004  * 0.00015 0.00005 ** 
Education 0.425 0.070 *** 0.811 0.120 *** 
Lesbian or Gay 
Television Characters 0.066 0.007 *** 0.068 0.011 *** 
Lesbian or Gay related 
Television News 0.013 0.002 *** 0.012 0.003 *** 
Female 0.253 0.045 *** 0.173 0.078 * 
Black 0.015 0.071 
 
0.172 0.092 @ 
Dependent Variable = 
Gays in the Military 
Question -1.374 0.065 *** -1.067 0.012 *** 
Independent 0.285 .055 *** 
   Democrat 0.627 .059 *** 
   
σ (Year) 0.035 
 
  0.058     
AIC 11927.7 
  
4070.6 
  DIC 11897.7 
  
4044.6 
  Log Likelihood -5949 
  
-2022 
  N(respondents) 10807     3920   
  
 
 
included.  The square and cube of birth year were significant for the model including all 
respondents and the model including Democrats only as well.  The cube of birth year 
allows the slope of the relationship between policy attitudes on lesbian and gay rights and 
birth year to take on a zero value for a specific year.  This means the cohort effect can be  
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Table 5-4: Multi-Level Logistic Regression for Republicans and Independents Only Controlling 
for Knowing Lesbians and Gay and  Attribution of Homosexuality over Time 
 (Dependent Variable = Support Job Protections for Gays or Support for Gays in the Military) 
  
Republicans 
Only     
Independents 
Only     
  Param. Est. S.E   Param. Est. S.E   
Constant 2.347 4.317 
 
-2.194 4.190 
 Knowing a  
Gay or Lesbian 0.450 0.090 *** 0.519 0.080 *** 
Born Gay or Cannot 
Change Orientation 0.902 0.097 *** 1.088 .088 *** 
Birth Year   
(starting at 1850)             -0.088 0.144 
 
0.057 0.138 
 Birth Year^2 0.0007 0.0015 
 
-0.0008 0.0014   
Birth Year^3 -0.000001 0.00006 
 
0.000004 0.000005   
Education 0.059 0.133 
 
0.328 0.117 ** 
Lesbian or Gay 
Television Characters 0.065 0.013 *** 0.066 0.012 *** 
Lesbian or Gay 
related Television 
News 0.011 0.004 ** 0.016 0.004 *** 
Female 0.373 0.083 *** 0.199 0.075 ** 
Black 0.076 0.227 
 
-0.280 0.135 * 
Dependent Variable = 
Gays in the Military 
Question -1.675 0.119 *** -1.419 0.106 *** 
σ (Year) 0.067 
 
  0.058     
AIC 3453.4 
  
4374.5 
  DIC 3427.4 
  
4348.5 
  Log Likelihood -1714 
  
-2174 
  N(respondents) 2907     3980   
  
 
non-existent in the model for a given age group, say those born in the 1940s through 
1960s, but still have an effect for those older than that group and younger than that group.  
These higher order terms were not significant for the sample of Republicans and 
independents and are only included for comparison with the models in Table 5-3.  
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Removing the higher order terms restores the statistical significance of the linear term for 
Republicans and independents. 
Knowing a lesbian or gay person and beliefs about being born gay or changing 
orientation both have an expected large impact on attitudes towards gays-in-the-military 
and job protections for gays.  The impact of knowing a gay person is roughly half that of 
biological attribution in terms of coefficient size.  Despite the large impact of these two 
variables, the contemporaneous impact of aggregate television news and television 
characters survives.  Figure 5-5 provides a graphical interpretation of the model, using its 
systematic components.  It plots the predicted probability of support for gay job 
protections for all respondents that answered that question for the five time periods for 
which surveys exist.  Between 1985 and 1993 there is a sharp rise in the predicted 
probability for all respondents due to the impact of additional news media coverage of 
gays.  After the media coverage dropped off in 1994, it was replaced by the rise in lesbian 
and gay television characters in 1995.  These period effects raise the estimated 
probability of all respondents starting in 1993 and continuing through 2000 as illustrated 
in Figure 5-5.  The effects of age also appear to be less linear than previous studies due to 
the introduction of the additional control variables.  The eldest respondents appear to less 
pro-gay in 1983 and 1985, but for the bulk of respondents in these time periods, age has 
no impact.  In the 1990s, however, respondents born after 1960 appear to be increasingly 
more pro-gay with birth year.  Nearly all of these individuals would have memories only 
after the demedicalization of homosexuality by the American Psychiatric Association in 
the early 1970s. 
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Figure 5-6: The Estimated Proportion of Public Opinion Change Due to Changes in 
Television, Demographics, Contact with Lesbians and Gays, and the Biological 
Attribution of Homosexuality 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6 displays the impact of the media in a slightly different way.  It plots 
the change in each variable in aggregate using 1983 as a baseline multiplied times the 
estimated coefficient in the 1st model of Table 5-3.  As these variables change in 
aggregate, they all impact the aggregated propensity of support for gay job protections 
and gays-in-the-military summated over individuals over time.  By weighting the 
aggregate change of each independent variable by the coefficient estimate, we obtain a 
rough measure of the relative change due to each over time.  The period effects of the 
media dominate demographic shifts, changes in interpersonal contact, and changes in  
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Figure 5-7. Random Effects for Second Multilevel Model of Policy Attitudes towards 
Lesbians and Gay 
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biological attribution.  Roughly one half of the change through 2000 is due to period 
media effects, one fourth due to demographic shifts in education and age, one-eighth due 
to the rise in interpersonal contact, and one-eighth due to changes in biological attribution 
attitudes. 
Other variables behave as expected in the model.  Being African-American 
appears to make Democrats slightly more supportive of gay rights, but slightly less 
supportive for independents.  Education appears to have less of an impact for 
Republicans. 
Figure 5-7 shows the random effects for an additional multilevel model that 
allows the effect of each individual-level variable to take a different value based on the 
magnitude of the effect in that specific survey.  The effect of a biological attribution 
appears to become a more powerful a predictor of gay rights in the 1990s.  This is when 
research implying a biological cause of homosexuality was reported on.  The effect of 
education becomes less predictive of gay rights support at this time also.  Highly 
educated individuals likely learned the biological attribution causing a decline in the 
impact of education.  Interestingly, gender appears to be more predictive of gay rights in 
the 1990s than the 1980s signaling a potential interaction between gender and period 
effects that can be explored in future research.  Except for the surveys taken during the 
1980s, few other systematic and significant deviations from the effects of the aggregated 
surveys appear.  Party appears to be a much less powerful in the 1980s, but not 
statistically so.  It is likely the party effect is non-zero because of Democrats’ greater 
support for job protections across time unrelated to sexual orientation.   
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These results should be taken cautiously, however.  Future research should try to 
more accurately measure television usage of individuals.  Reporting error in this measure 
may be the reason why the interactive effects are not present for Independents or 
Republicans.  Still, that the effect is present for Democrats implies the measure is at least 
valid in some circumstances and that media effects are present in public opinion toward 
same-sex relations in the GSS.  These results are confirmed by the second data set.  
Searching for interactive effects between age and media variables, or by disaggregating 
the GSS or other surveys should yield fruit in the future.  
Still potential problems lurk in this analysis.  In order to determine a media effect, 
I used aggregate level data and exploited the fact that characters and news stories vary 
over time.  Individuals in time periods with high numbers of lesbian and gay characters 
and news stories are compared with those in periods with a small number.  This creates a 
problem.  Anything trending in a similar way could be responsible for the effect.  
Although I created a second dataset specifically to control for known factors that trend in 
this fashion, contact with lesbians and gays and the biological attribution of 
homosexuality, something else unknown or a complex interaction between factors may 
actually be responsible for the effect.  Data from the 1980s and 1990s that ask 
specifically if respondents have encountered a lesbian and gay on television do not exist, 
and if they did respondents who answer no may have actually encountered characters but 
forgotten, leaving subliminal effects.   
Also of equal importance is verifying the order of causation between media 
representation and public opinion.  Although I have argued that media causes attitude 
change, liberalizing attitudes towards gays might be responsible for more lesbian and gay 
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television characters.  In order to solve this problem, in the next chapter I will verify the 
results not by using observational data, but by using an experimental design complete 
with an individual dose of media contact with a lesbian and gay individual. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the models presented of public opinion change presented in this chapter, 
it appears that two major changes responsible for shifts in public opinion towards gays 
and lesbians are the support of Democratic Party elites, chief among them President Bill 
Clinton in 1992, which clarified the party’s position to mass partisans, and a shift in the 
entertainment industry that resulted in a major increase in the number of lesbian and gay 
portrayals on television and other media in the mid-1990s.  These two events both 
affected public opinion in a positive fashion starting in the mid-1990s and continuing to 
today in America’s liberalization of attitudes toward homosexuality.  These events did 
not occur in isolation, but occurred due to the hard work and diligence of gays and 
lesbians in gaining acceptance and the groundwork that was laid decades prior by 
activists courting and persuading political and entertainment elites to come out in favor of 
gays and lesbians and their rights. 
Television need not only be a negative in regards to civic life.  Often in the 
academic literature it is portrayed as evil.  It saps social capital and reduces civic 
participation and interest in politics among the citizenry (Putnam 2000).  But sometimes 
contact with individuals through television can erase the space between citizens and show 
people new worlds and lives, displace negative stereotypes, and bring people together 
across social categories. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE EFFECT OF MEDIA CONTACT WITH LESBIANS AND GAY: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL CONFIRMATION 
 
 
 Although the last chapter used survey data to show that the increase in television 
portrayals of gays and lesbians is a major cause of the attitude liberalization towards 
lesbians and gays that took place in the 1990s, alternative explanations remain.  The 
greatest concern is that of causation.  Because the rise in television characters occurred at 
the same time as attitude liberalization, this rise could be caused by changing public 
sentiments and not the reverse as I have argued.  In addition, I showed that the aggregate 
liberalization in public opinion started among most of the public when the number of 
lesbian and gay characters on television increased in 1995 and in 1996, and among 
Democrats when Clinton took a pro-gay position even before that.  However, I did not 
show that individuals who saw lesbians and gays in the media liberalized after viewing 
them directly.   
 In this chapter, I use an experimental design to confirm that individuals liberalize 
their attitudes when they view a representation of a lesbian or gay individual and not the 
other way around.  Furthermore, I show that the context in which the lesbian or gay 
individual appears can also matter.  When lesbians and gays appear on TV with well 
liked politicians, it causes attitudes to liberalize.  When they appear in a context with 
politicians who are not respected and not well liked, little attitude change occurs.  This is 
similar to what happened in 1992, when lesbians and gays became associated with Bill 
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Clinton and Democrats who liked Clinton because of his party became more supportive 
of lesbians and gays. 
 
Observational vs. Experimental Designs 
 Most research into public opinion uses observational data such the NES, GSS, and 
media-based surveys, such as those discussed in Chapters 1 and 5.  The social sciences, 
due to an inability to conduct large-scale controlled experiments, have been forced to test 
their hypotheses using mostly observational data.  For example, one cannot create a 
parallel United States where the rise in lesbian and gay characters in 1995 and 1996 or 
the pro-gay campaign of Bill Clinton in 1992 did not take place to act as a control 
condition even though this would scientifically determine if these factors actually caused 
the attitude shifts that took place after.  This dependence on observational data, rather 
than experimental data, has led some individuals to denigrate the social sciences as non-
scientific.   
 However, a heavy reliance on experimental data may not be as beneficial as some 
would suggest.  The social sciences are not the natural sciences.  Effects in the natural 
sciences can usually be tracked to handful of potential causes, such as when an electric 
field or gravitation causes a particle to move.  A social science effect, like 
democratization or voting behavior, could have dozens or even hundreds of causes and 
these causes may be different for each individual.  The causes themselves may interact 
and be contingent on other causes, creating a much more complicated scenario.   
 This difficulty is compounded by the problem of determining what is meant by 
some concepts that people take for granted as meaning the same thing to everyone, but in 
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reality are different for each person.  What is freedom? What is tolerance?  What is 
justice?  These concepts are not as easy to define as physical phenomenon because they 
are constructed by people to describe their social situations and goals and not constructed 
by nature.  Determining how these concepts can be measured directly and controlled for 
often rests on the philosophical predispositions of the social scientists involved.   
 The distinction between observational and experimental studies rests on the trade-
off between external and interval validity.  Observational studies are often highly 
externally valid, in that the situations studied in observational studies are very likely to 
reoccur in a similar fashion in the real world outside of the research study.  For instance, 
in the last chapter, individuals surveyed were highly representative of the national public 
and had a diverse set of life experiences and demographics.  In a highly controlled 
experiment, such as one in which a treatment group and a control group watch two 
identical television shows (with identical dialogue, plot, settings, and costumes) but one 
character is identified as lesbian or gay for a treatment group and as heterosexual for a 
control group, the external validity is much lower for several reasons.  First, members of 
the public are likely to have a long term relationship with television characters outside of 
a controlled experiment.  This is because individuals typically do not watch a single 
episode of a show but watch multiple episodes involving the characters over a number of 
years and develop a close psychological attachment with the characters.  A long term 
study to capture such dynamics in an experimental setting would be expensive (and not 
very productive in terms of the usage of lab time).  Portrayals of minorities on television 
also often use stereotypes.  For instance, gay men are often portrayed as having a 
heightened fashion sense or as behaving effeminately on television.  Prior to the 1990s, 
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lesbian and gay men were often also portrayed as psychologically unbalanced (Tropiano 
2002).  In an experimentally controlled study, stereotypes would have to be controlled by 
different experimental conditions in addition to the mere presence of a minority character 
to preserve internal validity at the cost of external validity.  That way the effect of contact 
with a lesbian or gay or contact with the stereotype can be determined.  Lastly, but 
crucially, experimental studies often rely on samples of individuals unrepresentative of 
the public.  If the individuals sampled behave differently than those of the mass public, 
the external validity of the study is also called into question. 
 Although experiments have problems, they make up for their draw back in several 
ways.  They contain excellent internal validity, meaning that they generally are able to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis made (even if that hypothesis has little bearing on the 
outside world due to low external validity).  Randomization allows the stimulus or 
treatment in the experiment to be nearly uncorrelated with any confounding factors.  An 
experiment with a randomized treatment of media exposure would probabilistically be 
uncorrelated with any variable left off of a survey and unable to be controlled using pre-
existing survey data.  Most importantly, causation can be directly assessed in an 
experiment. 
 To confirm the findings of previous chapter, that individuals brought into media 
contact with lesbians and gays liberalize their attitudes, I constructed an experiment that 
attempts to balance external and internal validity.  Because several experiments have 
been conducted prior that have attempted to assess the impact of contact with gays and 
lesbians on public attitudes, I review their methods briefly before describing my 
treatment conditions and results. 
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Experimental Studies and Public Attitudes towards Lesbians and Gays 
 Because the number of individuals reporting contact with lesbians and gays and 
the number of portrayals of lesbians and gays in the media increased around the same 
time that public attitudes towards lesbians and gays liberalized, several studies have 
already been conducted using experimental or quasi-experimental designs in an attempt 
to assess causation.  Several of these studies, however, contain severe methodological 
flaws that call their findings into question. 
 A review article by Tucker and Potocky-Tripoli (2006) analyzed seventeen such 
studies.  The treatment condition in eleven of these was a workshop that addressed 
lesbian and gay issues and five contained contact with lesbian or gay identified 
individuals like a professor or a guest speaker.  One used a description of a biological 
cause of homosexuality as a treatment.  One involved a “non-stereotypical description of 
a lesbian couple”.  One involved a problem solving activity involving lesbian and gay 
issues.  All these studies involved convenience samples of students.  Only four studies 
truly randomized between treatments and control conditions.  Three of these also gave 
pretest measures of attitudes towards lesbians and gays, which may be problematic 
because they increase the likelihood of a consistent response between a pre- and post- test 
due to an individuals’ desire to give consistent responses and appear rational in front of 
the researcher (Zaller 1992).  Also, the pre-test may tip off the subjects that the study is 
about attitudes involving homosexuality. Hence, if they see a lesbian or gay, they may 
determine that the researcher wants to see a liberalization of attitudes toward gays and the 
subjects may respond in kind on the posttest.  Most of the studies had attrition problems 
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and did not report on the characteristics of the subjects that dropped out.  The one study 
that used randomization without a pretest had no true control condition, varying only the 
level of stereotypical content involved.  In fact, 6 of the 17 lacked any proper control 
groups.  Not surprisingly, these studies all report a wide variety of positive and negative 
results, which is likely the result of problems with the research design.   
An adequate experiment requires randomization, a true control condition, and a 
lack of attrition, among other factors.  A few of the designs used media contact with 
lesbians and gays, particularly films.  One of the studies mentioned above showed The 
Times of Harvey Milk as their treatment condition (Riggle, Ellis and Crawford 1996).  
This is an award winning biography on one of the first openly gay elected officials.  One 
study, not described in the article above, used a showing of the film Object of My 
Affection, a gay-themed movie about nontraditional relationships, as a treatment 
condition.  It also showed the film Father of the Bride II as a control condition (Mazur 
and Emmers-Sommer 2002).  It is very difficult to think of the movie Father of the Bride 
II as an adequate control condition.  The film may be reinforcing typical attitudes about 
gender roles which than impact attitudes toward homosexuality rather than actually 
having a neutral effect.  This may be an alternative explanation for the study’s positive 
findings, undermining the author’s conclusion.  The issue of an adequate control 
condition has to be taken seriously. 
 
The Control and Treatment Conditions 
 My study improves on these issues in the following ways.  Although I use a 
convenience sample of students, most of the other errors in previous studies are 
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corrected.  I use an adequate control condition which is nearly identical to the treatment 
conditions, but one heterosexual-identified individual is replaced with a lesbian identified 
individual.  The students are all randomized into various conditions.  Unlike the 
experiments outlined above where the treatment assignment was based on membership in 
a class or discussion group, the treatment and post-test treatment in attitudes were 
assigned on entry to the lab based on a randomly generated number.   
To test the media contact hypothesis, I created three separate treatment conditions 
and a control condition.  To create a treatment with as much external validity as possible, 
each treatment was modeled after an interview that took place on the Ellen DeGeneres 
Show.  Ellen DeGeneres is widely known as a lesbian in American popular culture.  This 
dates back to the mid 1990s.  Ellen stared in a sitcom (These Friends of Mine, nicknamed 
Ellen, and separate from the later Ellen DeGeneres talk show).  She played a heterosexual 
character of the same name.  As the show went on, it was revealed that Ellen DeGeneres, 
the actress, was in reality a lesbian.  Shortly after this, Ellen, the character, was rewritten 
as a lesbian and “came out” as such on the sitcom.  This caused a media firestorm and 
generated a vast amount of attention.  Interestingly the show’s ratings declined after 
Ellen’s “coming out”, resulting in the shows cancellation.  DeGeneres, the actress, 
subsequently became more public and outspoken about her sexuality and was later given 
a talk show, the current Ellen DeGeneres Show, where she interviews celebrities and 
occasionally politicians. 
 Ellen is ideal as a treatment condition for testing the media contact hypotheses.  
Her status as a lesbian is well known by the public, especially the college students in my 
sample.  The subjects do not need to be told that she is a lesbian directly, which would tip 
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them off as the purpose of the study and undermine internal validity.  All of the various 
interviews described in the treatment conditions below actually took place, increasing 
external validity.  However, the written dialogue in all the conditions was changed so that 
it was nearly identical in all four conditions.  Furthermore, Ellen, the actress, and Ellen, 
the sitcom character, are very similar and easy for the public to associate.  Since Ellen, 
the character, was a lesbian television character in the 1990s, it increases external 
validity.  Subjects may also have a long term relationship with Ellen as a celebrity figure, 
and these long term entertainment relationships may have been crucial to the attitude 
liberalization process. 
 I use three treatment conditions and all three along with the control are in 
Appendix II.  The subjects are placed on a computer, and asked to take a survey.  After 
answering several demographic and questions unrelated to lesbian and gay rights, the 
students are asked to read a paragraph stating that television can have a significant impact 
on politics and that on the next screen will appear a picture and written transcript of an 
interview that took place during the 2008 presidential election.  The next screen displays 
either the treatment or control conditions.  Each of these is a picture of an interview.  The 
main treatment interview is a picture of Ellen interviewing Tom Brokaw, a non-partisan 
journalist, on her television show.  The transcript below the picture involves a discussion 
of the nation’s most important problem.  Brokaw says it has to do with the economy.  The 
second and third treatment interviews involve the same short dialogue, but the pictures 
and names are changed from Brokaw to either Ellen interviewing Democrat Barack 
Obama or Ellen interviewing Republican John McCain.  By comparing them with the 
Brokaw condition, we can test for a stronger effect of attitude liberalization when Ellen is 
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interviewing the two partisan figures, and thus associated with, and tacitly endorsed by, a 
Democratic or Republican leader.  The students only see one of the three interviews or 
the control condition.  The transcript accompanying each treatment is identical and is 
always a discussion of the most important problem, except the name of the interviewee is 
changed to match the picture.  After this screen, they are asked what the most important 
problem is in national politics.  A roughly equal number of students saw the three 
conditions and the control.  By testing for differences between the four groups of 
students, we can ascertain the effect of priming affect that Ellen in combination with the 
interview has on lesbian and gay rights attitudes in questions in the posttest. 
 As mentioned above, the control condition is particularly important for balancing 
internal validity and external validity.  Here I use the same transcript as in my treatment 
conditions, but change the interviewer from Ellen DeGeneres to the heterosexual David 
Letterman.  Letterman also interviews only Brokaw, and a picture from this interview 
was used as the control condition.  This is not perfect for interval validity.  The backdrops 
for the two shows are different, and thus there is slightly more difference between the 
control and treatment conditions than there would be in a perfect design.  Also the 
genders of the two hosts are different in addition to their sexual orientations.  But this 
control condition provides the best balance of internal and external validity.  Editing the 
backdrops in the pictures would put them in a context that the subjects might find 
suspicious and undermine the results.   
 All conditions were followed by a question asking about the nation’s most 
important problem.  By adding the question, which involved the dialogue of the 
interviews and not gay rights, I hoped to decrease the likelihood of the subjects 
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discovering that the research hypotheses involved attitudes towards homosexuality as 
small as possible.   
 The measure of lesbian and gay rights support used here involves a five question 
battery asking about attitudes toward gay civil unions, gay marriage, gay adoption, 
employment protections for gays, and support for gays in the military.  Each of these 
questions was then followed by a question asking individuals if they felt strongly or 
weakly about their position on that issue or only weakly supported it.  These ten 
questions were used as a post test and combined in a scale of lesbian and gay rights 
support that ranges from 0 to 5, with five being the most supportive of gay rights.  For 
instance a score of five means the subject was strongly supportive of gay rights in all five 
policy areas.  A score of 0 means they were strongly against gay rights in each of the 
policy areas.  An individual that was strongly in favor of gay rights in 4 of the 5, but 
weakly in favor in one policy area would have a score of 4 and 2/3.  If they were weakly 
against in only one policy area, but strong supportive in the four 4, they would score 4 
and 1/3 and so on.  The actual question wordings are also in Appendix III.  Also asked 
during the experiment was the ideological self-placement of the respondents as well their 
party identification and whom they voted for in the 2008 presidential election. 
  
The Subjects and their Characteristics 
 Although using a convenience sample of students is non-ideal for studying gay 
rights because of a variety of issues, it remains the most attractive option due to the low 
costs involved.  This study uses a sample of 289 political science students at an elite 
university.  The study took place in the spring semester of 2009.  The students were 
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offered class extra credit for participating in the computer based study outside of class.  
There are several problems with the study sample that make a confirmation of my 
hypotheses less likely. 
The key problem is that students are much younger and better educated than most 
of the public.  Both these factors correlate highly with support for lesbian and gay rights.  
Even independent of demographics, students may be more liberal in general and on 
lesbian and gay rights in particular.  Figures 6-1 and 6-2 contain histograms of the party 
identification and ideology of the study respondents.  The students are much more liberal 
and Democratic than the public at large.  Whereas most members of the public 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Party Identification, Spring 2009 Study 
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Figure 6-2: Ideology, Spring 2009 Study 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Lesbian and Gay Rights Support Scale Histogram, Spring 2009 Study 
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Figure 6-4: Histogram of Obama Feeling Thermometer, Fall 2008 Study 
 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Histogram of Feeling Thermometer for John McCain, Fall 2008 Study 
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Figure 6-6: Histogram for George W. Bush Feeling Thermometer, Fall 2008 Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Histogram of Feeling Thermometer for Sarah Palin, Fall 2008 Study 
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lean moderate or conservative, most of the students are moderate or liberal.  Likewise the 
number of strong partisans and especially strong Democratic identifiers is high.  This 
suggests the sample has a higher political sophistication than the mass public and likely 
has a constrained ideology resulting in fewer unstable attitudes that are subject to 
manipulation in an experiment (Zaller 1992). 
Turning to the result of the posttest, the sample does appear to be highly 
supportive of lesbian and gay rights independent of the experimental manipulation.  
Figure 6-3 presents a histogram of the five point scale used to measure lesbian and gay 
rights support in the spring 2009 gay rights study.  The mode is clearly at 5, the 
maximum, suggesting the plurality of subjects is strongly supportive of the pro-gay 
position on all five of the issues listed above.5  However, this problem should, as well as 
the demographic problems of the sample, bias against positive results for the treatment by 
diluting the number of individuals that have attitudes capable of manipulation by the 
experiment.  Hence findings even suggestive of my hypotheses will be impressive. 
 The sample may actually be even more liberal and Democratic than the 
breakdown in ideology and party suggest.  For instance, the students who claim to be 
conservative may only be economically conservative due to their social situations.  
Cultural conservatives are usually against gay rights whereas economic conservatives are 
                                                          
5 This suggests that there might be a problem with truncation in our scale.  Different 
levels of individuals who are pro-gay may be grouped together at the highest category 
because there is no question on the scale to distinguish them.  For instance people who 
are strongly supportive of gay rights may be at the same place on the scale (5) as those 
who are very strongly supportive.  This should also bias against positive results on the 
experiment.  A question that may be more difficult for a social liberal to support, like 
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more heterogeneous in their support.  This coupled with the demographics of the group 
and the broad appeal of the Democratic ticket led by Barack Obama in the year prior 
among the young makes even the conservatives in the sample warm to Barack Obama, 
less supportive of Republicans in general, and particularly less supportive of socially 
conservative Republicans.  The net result of this would be a sample that respects and 
values the opinions of Barack Obama and does not value the opinions of John McCain.  
This would mean that the Obama condition would have a greater effect on gay rights 
attitudes than a non-student sample.  Likewise, the McCain condition may have a weaker 
effect, especially among conservatives and Republicans. 
Examining the feeling thermometers results of the subjects affect toward the 
candidates allow a test of this.  Although the feeling thermometers towards Obama and 
McCain were not included in the spring study, a similar study with nearly identical 
demographics and sample size ran in the previous semester before the presidential 
election under identical conditions at the same university.  Figure 6-4 shows a histogram 
of the feeling thermometer for Barack Obama for this fall study.  The modal category is 
clearly 100, and nearly all respondents give him a positive rating.  Figure 6-5 contains the 
feeling thermometer for Sen. McCain.  Feelings for him are much more mixed but 
slightly positive.  Most respondents cluster towards the middle of the scale.  
However, McCain is far from being considered a loyal, conservative Republican due to 
his reputation as a “Maverick”.  This may lead liberal leaning students to feel warmer 
towards him.  The affect for a more typical socially conservative Republican can be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
affirmative action for lesbians and gay or support for cross-dressing in public should be 
added to the battery in the future.   
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gleaned by examining Figures 6-6 and 6-7.  These are the feeling thermometers for 
George W. Bush and Gov. Sarah Palin of Alaska.  Although President Bush’s rating may 
be low due to the several crises that took place during his second term, Sarah Palin’s 
ratings among conservative Republicans were very high during this period.  However, 
virtually no students give either of these typical, social-conservative Republicans warm 
feelings.  For Palin, 100 is one of the least popular responses on the thermometer.  If the 
conservatives in the student sample were more typical of conservatives in the mass public 
we would expect a greater polarization on attitudes toward Palin and Obama. 
 In a representative sample of the public, I would expect conservative Republicans 
to behave differently from liberal Democrats.  The student sample, with its positive affect 
towards Obama and negative affect towards socially conservative Republicans based on 
age and education, and the issues of the 2008 presidential election calls this expectation 
into question.  Indeed, I find that the student sample at-large behaves more like a sample 
of liberals in aggregate. 
 Although there are problems with the student sample, the sample problems should 
only make positive results less likely, not more likely.  Any positive results I find in this 
educated, pro-gay, and young sample should be more pronounced using a sample of the 
general public. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 My expectations are that media contact with Ellen DeGeneres, a lesbian, will led 
to more liberal attitudes on the lesbian and gay rights scale.  Additionally, I expect that, 
due to the sample’s positive affect towards Obama, a similar liberalization will occur for  
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Figure 6-8: Mean Lesbian and Gay Rights Support Across by Experimental and Control 
Groups. 
 
 
that condition.  The McCain condition could have either result.  Because he occurs in a 
treatment with Ellen, the sample may be come more liberal compared to the control.   
However, his limited popularity among students as compared to Obama may render the 
condition ineffective.   
The results of the experimental manipulation are depicted graphically in Figure 6-
8.  This figure shows the mean of the lesbian and gay rights measure for each of the four 
treatment and control groups.  The control group (Letterman-Brokaw) and McCain 
condition (Ellen-McCain) resulted in samples that have the lowest support for lesbian and 
gay rights.  As expected, the Obama (Ellen-Obama) and Ellen (Ellen-Brokaw) conditions 
resulted in more liberal attitudes toward lesbian and gay rights.  The difference between 
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the Obama and McCain conditions is roughly one response category on the ten question 
battery answered in a more liberal direction.  This is equivalent to moving from being 
weakly supportive of gay marriage to strongly supportive of gay marriage or from being 
weakly against gay adoption to weakly in favor of gay adoption.  The other major 
differences, such as those between the control and Ellen conditions and the Ellen and 
McCain conditions are slightly smaller yet still similar in size.   
The results of an ANOVA to test for statistical significance between the groups 
are disappointing however.  The ANOVA cannot rule out that the differences are due to 
chance (F = 1.18, p = .317).  The extra credit motive might be responsible for the low 
statistical significance.  I reestimated the ANOVA, but dropped the students whose self-
reported GPA was in the bottom 15% of the sample.  These subjects are most likely to 
taking survey solely for the extra credit involved.  Since they know the results are 
anonymous, they might be distracted or unfocused on the task of completing the survey.  
The differences for the restricted sample, thankfully, attained statistical significance on 
the ANOVA (F=2.31, p=.076).   
I then estimated a multivariate model using the responses for party, ideology, 
knowing lesbians or gays, attitudes on a biological causation of homosexuality, and 
gender as controls.  Party was coded on a seven point scale running from 0 (strong 
Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican).  Ideology was also coded using a seven point scale 
ranging from 0 (Very Liberal) to 1 (Very Conservative).  Gender was coded as a 1 for 
male and 0 for female.  Dummy variables were also created for those who stated they 
knew lesbians or gays, did not know lesbians or gays, those who thought that individuals 
were lesbian or gay due to experiences, and those who thought that lesbians and gays 
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choose to be lesbian or gay.  These variables equaled 1 if a subject was in the category 
and 0 otherwise.  The excluded categories were those who suspected they knew a lesbian 
or gay, but did not know for sure not sure, and those who believe people are born gay or 
lesbian.  The main independent variable was coded as a set of dummy variables were 1 
represented each condition and 0 otherwise.  The excluded category was the control 
condition. 
I find that differences using the sample restricted by self-reported GPA are statistically 
significant and large for the Obama condition, as illustrated in by the dummy OLS 
regression in Table 6-1.  This represents the same rise in support as someone that 
suspects someone they know is lesbian or gay as compared to someone that actually 
knows an out lesbian or gay.  Unfortunately the condition of Ellen with Brokaw, although 
in the right direction, does not reach statistical significance.  The results would have 
likely been much stronger if a non-student sample with lower and more malleable gay 
rights support had been available.  The fact that detectable results were found for the 
Obama condition, and that the subject in the Ellen condition are of nearly the same level 
of lesbian and gay rights support with such a non-ideal sample, affirms the power the 
media effect.  
 The fact that this is a sample predisposed to favor Obama heavily in terms 
of affect, and the experimental group with the most liberal attitudes was those subjects 
exposed to the Obama-Ellen interview suggests the power of elite led change.  Obama is 
clearly capable of inspiring attitude change if the effort is made in a fashion similar to the 
attitude change caused by Clinton in the early 1990s.  It is surprising that this condition 
was slightly more powerful than the effect of media contact with Ellen only, and this 
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Table 6-1: Regression 
Analysis of Experimental 
Data (Dependent Variable = 
Gay Rights Support) 
Excluded: Control 
Condition 
Coefficient Estimate 
(Standard Error) 
P-value 
Intercept 5.72 
(.29) 
.000 
Ellen w/Obama Condition 0.2595 
(.1471) 
.079 
Ellen w/McCain Condition 0.0042 
(.1459) 
.977 
Ellen w/Brokaw Condition 0.0897 
(.1501) 
.550 
Party (Republican) -0.7159 
(.2695) 
.008 
Ideology (Conservative) -0.1946 
(.0610) 
.002 
Causation of Homosexuality:  
Experiences 
-0.4133 
(.1259) 
.001 
Causation of Homosexuality: 
Personal Choice 
-0.8904 
(.1727) 
.000 
Gender (Male) -0.3160 
(.1072) 
.004 
Do Not Know a Lesbian or 
Gay 
-0.1054 
(.2712) 
.698 
Know a Lesbian or Gay 0.2587 
(.1737) 
.137 
R^2 .5227  
note: two-tail tests 
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might have not been the case with a representative sample where the ceiling effect of 
lesbian and gay rights support would have been less of an issue.  Although not surprising, 
the McCain condition performed the worst, even controlling for other factors.  McCain, 
as stated above, was liked much less than Obama by the students in the fall study.  It is 
likely that by spring he was even less well liked. Liberals would not have liked him 
because of his conservative oriented campaign in 2008.  Young conservatives would have 
not liked him because he lost the election in combination with his tradition of bucking the 
Republican Party on key issues.  When Ellen interviews a negative figure in the young 
subjects’ eyes, like McCain, the effect of media contact with her became non-existent and 
maybe slightly negative on attitudes towards gays.  Media contact and portrayals of 
minorities matter in terms of public opinion. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter used an experimental design to confirm the results of the previous 
chapter which used aggregate and observational survey data.  Individuals liberalized their 
gay rights policy attitudes when exposed to lesbians or gays through media contact, in 
this case an interview hosted by Ellen DeGeneres.   The most liberal responses on gay 
rights came from those who saw Ellen interview a positively viewed individual leader, 
Barack Obama.   
However, attitudes of the public do not always flow from attitudes toward 
political leaders as was the case with Clinton in 1992 and 1993 and Obama in this 
experiment.  Sometimes those attitudes on minorities help determine who political 
leaders are in the first place.  In the next chapter I examine the case of the 2004 
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presidential election.  The incumbent president, George W. Bush, made his stance against 
same-sex marriage a major part of his campaign.  Did this strategy work?  Did the media 
coverage surrounding same-sex marriage cause it to work, or did ballot initiatives trying 
to ban same-sex marriage have an effect on the election in place of the media?  The next 
chapter deals with these issues before returning to concluding remarks on Obama, his 
presidency, the future of lesbian and gays rights attitudes in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
TAKING THE BAIT: BELIEFS ABOUT LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES AND THE 
2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I showed that positive attitudes towards leaders 
transferred to lesbians and gays when the group became associated with those leaders.  
Democrats in Congress became more liberal on gay rights.  Republicans moved against 
lesbian and gay rights to appeal to social conservatives.  When lesbians and gays became 
associated with the Democrats and, later, Bill Clinton, Democrats in the public became 
more tolerant of lesbian and gay rights.  I showed this using aggregate level data for Bill 
Clinton in Chapter 4 and in an experimental context for a group of students using Barack 
Obama in Chapter 5.  Although attitudes towards lesbians and gays are generally less 
stable and less salient than attitudes towards well known political leaders (Hillygus and 
Shields 2005), sometimes attitudes towards minorities can influence a preference among 
leaders.  Indeed, this was the case in the 2004 presidential election.  Up to this point, I 
have focused on changing attitudes towards lesbians and gays.  In this chapter, I 
demonstrate the impact these attitudes had on American politics at the highest levels.   
As people opinions on lesbian and gay rights moderated throughout the 1990s, it 
became possible for this to become a partisan issue in a national campaign.  In fact, I 
show that it was an important issue in determining vote choice in the 2004 presidential 
election.  Social conservative and Republican operatives placed several ballot measures 
that would ban same-sex marriage up for a vote simultaneously with the presidential 
election in 2004.  It was thought that these ballot measures would help President Bush 
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win reelection.  While lesbian and gay rights now enjoy strong support within the 
Democratic Party, same-sex marriage had no where near majority support in swing states 
in 2004.  Republican candidates, including Bush, could campaign on being against same-
sex marriage strongly.  This would increase the appeal to their social conservative 
supporters and not alienate swing voters.  Democrats, however, were in a bind.  They 
could not advocate for same-sex marriage rights because swing voters did not support 
them.  However, their base and core supporters were in favor of same-sex marriage.  
Coming out strongly against same-sex marriage would hurt the enthusiasm of Democratic 
activists and potentially cut off liberal donors. 
Immediately following the reelection of president George W. Bush in 2004, a 
scholarly conventional wisdom developed suggesting that same-sex marriage and 
specifically anti-same-sex marriage ballot measures had no effect or a very small effect 
on presidential vote choice in 2004 (Abramowitz 2004, Hillygus and Shields 2005, 
Friedman 2004, Sherrill 2004).  Such findings quelled the worst fears of those on the 
political left.  As normatively appealing as it may be for some to conclude that efforts to 
tap anti-gay sentiment were unsuccessful, the continued behavior of social conservatives 
suggests that they believe the strategy had merit.  In 2006, eight more states, including 
two pivotal to Senate control (Virginia and Tennessee), placed anti-same-sex marriage 
initiatives on their statewide ballots either at the urging of social conservatives or by 
petition.  As the number of same-sex marriage ban referenda and initiatives on the ballot 
in 2006 slowly increased, the energy of social conservatives in putting them on the ballot 
appeared to be enhanced by the sense that they would somehow increase the chances of 
victory for their preferred electoral candidates.   
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 I present evidence here that suggests that these measures mattered.  The same-sex 
marriage issue specifically---and attitudes toward lesbian and gay families in general---
affected presidential vote choice in the 2004 presidential election.  The mechanism 
through which these attitudes have affected the vote, however, has been misunderstood.  
Ballot initiatives to ban same-sex marriage became a national, not local or state specific, 
story.  Previous research concluding a null effect of the bans had compared differences in 
the Republican share of the presidential vote in states with and without marriage bans 
(Abramowitz 2004).  This research found no difference.  However the majority of media 
coverage that individuals encountered was likely on the national news networks.  Hence, 
theories of media priming would suggest that the effect of same-sex marriage ought to be 
large in both states with those bans on the ballot and in those states without.  Looking at 
variation between states will miss this effect. 
First, I use county level-data to show evidence of a potentially decisive impact of 
the same-sex marriage issue on the race for president in Ohio.  I next demonstrate that 
voters in states with same-sex marriage bans on the ballot in 2004 behaved similarly to 
voters in states without same-sex marriage bans on the ballot suggesting that something 
other than the ballot measure caused the effects in Ohio.  In both cases attitudes about 
same-sex marriage mattered profoundly.  Finally I use the 2000-2002-2004 panel of the 
American National Election Study to assess whether people use their beliefs about the 
legitimacy of lesbian and gay families to determine their presidential vote or if the results 
from cross-sectional surveys presented can be fully explained by an elite led change in 
beliefs about the rights of lesbians and gays through the clarification of party and 
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candidate positions on same-sex marriage and media focus on the politics of recognition 
of lesbian and gay families.   
The sheer number of marriage bans on state ballots in 2004 likely caused the issue 
to spill over into the national media and thus affect the vote nationally.  The combination 
of the attention of the national news on same-sex marriages in 2003, on the political 
implications of these unions on the 2004 presidential election, and finally, on the 
implications of same-sex marriage ballot measures in swing states shifted the nexus of 
attention on the politics surrounding gay and lesbian unions from the affected states and 
localities and squarely located it in the national arena.  Essentially, the issue transmuted 
from one with local effects into one with a large national impact.   
 
Media-led Priming and Its Effect on Vote Choice 
Previous research into the same-sex marriage issue has led to conflicting results.  
First, Abramowitz (2004) looked for effects of the same-sex marriage issue using the 
states as his unit of analysis.  He found no differential effects in states with same-sex 
ballot measures as compared to those without them.  Another study using aggregate-level 
data found different results from Abramowitz.  Smith, DeSantis, and Kissel (2006), using 
counties as the unit of analysis, found an effect of county same-sex marriage ban support 
on vote choice, but they examine only states with same-sex marriage ballot measures. 
Others have used individual-level survey data and have also found results at odds 
with Abramowitz.  Using a post-election internet panel, Hillygus and Shields (2005) 
found that the effects of individual attitudes towards same-sex marriages exerted an 
influence on the vote (see also Lewis 2005), with the effect in ballot measure states 
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slightly larger than non-ballot measure states.  However, the effect was so small that it 
was not statistically significant when examining only respondents in marriage ban states.  
Donovan et al. (2005) also found effects within the states of Ohio, Michigan, and 
Arkansas, which all had same-sex marriage bans on the ballot.  But when they examined 
national individual-level data, using a mid-October poll, they found that the intensity of 
same-sex marriage attitudes affected vote intention in same-sex marriage ban states, but 
not at a national level.  Finally, Campbell and Monson (2005) found that religious 
affiliation has a larger impact on the vote in states voting on same-sex marriage bans than 
non-same-sex marriage ban states, but their study is geared towards searching for the 
effects of religious beliefs on the vote and does not control for the effect of attitudes 
towards recognition of same-sex couples contingent upon living within a ban state.   
None of these studies assesses whether same-sex marriage attitudes exert change 
in presidential voting which is a particularly compelling question given the increase in 
George W. Bush’s vote share from 2000 to 2004.  Moreover, these studies do not assess 
if party or affect towards the candidates are causing members of the public to bring their 
attitudes on same-sex marriage in line with partisan elites.   Because attitudes towards 
lesbians and gays are likely to be more weakly held than party identification and 
candidate assessments, endogeneity is a potential problem.   
Theoretically, there is a good reason to believe that the effect of same-sex 
marriage attitudes should have been felt nationally and not locally in same-sex marriage 
ban states.   Priming likely had a national effect on the vote.  Priming is when media 
coverage of a specific issue influences voters by making that issue the lens (or more 
accurately one of the lenses) through which they interpret the election (Druckman 2004; 
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Miller and Krosnick 2000).  By covering a political issue, the media raises its salience to 
the public (Iyengar and Kinder 1985).  This causes the public to both view that specific 
issue as important to the election and to evaluate candidates’ stances on that issue when 
deciding whom to vote for.  Regarding same-sex marriage, more media attention on the 
issue should make it a more important consideration to voters.   
Priming can have a major effect on American elections across a wide variety of 
issues.  Using experimental methods, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) found that showing 
news stories to individuals influenced candidate choice in a general election.  Using exit 
polls, Druckman (2004) has demonstrated priming effects in U.S. Senate campaigns.  
Miller and Krosnick (2000) have found that the importance given to a specific issue as 
influenced by the media can affect vote choice.  Even the way the media talks about an 
issue or event can affect the public's perceptions and evaluation of an issue through 
framing, or the emphasis of different components and aspects of an issue or story 
(Nelson, Clausen, and Oxley 1997, Gitlin 2003, Brewer 2003).  Because a relatively 
small percentage of Americans say same-sex marriage is the most important problem 
facing the nation (Hillygus and Shields 2005), one might argue that gay rights attitudes 
are generally of such low salience that they cannot be of importance to the public in 
voting decisions.  While this may be the case, a counter argument can be constructed that 
attitudes toward race, gender, and sexuality are “easier” for the public to access 
cognitively and thus more powerful (Carmines and Stimson 1980). 
Same-sex marriage certainly received ample attention from the news media in 
2004.  It first became a major part of the national political dialogue when the supreme 
judicial court in Massachusetts ruled that barring gays and lesbians from the right to 
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marry violated the state constitution in the summer of 2003 and reignited in the summer 
of 2004 when the ruling took effect.  Following this, President Bush took a position 
against same sex marriage in his reelection campaign.  This position would appeal to 
religious conservatives.  Congress voted on a Constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage in September of 2004, which was defeated largely by Democrats.  Finally 
several states placed their own same-sex marriage bans on the ballot.  All of these events 
made it into the news.   
Whether priming exerts effects locally or nationally depends on the pattern of 
media coverage.  If the local media in same-sex marriage ban states cover the issue more 
intensely than other states, attitudes about lesbian and gay families should be activated to 
a greater extent in those areas.  If not, however, the effects might be the same.  Even if 
ban states and non-ban states do differ, the effect of attitudes can still be important for 
both. 
 Examining local newspaper coverage of the same-sex marriage debate suggests 
that residents of states with ballot measures ought to react to the issue in roughly the 
same way as those in non-same-sex marriage ban states.  Lexis-Nexis keeps a searchable 
digital archive of many local newspapers.  Using this archive, I searched for the number 
of stories mentioning either “same-sex marriage”, “gay marriage”, or “homosexual 
marriage” and one of the two presidential candidate’s last names from Labor Day through 
Election Day in 2004.  I added the number of hits for these search categories together as a 
measure of election-related media around same-sex marriage.  Included are three papers 
in the swing state of Ohio, which had a same-sex marriage ballot measure and which I 
single out for an in depth analysis below.  Also included were four other papers in states 
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with same-sex marriage bans, twelve major papers in states without same-sex marriage 
ballot measures, and the Washington Post, New York Times, and USA Today.   
Figure 7-1 shows the total number of stories on same-sex marriage associated 
with the 2004 presidential election for local and national papers.  States with same-sex 
marriage bans are on the right, and all other papers are on the left.  The Washington Post 
and the New York Times, both generally regarded as national papers of record, come in 
first and second in terms of candidate-related same-sex marriage coverage with 120 and  
 
 
Figure 7-1: Number of New Stories involving Gay Marriage by States with and without 
Ballot Measures on The Issue 
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18 total hits.  The next highest on the measure are the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette and 
the Atlanta Journal and Constitution with 110 and 101 hits, respectively.  While both 
these states had same-sex ballot initiatives, Georgia was considered a non-competitive 
state in terms of the presidential election, and Arkansas had only a low chance of 
swinging to the Democrats.  The next two highest papers, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, were not in states with ballot initiatives.  Moreover, an 
independent samples t-test, ignoring the national papers, reveals the difference in 
coverage between papers in states with same-sex marriage bans on the ballot and without 
same-sex marriage bans on the ballot is not statistically significant (t=.410, p=.687).   
Of the Ohio-based papers, the Columbus Dispatch fell close to the mean, while 
The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) and the Dayton Daily News fell closer to the bottom in 
politicized same-sex marriage coverage.  These results provide evidence that coverage of 
the same-sex marriage issue was regularly distributed between states with and without 
same-sex marriage ban measures in 2004.  Theoretically, this means that any effects of 
beliefs involving same-sex couples on the 2004 presidential vote should be felt nationally 
and not locally.   
Priming will be particularly powerful when political elites clarify party positions 
on issues of national importance.  This can result in two-way communication flows that 
make candidate choice more clear to the public (Zaller 1992).  Candidates, along with 
parties are equally crucial to effects of media coverage.  They are important in creating a 
partisan dimension concerning the issue.  If presidential candidates and their associated 
parties clarify their positions on an issue discussed by the media through political 
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rhetoric, it increases the possibility that the public will use that issue in guiding vote 
choice.  This was certainly the case for same-sex marriage in 2004.   
In addition to the volume of coverage accorded the issue by the national media 
and coverage generated by the marriages in Massachusetts and other states, same-sex 
marriage took on an increased electoral salience when Republican leaders in Congress 
held a vote on a Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex unions, a proposal firmly 
endorsed by President George W. Bush.  Democratic nominee John Kerry tended to 
remain silent on the issue, but it was a Democratic mayor in San Francisco who 
authorized same-sex marriage licenses and strong Democratic opposition in Congress that 
likely killed the proposed Constitutional amendment.  Because the state of Massachusetts 
legalized same-sex marriages and this state has been regarded as a Democratic bastion (as 
well as being the home state of the Democratic nominee in 2004), the partisan dimension 
of the issue should have become more clear in the public mind.  This is on top of the 
polarization that took place in the 1980s and more strongly in the 1990s discussed in 
Chapter 3.  These recent political communications by political actors, in addition to the 
political polarization on lesbian and gay rights that started in the 1980s, laid the 
groundwork for an impact of same-sex marriage on the national vote. 
To recap, the key to understanding the media priming that took place concerning 
same-sex marriage is to also understand that priming nationalized the effects of the issue.  
Studies searching for state-specific effects are, as a result, unlikely to find substantive 
differences between states.  That is not to suggest that the issue did not have an effect in 
Ohio and other states with ballot initiatives (as some previous studies have found).  Since 
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media in non-ballot measure states gave the issue as much attention as those in ballot 
measure states, it suggests the effects ought to be fairly uniform across the nation.   
   
Ground Zero: Ohio in 2004 
 The logical place to begin any analysis of the 2004 presidential election is Ohio.  
It featured a high profile, anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiative, and its close outcome 
provided President Bush with his margin of victory in 2004.   Mr. Bush’s victory in Ohio 
was not a forgone conclusion during the campaign.  The state narrowly went for him in 
2000 despite his opponent’s redeployment of resources from Ohio to Florida in the 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: The 2004 Presidential Vote and the Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Ohio 
(Counties) 
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October before the election.  Moreover, the state’s economy was in marked decline by 
2004, and John Kerry attempted to make this the major issue of the campaign.  A county-
level analysis provides an appropriate starting place for an analysis of the effect of same-
sex marriage attitudes on presidential vote choice. 
 First, I examined whether there existed a correlation between “yes” votes on the 
same-sex marriage ban in Ohio and changing support for Bush between 2000 and 2004.  
Specifically, I gathered countywide voting data for the presidential elections in 2000 and 
2004 and the same-sex marriage ballot initiative in 2004.  I obtained the countywide 
results for the 2004 presidential election and same-sex marriage vote from the website of 
the office of the Ohio Secretary of State along with the results from the 2000 presidential 
election.6   
Figure 7-2 displays the aggregate percentage of “yes” on the same-sex marriage 
ban plotted against the shift in the two-party vote to President Bush from 2000 to 2004 
for all 88 Ohio counties.  A strong correlation (r =.54) between the change in the 
presidential vote and disapproval of same-sex marriage appears graphically.  Simply put, 
the more a county voted for the same-sex marriage ban, the more Bush’s share of the vote 
increased.7 
To assess the robustness of the relationship between the change in vote and the 
support for same-sex marriage ban, I estimate a multivariate model.  Obviously other 
                                                          
6 http://www.sos.state.oh.us/ 
7  Athens County appears as an outlier in the upper left corner of the chart because it contains Ohio 
University, a liberal college town, where a successful voter registration drive among students boosted the 
percentage voting for the Democrats and likely also led to the same-sex marriage ban being defeated 
county-wide.  The next cluster of counties above and to the right of Athens County, where the same-sex 
marriage ban did poorly relative to the rest of the state, include Franklin, Hamilton, and Cuyahoga 
Counties.  These counties contain the cities of Columbus, Cleveland, and Cincinnati where Kerry tended to 
do well relative to Gore in 2000. 
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factors could change voting behavior too.  The economy was a major issue, given the 
marked increase in unemployment between 2000 and 2004.  I obtained the change in 
unemployment rate for each county from October 2001 through October 2004 from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and included it in the model.  Same-sex marriage vote 
may be a proxy for other social variables such as age, urban living, or education as they 
all correlate with support for the rights of lesbians and gays and may have had an effect 
on presidential vote choice independently (Loftus 2001, Lewis and Rogers 1999, Wilcox 
and Wolpert 2000).  I obtained the percentage of residents age 15 to 32 in 2000, the 
percentage of residents over age 61 in 2000, the percentage living in areas classified as 
rural in 2000, and the percentage of residents with advanced degrees and only high 
school educations in 2000 from the U.S. census bureau and included them in the analysis.  
I then regressed the county-level results for the two-party presidential vote percentage on 
the proportion voting “yes” in the same-sex marriage ban, the two party-vote percentage 
in 2000, and these control variables.   
The results of the regression model are displayed in Table 7-1.  The first column 
contains the estimates from ordinary least squares regression model, and the second 
model contains a weighted least squares model weighted by county population.8  I also 
include in the table the first difference for statistically significant variables.   
The results conform to expectations; the impact of same-sex marriage on the 
presidential vote is substantial and significant in both models.  For every percentage point 
better the same-sex marriage ban did, Bush gained .236% of the vote from 2000 to 2004 
according to the un-weighted regression.  For every percentage point higher in 
                                                          
8 The weighted least squares method is generally necessary when using aggregated data such as the 
county level data employed here (Voss 1996).   
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Table 7-1: Change in  
Bush Vote in Ohio  
(County-Level) 
Democratic 
Percentage of Two-Party Vote 
2004 
Democratic 
Percentage of Two-Party Vote 
2004 (weighted)† 
Variable Parameter Est. 
(Std. Err.) 
First  
Difference 
Parameter Est. 
(Std. Err.) 
First  
Difference 
Constant 0.019 
(0.258) 
--- 0.026 
(0.065) 
--- 
Democratic Vote % in 
2000 
       0.968*** 
(0.032) 
0.405        0.945*** 
(0.027) 
0.395 
Nader Percentage 0.279 
(0.436) 
--- 0.223 
(0.336) 
--- 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Ban Percentage “Yes” 
      -0.236*** 
(0.067) 
0.084       -0.269*** 
(0.057) 
0.095 
Change in 
Unemployment 
(Oct.2004 – Oct.2001) 
       0.515*** 
(0.114) 
0.041    0.297* 
(0.123) 
0.023 
% Population with 
Advanced Degree 
 in 2000 Census 
   0.214* 
(0.094) 
0.075        0.252*** 
(0.074) 
0.088 
% Population with 
High School Degree or 
Less In 2000 Census 
   0.160* 
(0.072) 
0.078        0.219*** 
(0.064) 
0.106 
% Population Age 15 
to 32 in 2000 Census 
-0.009 
(0.074) 
--- -0.010 
(0.063) 
--- 
% Population Over 
Age 61 in 2000 Census 
0.004 
(0.116) 
--- -0.029 
(0.098) 
--- 
% Population 
Classified as Rural in 
2000 Census 
0.019 
(0.012) 
--- 0.003 
(0.012) 
--- 
Adj. R² .977  .991  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
† Data Weighted by County Population in 2000 Census 
 
 
unemployment relative to 2001, Mr. Bush lost .52% of the vote.  The greater variation in 
the same-sex marriage vote relative to change in unemployment suggests a larger impact 
on the vote than unemployment despite the larger coefficient estimate for the latter.  The 
first difference for the same-sex marriage ban is .084, as compared to .041 for 
unemployment.  In addition, counties with a high percentage of advanced degrees and 
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with populations that are more highly educated voted more for Kerry than Gore.  The 
model as a whole performs quite well with an R2 of .98. 
While these results suggest a large impact of the same-sex marriage ban on 
presidential vote-share, aggregate-level data should be treated with caution due to the 
chance of an ecological fallacy (King 1997).  We cannot be certain that the assertion that 
individuals who held anti-same-sex marriage positions are actually the people who 
became more likely to vote for Bush is correct.  The relationship between these variables 
may be spurious.  In addition, other factors that cannot be measured at the aggregate level 
may be causing both the change in Bush votes and the high support of the same-sex 
marriage ban.  That said, these results clearly suggest that more analysis is needed and 
that the effect of the same-sex marriage bans cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
 
An Individual Analysis of Ohio 
 Demonstrating a link at the level of the individual voter in Ohio would be 
reassuring.  The 2004 exit polls produced by Edison/Mitofsky Research and employed by 
the television networks can be used to determine the effect of attitudes about same-sex 
marriage and voting for same-sex marriage bans.  The exit polls also allow me to 
introduce additional control variables that cannot be reproduced easily at the aggregate 
level.9   
 The dependent variable here is a vote for George W. Bush, coded as a one for 
Bush and a zero otherwise.  My key independent variable is a vote in favor of the same-
                                                          
9 While the over-sample of Democrats and other liberals in the exit polls has been well documented in the 
media, this over-sample should have no significant impact on the regression analysis when party 
identification and other related variables are included as independent variables. 
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sex marriage ban, also known as State Issue 1, which was also asked on the survey.  Race 
and ethnic origin, sex, income, age, church attendance, and religion were all included as 
demographic variables on the survey and are used as control variables in the analysis 
below, along with 3-point measures of party identification and ideology.  They were all 
recoded on scales ranging from zero to one.  I also included as controls two variables 
tapping other opinions about current political issues.  Respondents were asked if they 
were safer from terrorism under Mr. Bush’s policies and what the most important 
problem was in the country.  I included dummy variables for those who indicated that 
they felt safer and that picked the economy as the most important issue.  Since my 
dependent variable is dichotomous, I employ logistic regression. 
 Table 7-2 contains the estimated effects on presidential vote choice for the same-
sex marriage ban and other variables.  While the same-sex marriage issue may not have 
been the most important of the election, my results suggest that it still had a substantial 
impact on vote choice.  The positive and significant coefficient suggests that at least 
some voters may not have supported Bush if the issue had not been on the national 
agenda.  The relationship easily holds with the control variables included in the model.  
When same-sex marriage is included in the vote-choice model, the effects of religiosity 
and religious denomination on vote choice in Ohio in 2004 lose traditional levels of 
statistical significance despite the attention the popular press gave religiosity in its 
immediate analysis of the 2004 race.  Other variables have effects conforming to 
expectations. 
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Local vs. National Effects 
But was it really the presence of the same-sex marriage measures that affected 
vote choice in Ohio or was media priming responsible for its impact?  Using only data 
based on Ohio cannot answer that question.  All the voters in the state were subjected to 
both media priming over both same-sex marriage as a national issue due to the national 
coverage of the same-sex marriage bans, and the direct effects specific to the actual 
marriage ban that appeared on the ballot in the state simultaneously.  Did the impact of 
the issue have a larger effect in Ohio and other states where same-sex marriage 
recognition was on the ballot compared to a priming effect nationally?   
To answer this question, I turn to the national exit poll also produced by 
Edison/Mitofsky.  The poll had over 10,000 respondents.  Unfortunately, the same-sex 
marriage question appeared on only one-fourth of the survey forms.  Worse, economic, 
war, terrorism, and other related variables did not appear on this particular survey form, 
so their measures cannot be included in a national analysis based on the exit poll surveys.  
However the religion battery, more central to this inquiry, was on the same form, as was 
a question asking people’s recollection of their vote for president in 2000 which allows 
me to control for voting history and, hence, understand change in voting behavior 
between 2000 and 2004.  Using the national exit poll, I reproduced the same logistic 
regression as with Ohio, but included new variables from the religion battery that may 
have been responsible for the relationship between vote choice and same-sex marriage, 
and dropped the questions involving national issues that were not included on the form.  
Attitudes involving abortion and self-identifying as a born again or evangelical Christian  
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Table 7-2:  
2004 Ohio Exit Poll 
The Effect of Gay Marriage 
on Bush Vote in 2004 (Ohio) 
Variable Parameter Est. Std. Error 
Constant       -4.527*** 0.397 
Party ID (3-pt)        3.742*** 0.280 
Ideology (3-pt)  1.345    0.350 
Black     -1.194** 0.411 
Female  0.147 0.200 
Income   0.113 0.351 
Protestant  0.305 0.249 
Catholic  0.392 0.249 
Religiosity  0.573 0.362 
Over 65 years old -0.222 0.392 
Under 30 years old  0.031 0.240 
Hispanic Origin -1.129  0.626 
Safer From Terror         2.122*** 0.203 
Economy MIP        -1.890*** 0.246 
“Yes” on Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban 
        0.988*** 0.211 
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 
  90.9 %  
Cox and Snell. R² .597 N=1512 
Logistic Regression 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed tests 
 
 
were added to the model along with race, sex, Hispanic origin, church attendance, age, 
party identification and ideology.   
As opposed to the self reported same-sex marriage ban vote in the Ohio data, the 
national exit poll asked respondents if they were in favor of same-sex marriage, civil 
unions, or no legal recognition for gay couples.  I coded the same-sex marriage variable 
as 0 for support of same-sex marriage, .5 for support for civil unions, and 1 for no legal 
recognition.  I then created two dummy variables: a variable equaling 1 if the respondent 
voted in a state with a same-sex marriage ban, and 0 if they did not; and another variable 
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Table 7-3:  
2004 National Exit Poll 
A Republican Vote for 
President in 2004 
2004 National Exit Poll  
 Model 1 
A Republican Preference for 
President in 2004 
2004 National Exit Poll  
Model 2 
Variable Parameter Est. Std. Error Parameter Est. Std. Error 
Constant       -4.422*** 0.273       -4.406*** 0.270 
Party ID (3-pt)        3.068*** 0.190        3.063*** 0.191 
Ideology (3-pt)        1.510*** 0.237        1.498*** 0.236 
Bush Vote in 2000        2.192*** 0.154        2.205*** 0.153 
Hispanic Origin   -0.572* 0.255   -0.604* 0.255 
Black        -1.541*** 0.294        -1.551*** 0.294 
Female       0.392** 0.143       0.381** 0.143 
Under 30 years old     0.433* 0.186     0.421* 0.186 
Over 65 years old  -0.424 0.235  -0.440 0.235 
Income  -0.182 0.242  -0.217 0.241 
Abortion        1.300*** 0.262        1.315*** 0.262 
Religiosity -0.468 0.270 -0.422 0.256 
Born Again    0.432* 0.190    0.377* 0.178 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Attitude (3-pt) 
       1.248*** 0.220        1.347*** 0.213 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Ban on Ballot† 
-0.006 0.630   
Same-Sex Marriage* 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Ban† 
  0.454 0.794   
Born Again*Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban† 
-0.219 0.457   
Religosity*Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban† 
 0.027 0.663   
Ohio Dummy Variable    0.334 0.666 
Same-Sex Marriage 
*Ohio† 
  -0.419 0.988 
Born Again*Ohio†    0.495 0.767 
Religosity*Ohio†   -0.422 1.142 
     
% correctly predicted 89.5%  89.4%  
Cox and Snell. R² .567 N=2651 .567 N=2651 
Logistic Regression 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, two-tailed tests 
† When these models are re-estimated leaving out all but one of the interaction variables, the 
interaction variable is still statistically insignificant.  This shows that insignificance for those 
variables is not due to multicollinearity among them. 
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equaling 1 if the respondent to the national exit poll voted in Ohio and 0 otherwise.  The 
first variable will determine the actual effect of having a same-sex marriage ban on the 
ballot.  The second was created to test the proposition that the Ohio same-sex marriage 
ban had more of an effect on vote choice due to the intensity of the Ohio presidential 
campaign as compared to the other bans.  I then interacted these variables with a number 
of other variables that, theoretically, could have increased the likelihood of a vote for 
Bush with a same-sex marriage ban on the ballot: church attendance, status as a born-
again Christian, and attitude toward same-sex marriage.  I included all of these 
interactions in two models, one examining the differences between same-sex marriage 
ban states and non-same-sex marriage ban states in 2004, and one looking at differences 
between Ohio and the rest of the nation.  I then estimated the effect of same-sex marriage 
attitudes, the effect of residing in a state with a same-sex marriage ban on the ballot, and 
the interaction of the two on vote choice for George W. Bush for two models: one testing 
the effects for residing in Ohio and its interactions, and one for all states with a marriage 
ban. 
 Table 7-3 contains logistic regression estimates for two models designed to 
answer the above questions.  First the effect of attitudes toward same-sex marriage, as 
measured by the 3-point same-sex marriage variable, is statistically significant and 
substantial.  The change in probability predicted by the model is graphed in Figure 7-3 
for Model 1 of Table 7-3.  The calculations in Figure 7-3 assumed a white male who 
makes between $30,000 and $49,999 in a year, attends church once a week, believes 
abortion should be mostly legal, and is between 30 and 65 years of age.  The results 
depicted in Figure 7-3 show that same-sex marriage attitudes had a major impact on vote  
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Figure 7-3: Shift in Probability of Bush Vote Based on Gay Marriage Position 
 
 
choice at the national level and not just in the pivotal state of Ohio.  If the voter was a 
moderate and independent, the probability that the individual would vote for Bush 
increases by nearly 30% from near 50% to 80% if he favors no legal recognition for gay 
and lesbian couples versus favoring same-sex marriage.  Had this same respondent voted 
for Al Gore in 2000, he would have seen nearly a 20% increase in his probability of 
voting for Mr. Bush in 2004 moving from an attitude of pro- to anti-same-sex marriage.  
If he was a conservative Democrat and had voted for Mr. Bush in 2000, the chances of 
him supporting Mr. Bush again would have gone from one in three, to three out of five 
depending on his position on same-sex marriage.  In relative terms, the magnitude of the 
effect of same-sex marriage attitudes is nearly the same as the magnitude of the effect of 
ideology.  The impact of same-sex marriage dwarfs that of identifying as “born again”, 
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and when both variables and attitudes toward abortion are included in the equation, 
church attendance (religiosity) is insignificant and in the wrong direction.  Furthermore, 
the model performs well and correctly accounts for nearly 90% of individual voting 
decisions. 
 Equally important, there is no evidence that the effect of same-sex marriage was 
disproportionately concentrated in either Ohio or the 11 states where a same-sex marriage 
ban was on the ballot in 2004.10  Interaction terms between these geographic and 
religious variables and same-sex marriage are also insignificant.  The interaction term 
between anti-same-sex marriage attitudes and having the issue on the ballot is in the 
expected direction, but it lacks statistical significance.  Furthermore the interaction term 
in the model involving the same-sex marriage issue and residence in Ohio has the 
improper sign as well as being statistically insignificant.  Taken together these results 
suggest that same-sex marriage has had a national effect.  The national effect likely was 
caused by media priming on the issue, and could not have been caused by same-sex 
marriage ban amendments that were only present in some localities.  These results are 
consistent with the content analysis of local and national newspaper coverage above.  In 
short, attitudes involving lesbian and gay rights impacted the presidential vote nationally. 
 
Determining Causation: The 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel 
 It is possible that using a traditional regression model to estimate the effect of 
same-sex marriage on vote choice might prove misleading.  The relationship between 
same-sex marriage and vote choice or same-sex marriage and attitudes toward the 
                                                          
10 The results in table 3 hold if the models are estimated with only one each of the interactions suggesting 
insignificance is not due to mulitcollinearity among the interaction variables. 
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president might be endogenous.  When the party position is clarified through political 
communications it may lead individuals with weakly held attitudes on same-sex 
marriage, but strong partisan or ideological identities or positive affect toward the 
president, to adopt the party position on same-sex marriage given the clarified stance on 
the issue specified by the leaders of the party (Zaller 1992).  In essence, Republican-
leaning individuals or individuals predisposed to trust the president on other grounds will 
become more likely to adopt positions against same-sex marriage leading to the illusion 
of support for a priming hypothesis.  This causal mechanism is an elite-led public opinion 
change and in simple models of voting based on cross sectional survey data, priming and 
elite-led public opinion change will yield identical and significant results.  This is despite 
the notion that the attitude causing the other to change in the two theoretical models are 
completely different.  Support for Mr. Bush in 2004 can lead to a position against same-
sex marriage just as being against same-sex marriage can lead to support for Mr. Bush. 
One way to account for this is through finding measures of same-sex marriage 
attitudes or beliefs about lesbian and gay family legitimacy and that could have effects on 
presidential vote that are independent and exogenous from both the media coverage on 
same-sex marriage and the associated same-sex marriage bans that took place in 2003 
and 2004.  To do so, I employ the 2000-2002-2004 American National Election Study 
(ANES) panel which contained a question on the first wave in 2000 asking respondents 
whether they approved of lesbian and gay couples adopting children.11 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately, attitudes about gay marriage were not asked in the 2000 cross section.  Fortunately, 
support for or against lesbian and gay adoption, an attitude which is highly similar to attitudes on same-
sex marriage, was asked in the 2000 round of interviews.  The bivariate correlation between the two 
attitudes is .590 (N=972) using the 2004 NES.  This is a very strong relationship.  Incidentally, the ANES 
panel also asked attitudes about job protections for homosexuals and attitudes on gays in the military.  In 
this analysis I assume that attitudes on lesbian and gay adoption are much closer to attitudes on gay 
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 Using the 2000-2002-2004 ANES, I first constructed a voting model to test for a 
potential effect of gay adoption on vote choice in 2000.  Theoretically, there should be no 
effect.  The media coverage surrounding same-sex marriages did not take place until 
2003 and 2004 and neither same-sex marriage nor had lesbian and gay adoption had been 
significantly debated in the national press.12  I constructed the model using variables that 
traditionally affect voting behavior.  Specifically included are party identification (7-pt), 
income (measured as a scale based on the NES coding categories), age, education, and 
education squared along with dummy variables for female respondents, African-
Americans, and Latino respondents.  In addition, I constructed a scale of domestic policy 
issues by using the mean of the government spending scale, attitudes on school vouchers, 
and guaranteed jobs by the government, and government health insurance.   I also 
constructed a foreign policy scale from attitudes on isolationism and defense spending.13  
I measured attitudes about Mr. Bush as a candidate that may have had effects on vote 
choice using the mean of the responses to questions about specific personality traits 
                                                                                                                                                                             
marriage in 2004 than to job protections for lesbians gays and lesbians and gays in the military.  Number 
one, gay job protections and gays in the military were old issues and likely already incorporated into the 
political system.  Same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption and other issues involving beliefs about gay 
families had never been subject to a major national debate before 2003.  Second, many more Americans 
agree with job protections for gays and lesbians and gays in the military than same-sex adoption and 
same-sex marriage in 2004.  While less than half the public agrees with same-sex adoption and same-sex 
marriage, over three-fourths regularly agree that gays and lesbians should serve openly in the military and 
should not be discriminated against in employment according to the 2004 NES cross sectional study.  
Lastly, same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption are likely more related attitudes than same-sex 
marriage and the other two.  Same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption both tap feelings about the 
family and particularly gender roles in the family, while lesbian and gay jobs and lesbians and gays in the 
military are related more with individualism and egalitarianism.  The bivariate correlations in the 2004 
NES were only .394 (N=973) and .358 (N=973) between gay marriage and gays in the military respectively.   
12 Not counting the debate in Vermont surrounding civil unions or those based on similar court decisions 
in Hawaii or Alaska.  Since gay marriages never actually resulted from these decisions, I assume that the 
effects of these debates never had as large of an effect on voting psychology, or the press, as those 
sparked by the Massachusetts SJC decision in 2003. 
13 Recall Mr. Bush took an isolationist position in the presidential debates in 2000. 
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measured in a more favorable way.  I used retrospective views on how well the economy 
was performing over 1999 as a measure of economic voting.  Finally, I controlled for 
several items tapping religion and associated attitudes: church attendance, belonging to a 
Protestant denomination, being Catholic, identifying as born-again, abortion attitudes, 
and moral traditionalism.  Moral traditionalism gauges attitudes about change in society 
and lifestyles and whether these changes are bad or good and is common in models 
involving religion and lesbian and gay issues (Wilcox and Wolpert 2000).14  Finally 
lesbian and gay adoption attitudes are measured by a variable taking the value of one if 
the respondent indicated they are against gay adoption and zero otherwise.  All variables 
(except age) were recoded on scales to have a maximum of one and minimum of zero.  I 
estimate the effects on presidential vote choice in 2000 using logistic regression. 
 The results, displayed in Model 1 of Table 7-4, confirm the hypothesis that 
lesbian and gay adoption attitudes and, by implication, same-sex marriage, mattered little 
in 2000.  Candidate traits, party, age, and domestic issues appear to driving the vote, 
along with moral traditionalism and identifying as born-again.   
Next, I re-estimated the same model, using their 2000 values to estimate their effects on 
the vote in 2004.  Using the 2000 values solves the endogeneity problem between lesbian 
and gay adoption and vote choice as attitudes in 2000 are exogenous to changes that took 
place that were caused by media and political rhetoric that took place in 2003 and 2004.   
The results of the 2004 vote choice model (Model 2 in Table 7-4) show a large 
and significant effect of gay adoption attitudes in 2000 on vote choice in 2004, 
                                                          
14 Ideology is not included in the model below because of problems in the reliability of the measure across 
interview formats (Luskin 1987; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989).   
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Table 6-4: Gay 
Adoption and the 
2000-2002-2004 
ANES Panel 
Study (Logistic 
Regressions) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(std. error) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(std. error) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(std. error) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(std. error) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(std. error) 
       Dependent     
       Variableà 
Independent 
Variables (Below) 
2-Party 
Vote 
2000(Bush
) 
2-Party 
Vote 2004( 
Bush) 
2-Party 
Vote 2004 
(Bush) 
2-Party 
Vote 2004 
(Bush) 
2-Party 
Vote 2004 
(Bush) 
Gay Adoption 
(2000) 
 
 0.276 
(0.315) 
    0.998** 
(0.348) 
  1.664* 
(0.653) 
    1.885** 
(0.749) 
   1.060@ 
(0.598) 
Party  
    (2000, 2004 in 
model 5) 
   6.186*** 
(0.521) 
    4.725*** 
(0.571) 
1.397 
(1.136) 
1.362 
(1.148) 
   3.963*** 
(1.963) 
Abortion  
    (2000, 2004 in  
     model 5) 
0.438 
(0.440) 
0.747 
(0.477) 
 -0.537 
(0.982) 
-0.678 
(1.027) 
-0.603 
(0.958) 
Income  
    (2000, 2004 in  
    model 5) 
 0.445 
(1.077) 
 0.451 
(1.135) 
-0.020 
(2.035) 
-0.009 
(2.044) 
1.488 
(0.922) 
Born Again (2000)    0.583@ 
(0.341) 
0.602 
(0.379) 
0.207 
(0.741) 
0.231 
(0.752) 
0.939 
(0.697) 
Moral 
Traditionalism 
(2000) 
   0.381@ 
(0.202) 
 0.317 
(0.222) 
 0.512 
(0.386) 
0.485 
(0.386) 
0.460 
(0.391) 
Education (2000) -3.164 
(2.670) 
-2.545 
(3.083) 
-3.367 
(5.171) 
-2.914 
(5.151) 
-9.000* 
(4.247) 
Education^2 
(2000) 
1.448 
(2.191) 
 0.872 
(2.448) 
 2.497 
(4.225) 
2.132 
(4.218) 
   6.220@ 
(3.487) 
Religiosity  
    (2000, 2004 in  
    model 5) 
 -0.042 
(0.470) 
0.499 
(0.477) 
 0.064 
(0.918) 
0.215 
(0.944) 
  1.039 
(0.768) 
G. W. Bush Traits 
Mean  (2000, 2004 
in model 5) 
   7.491*** 
(1.044) 
    4.870*** 
(1.139) 
-0.308 
(1.980) 
-0.504 
(2.010) 
   5.457*** 
(1.578) 
Domestic Issues,  
    (2000, 2004 in      
    model 5) 
 -2.072*** 
(0.643) 
-0.746 
(0.752) 
-0.529 
(1.336) 
-0.542 
(1.349) 
1.247 
(1.653) 
Foreign Policy 
Issues 
    (2000) 
0.445 
(0.506) 
0.251 
(0.547) 
     
Black -1.324 
(1.057) 
   -2.964** 
(1.134) 
 -2.357@ 
(1.281) 
 -2.537@ 
(1.313) 
-3.533* 
(1.615) 
Hispanic -0.014 
(0.864) 
-0.013 
(0.757) 
0.668 
(1.441) 
0.615 
(1.454) 
0.019 
(1.803) 
Protestant (2000) 0.394 
(0.647) 
 0.135 
(0.604) 
-1.157 
(1.139) 
-1.085 
(1.154) 
-1.579 
(1.037) 
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Table 7.4 (cont.) 
Catholic (2000) 0.665 
(0.601) 
0.084 
(0.794) 
-2.057 
(1.265) 
  -2.118@ 
(1.261) 
  -2.572* 
(1.106) 
Female 0.062 
(0.294) 
 0.282 
(0.326) 
0.153 
(0.597) 
0.117 
(0.603) 
-0.072 
(0.560) 
Age    -0.027** 
(0.010) 
  -0.042*** 
(0.011) 
   -0.090** 
(0.022) 
   -0.063** 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban 
States (2004) 
    0.245 
(1.026) 
 
Same-sex Ban 
States*Gay 
Adoption (2004, 
2000)  
   -0.911 
(1.413) 
 
Strength of 
Opposition for 
Bush’s War on 
Terror (2004) 
   -3.592*** 
(0.839) 
 -3.675*** 
(0.863) 
 -1.695* 
(0.837) 
Bush 2-Party Vote 
2000 
     2.640*** 
(0.779) 
   2.674*** 
(0.806) 
     1.636** 
(0.575) 
Economy over 
Past Year  
(2000, 2004 in 
models 3,5) 
-0.352 
(0.487) 
-0.720 
(0.547) 
     -0.732 
(1.234) 
-0.575 
(1.257) 
-1.255 
(1.273) 
Iraq Not Worth It 
(2004) 
  -1.879*** 
(0.589) 
   -1.857** 
(0.593) 
  -1.330* 
(0.633) 
Constant   -3.679* 
(1.528) 
 -1.266 
(1.700) 
  5.953* 
(2.834) 
  5.730* 
(2.869) 
-0.972 
(2.780) 
Cox and Snell R^2 .600 .541 .666 .666 .677 
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 
90.3% 87.6% 94.7% 94.9% 95.9% 
Number of Cases 801 490 415 415 491 
@p<.01, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 – two tailed tests 
 
 
despite that these attitudes were measured over four years before the act of voting.  The 
effect is roughly equivalent to moving up a position on the party ID scale in 2000 or 
rating Mr. Bush more favorably on about 4 or 5 specific candidate characteristics.15   
                                                          
15 These results in model 2 hold if views on biblical interpretation and authoritarianism are added.  Also 
the coefficient on lesbian and gay adoption  remains significant if the sample is restricted to only voters 
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Using only the 2000 variables may be problematic, however.  New issues also 
entered the political debate over Mr. Bush’s first term and attitudes involving these issues 
may be correlated with attitudes involving gay and lesbian adoption and same-sex 
marriage.  The foreign policy scale in 2000 is likely a very poor measure on attitudes 
involving terrorism and the war in Iraq.  To better account for these new issues, in Model 
3, I add in attitudes measuring disapproval for the president’s war on terror, the 
respondent’s evaluation of the value of the Iraq war, and the direction of the respondents’ 
two-party vote in the 2000 election.  I also updated the retrospective evaluation of the 
economy based on change in the national economy from the last year to the 2004 
assessments from the 2000 assessments.  Adding in these new measures, as illustrated in 
the third column of Table 7-4, actually increases the magnitude of the gay adoption 
attitude effect’s estimate.  Other new issues involving foreign policy are clearly not 
driving the effect of lesbian and gay rights attitudes, although terrorism and the Iraq war 
are themselves also having major effects on presidential voting behavior.  The effect of 
gay adoption attitudes are roughly the same magnitude of those of attitudes on the value 
of the war in Iraq, and twice the effect size of economic evaluations. 
Next I change the model to test for effects of the same-sex marriage bans in 2004.  
This is in order to create a model that matched the exit poll results presented above as 
closely as possible.  Recall that this should manifest itself as an interactive effect between 
voting in a same-sex marriage ban state and same-sex marriage attitudes, here proxied by 
gay and lesbian adoption attitudes.  Model 4 includes the dummy variable for same-sex 
marriage ban states in 2004 and the associated interaction.  Neither is significant in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
who voted for Mr. Gore in 2000 are modeled indicating that beliefs about the legitimacy of lesbian and 
gay families can effect votes. 
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statistical sense and the coefficient on the interaction is in the wrong direction paralleling 
the results from the exit polls above.  This suggests again that same-sex marriage bans 
themselves had no effect on vote choice while same-sex marriage attitudes did. 
Lastly, I updated the model using (endogenous) attitudes measured in 2004.  I do 
this to get a sense of the dynamics between lesbian and gay adoption and the other 
variables.  Lesbian and gay adoption is kept at its 2000 values, along with age, religious 
denomination, sex, and race.  Presumably these demographic categories are stable over 
time.  Updated values for moral traditionalism, education, and born again were not 
available in 2004 so I continue to use the 2000 values, as I do with gay adoption.  The 
results of the new vote-choice model are in Model 5 of Table 7-4.  The effects of Bush’s 
character traits and party identification, whose 2000 measures had been drowned out by 
the 2004 attitudes involving terror and Iraq reappear and are large and statistically 
significant.  The effect of lesbian and gay adoption declines as compared to models 2 and 
3, as would be predicted if candidate traits, party identification, or other updated variables 
in 2004 are related to lesbian and gay adoption or same-sex marriage endogenously.  This 
demonstrated endogeneity also explains why others  have sometimes failed to find a 
significant or large effect of same-sex marriage or lesbian and gay rights attitudes on vote 
choice in 2004 (Mockabee 2007).  This effect is clear when examining multiple data 
sources as has been demonstrated throughout this paper.  Same-sex marriage and lesbian 
and gay rights attitudes are exerting effects, particularly through Bush candidate traits, 
indirectly through endogeneous relationships between the variables.  This can be 
demonstrated by looking at the correlation between Bush traits in 2000 and 2004 and 
lesbian and gay adoption attitudes measured in 2000.  The correlation between 2000 Bush 
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traits and adoption attitudes is .216 (N=1215), while the correlation in 2004 is .340 
(N=771).  Finally, the results in model 1 of Table 7-4 also hold when restricted to voters 
who continued throughout the entire panel and reported voting in both elections. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Political scientists are beginning to realize that ballot initiatives can, by helping to 
set the criteria by which voters match their issue positions to parties and candidates, shift 
results of close elections (Nicholson 2005).  This chapter confirms that same-sex 
marriage, in 2004, had the potential to have a decisive effect by defining the agenda for 
the election.  The national media, through coverage of the same-sex marriage issue, 
shaped the context of choice that voters used to decide upon a candidate.  The context 
created a linkage between attitudes and beliefs about lesbian and gay families and their 
legitimacy, government recognition and policies toward these families, and ultimately 
candidate choice in the 2004 presidential election.   
Pundits and scholars who have claimed that the ballot initiatives themselves had 
an effect on vote choice have missed the more likely causal mechanism behind this issue: 
namely, the discussion of same-sex marriage by national media elites.  This is not to say 
that had the same-sex marriage bans not been on the ballot that there would have still 
been as large of an effect of same-sex marriage attitudes on vote choice.  Their presence 
created an environment amenable to a media narrative weaving together the 2004 
presidential election and same-sex marriage.  This narrative gave the numerous ballot 
measures banning same-sex marriage an impact outside of their respective states.  They, 
along with the media, interacted to create what was essentially a national referendum on 
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the issue.  Lastly, the effect of lesbian and gay adoption attitudes measured in 2000 on 
vote choice in 2004 rather than on vote choice in 2000 provides strong confirmation that 
attitudes towards lesbian and gay families are determining vote choice rather than vote 
choice and elite led opinion determining attitudes towards the legitimacy of gay and 
lesbian families.   
In terms of the larger story of this dissertation, it should be stated that public 
opinion about lesbians and gays are not just a cause of the political system but also help 
structure the political system in an endogenous fashion.  The polarization on lesbian and 
gay rights issues in the 1990s and the election of Bill Clinton changed attitudes towards 
lesbian and gay rights.  Attitudes towards lesbian and gay rights then potentially helped 
change the results of the 2004 presidential campaign.  This makes for a difficult 
balancing act for politicians.  Supporting an unpopular minority group can make public 
attitudes toward that group more positive over time, but that support may risk an 
immediate backlash.  However, if support for minority rights rises high enough, 
politicians can collect the material benefits of support, volunteers and campaign 
donations, with virtually no risk of backlash.  Democratic politicians in California are 
taking strong positions in favor of same-sex marriage in order to win support in 
Democratic primaries and the backing of activists.  This is in spite of the fact that the 
state banned same-sex marriage in 2008.  Same-sex marriage appears to be headed for the 
ballot in Maine and California (as a repeal of the 2008 initiative).  Both measures have a 
good chance of being decided in a pro-gay direction, which has left Republican who are 
against same-sex marriage much less vocal than in 2008. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION: BUSH, OBAMA, AND THE FUTURE OF  
LESBIAN AND GAY PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
 
 
 Although the American Psychiatric Association’s removal of homosexuality from 
the list of mental disordered marked a shift in elite thinking credited with starting the 
process of mass attitude change towards lesbians and gays (Zaller 1992), the real process 
is more complicated.  Gays and lesbians developed a collective identity suitable for 
political mobilization and activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Entrepreneurial 
candidates for office noticed this development in urban centers and targeted electoral 
appeals to these constituents almost immediately after the collective identity developed.  
As the lesbian and gay movement institutionalized, interest groups formed which targeted 
donations and activists towards the Democratic Party.  This caused mainstream 
democratic politicians to liberalize on lesbian and gay rights, starting an issue evolution 
similar to the one that took place on race in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989).   
Attitudes towards lesbian and gays have changed radically since the early 1990s 
due to two major factors contingent on these events.  The support of Democrats and Bill 
Clinton for lesbian and gay rights was the first of these.  It and don’t-ask-don’t-tell 
provided a visible symbol of the polarization that had taken place at the elite level 
involving lesbian and gay issues and was received much more new coverage than 
previous lesbian and gay issues.  Democrats in the mass public began to liberalize their  
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Figure 8-2: Television, the 2004 Election, and Declining Acceptance towards Same-Sex 
Relations among Youth 
 
 
attitudes.  Clinton’s election then triggered an increase in lesbian and gay television 
characters which broadened attitude liberalization beyond his party’s.   
Remember, the support of Democratic elites itself was contingent on the 
development of a lesbian and gay movement in major U. S. cities that could provide 
resources to Democrats.  Elite-led change must often come from the bottom up.  The 
lesbian and gay movement thrived because it articulated and spread a lesbian and gay 
identity throughout the country.  This had many cultural effects beyond the political 
sphere.  This process and its historical narrative are outlined in Figure 8-1. 
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 While it seems that further advances for lesbian and gay rights are certain in the 
future and that attitude liberalization will continue at its current pace, there are reasons to 
be more guarded.  In addition to the possibility of the election of politicians unfriendly 
towards the rights of lesbians and gays described in Chapter 7, the clock can easily be 
rolled back on public support of gay rights directly.  This came close very close to 
happening in 2004, and is illustrated in Figure 8-2.  Although not directly comparable to  
Figure 1-4, Figure 8-2 displays a count of shows with lesbian, gay, or bisexual characters 
on the big three television networks from 2001 onward16.  The rise of cable television and 
the internet has rendered this measure less valid after the 1990s, but it still acts as a rough 
measure of the cultural representation of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in the American 
mainstream.   
Despite the explosion in the number of shows on TV with the creation of new 
networks, the number of characters on the big three networks shows a small decline from 
its high in 2001 and 2002.  The same-sex marriage debate in 2003 and 2004 was 
concurrent with this decline.  Also, unlike the 1990s, the 2004 presidential election 
showcased an incumbent president strongly against lesbian and gay rights illustrated by 
same-sex marriage.  Even the Democratic nominee, Sen. John Kerry, equivocated in his 
support. 
If the effect of the decline in characters and the lack of presidential support for 
gay rights can be seem in public opinion, it would be most readily detectable among the 
nation’s youth who have not experienced older time periods and have less static opinions.  
                                                          
16 This count was derived from a different method than the count of figure 4 of chapter 1.  This count was 
created by referencing www.glaad.org and conducting a number of web searches for television 
characters.  Reality show characters, which increased dramatically over this period, were not included, 
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Indeed, as shown in Figure 8-2, the nation’s youngest citizens became less supportive of 
gay rights over the course of Bush’s first term and reelection campaign.  With lesbian and 
gay cultural representation on the decline and presidential leadership against lesbian and 
gay rights, a retreat from acceptance of homosexuality started. 
But the retreat from tolerance was not to be.  Bush’s popularity declined rapidly 
after his reelection to the point where he no longer capable of influencing many members 
of the mass public in an anti-gay direction.  Likewise the number of lesbian, bisexual, and 
gay characters started increasing again with a new generation of television shows in 
2005.  In 2008, Republican John McCain did not make opposition to same-sex marriage a 
major issue in the campaign.  After his loose, his daughter, Megan McCain, stated that 
the Republican Party needed to liberalize on lesbian and gay rights in order to appeal to 
young voters.  By 2006 the retreat from tolerance had itself reversed and by 2008 the 
nation’s youth had become so supportive of lesbian and gay relationships that the 2004 
backlash became lost in the decades long tread of liberalization. 
 
Obama: A Difficult Position 
 2008 also brought the election of a second pro-lesbian and gay rights Democratic 
president, Barack Hussein Obama.  Like Clinton, he campaigned on ending Don’t-Ask-
Don’t-Tell (DADT), adding hate-crimes protections for lesbians and gays to existing 
federal statutes, and passing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).  
However, in spite of high Democratic margins of control in both the House and the 
Senate, none of these agenda items has become law as of six months into his presidency.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
causing a slightly smaller number than Figure 1-4.  Also the number of episodes each character appeared 
in was unable to be verified, meaning some minor characters may have accidentally been listed. 
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Only hate-crimes protections seem likely to be enacted in the immediate future.  The 
Obama administration seems particularly against an immediate repeal of DADT, despite 
a need for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The reason for President Obama’s lack of vocal support for lesbian and gay rights 
issues is almost certainly due to his seeming command of presidential history and strong 
desire to avoid problems experienced by previous presidents.  For instance, instead of 
imposing health care reform on Congress, he has taken a hands-off and cooperative 
approach to the legislature, in an attempt not to follow in the footsteps of President 
Carter.  Carter had dictated to the Congress and ended up alienating needed support for 
his entire administration. 
Obama appears to be avoiding lesbian and gay rights in order to avoid triggering a 
potential backlash like the one experienced by Bill Clinton in 1994.  Recall that 
Democrats lost both houses of Congress in 1994.  Bills supportive of lesbian and gay 
rights were keep from making it to the floor regularly as described in Chapter 3.  Even if 
a number of lesbian and gay rights bills became law prior to the 2010 midterm elections, 
strong public support would not guarantee that these bills wouldn’t be repealed if the 
Republicans took control after the midterm.  The Republican 104th Congress had no 
trouble repealing a popular assault weapons ban passed in the Democratic 103rd Congress 
in order to increase its appeal to members of its base.  Obama appears to be moving 
slowly on gay rights issue, and perhaps extremely slowly, in accordance with his 
perception of the best interests of the Democratic Congress, lesbian and gay activists, and 
himself by avoiding an electoral backlash partly due to gay rights issues in 2010.  
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However, the long term interests of all of these groups would dictate a quicker 
and more vocal response.  Gay and lesbian rights are relatively unpopular in the African-
American community although they are widely supported by Black civil rights leaders 
and members of the Congressional Black Caucus.  More vocal support for lesbian and 
gay rights would likely liberalize the mass Africa-American community in the long run.  
This would eliminate the possibility of a future schism within the Democratic Party.  
Several gay and lesbian activists noted that a lack of African-American support for same-
sex marriage was a contributing factor to the passage of a ban on same-sex marriage in 
the state of California (although the lack of a coherent campaign that appealed to African-
Americans by lesbian and gay activists likely contributed to this outcome). 
Additionally, Obama’s added appeal to young voters would hasten the 
liberalization process if he made a more vocal appeal.  As mentioned above, by 
increasing tolerance in the public over time, the chance of backlash decreases in the long 
run.  For instance, no major politician would today advocate de jure school segregation 
based on race, even in the South, although making an appeal to desegregate would have 
resulted in an electoral backlash in the 1950s and 1960s in the region.  A similar pattern 
has slowly been unfolding for gay and lesbian rights since the 1990s.   
Obama appears to have resolved the balance between short term risks and long 
term rewards by acting in a risk averse manner. He does not want to jeopardize his 
initiatives on economic recovery and health care, which are of higher salience to the 
public than gay rights.  Because the liberalization of attitudes on homosexuality now 
seems unrelenting, the lack of presidential leadership is likely not interpreted as having a 
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significant effect on the process.  This would be a mistake.  As happened during the Bush 
years, the process could easily reverse itself.  Gains could slip away into nothingness.   
 
The Annihilation and Creation of Tolerance 
 Has the trend toward a more tolerant society over the last century been a natural 
and unavoidable outcome of the enlightenment and industrialization?  Or is it contingent 
on other factors that can be turned back and reversed?  This research suggests the latter.  
Changes in television and political leaders complement each other in causing social 
change.  But when eliminated, tolerance can disappear.  Increasing mass tolerance would 
not have occurred without the rise of mass media and entertainment in the 20th century.  
Likewise the structure and policies of the media and entertainment industries shape all 
the contours of our society in unexpected ways.   
State regulation of television and entertainment can create and destroy tolerance 
within cultures in support of a public good or to strengthen a ruling social group or class.  
Government regulation of television in favor of increasing tolerance appears unlikely, 
however, for the very reason that this requires elite support that unpopular groups do not 
have.  
 The free market itself may not be well suited to increase tolerance.  Unpopular 
minorities often make unpopular and controversial characters, and without the effect of 
political elites in starting social change, it may not be economical for executives in 
change of content to change television prior to shifts in the political arena. Niche media, 
cable, and the internet, however, may increase diversity in the long run, but if only 
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individuals who are already tolerant watch this media, the vast majority of the public will 
remain unchanged. 
 The way the gay and lesbian movement affected change seems to be one viable 
model.  Groups in urban centers and in Washington, DC lobbied elites, while 
organizations like the Gay & Lesbian Alliance against Defamation (GLAAD) lobbied 
media elites and monitored media content.  Without the economic resources that many 
lesbian and gay individuals had in the 1970s and 1980s, the pressure created by these 
groups may not have been possible.  The African-American civil rights movement 
focused on news media and used a larger number of volunteers to pressure leaders in the 
1960s in contrast to the model used by the lesbian and gay rights movement. 
 What is certain is that both television and the media matter in affecting change.  
When sexuality liberalized in the 1960s, attitudes toward gays were left behind.  When 
more lesbian and gays forged a collective identity, public opinion barely budged.  When 
psychiatric and media elites declared that lesbians and gays were not mentally ill, the 
public seemed to turn a deaf ear.  But when a president supported lesbian and gay people, 
the public started listening.  Finally, when lesbians and gays characters started streaming 
into homes in the mid 1990s, the message broke through.  Tolerance grew and 
government policies shifted.  Changing media had changed minds. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
QUESTION CODING FOR SECOND POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA SET 
 
Survey  Year Variable Question Wording Coding 
LA Times 1983 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
Do you favor or oppose laws 
to protect homosexuals 
against job discrimination? 
1 = Favor, 0 = Oppose, 
Other Responses 
LA Times 1983 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you know any friends or 
co-workers who are openly 
homosexual? (IF NOT) Do you 
know any friends or co-
workers who you suspect are 
homosexuals? 
1 = Yes, open 
homosexuals, 0 = Other 
responses [including 
suspected] 
LA Times 1983 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
In your opinion, what causes 
homosexuality? Is it 
something that people are 
born with … or is it 
something that develops 
because of the way people 
are brought up … or is it just 
the way that some people 
prefer to live? 
1= Something that 
people are born with, 0 
= Other responses 
LA Times 1985 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
Do you favor or oppose laws 
to protect homosexuals 
against job discrimination? 
1 = Favor, 0 = Oppose, 
Other Responses 
LA Times 1985 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you have any friends, or 
relatives, or co-workers who 
have told you, personally, 
that they are gay or lesbian? 
(If no) Do you have any 
friends, or relatives, or co-
workers who you seriously 
suspect are gay or lesbian --- 
but they haven't told you? 
1 = Yes, [explicitly] told 
you, 0 = Other 
responses 
LA Times 1985 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
In your opinion, what causes 
homosexuality? Is it 
something that people are 
born with … or is it 
something that develops 
because of the way people 
1= Something that 
people are born with, 0 
= Other responses 
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are brought up … or is it just 
the way that some people 
prefer to live? 
Gallup 1993 Gays in the 
Military 
Do you favor Keeping the ban 
on homosexuals serving in 
the military? 
1 = Favor ending the 
ban, 0 = Other 
responses 
Gallup 1993 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you have a co-worker, 
friends or relative who is 
openly homosexual? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
Gallup 1993 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
In your opinion, what causes 
homosexuality? Is 
homosexuality… 
1 = Something that 
people are born with, 0 
= Other responses 
CBS & NY 
Times 
1993 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
As you know, there has been 
considerable discussion in 
the news lately regarding the 
rights of homosexual men 
and women.  In general, do 
you think homosexuals 
should or should not have 
equal rights in terms of job 
opportunities? 
1 = Should,  0= Should 
not, Other responses 
CBS & NY 
Times 
1993 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you have a close friend or 
family member who is gay or 
lesbian? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
CBS & NY 
Times 
1993 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
Do you think being 
homosexual is something 
that people choose to be, or 
do you think it is something 
they cannot change? 
1 = Cannot change, 0 = 
Choose to be, Other 
responses 
Newsweek 1998 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
Thinking again about what 
might be done to protect gay 
rights, do you think there 
should or should NOT be … 
Equal rights for gays and 
lesbians in terms of job 
opportunities? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
Newsweek 1998 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Please tell me whether or not 
each of the following applies 
to you.  First, do you … a) 
work with someone you 
know is gay or lesbian, b) 
have someone in your family 
who is gay or lesbian, c) have 
a friend or acquaintance who 
is gay or lesbian? 
1 = Yes (any category), 0 
= No on all, or Other 
response 
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Newsweek 1998 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
1) In your opinion, is 
homosexuality something a 
person is born with, or is 
homosexuality due to other 
factors such as upbringing or 
environment?         2) Some 
people believe gays’ and 
lesbians’ sexual preference is 
something that cannot be 
changed.  Others believe 
their sexual preference can 
be changed through 
willpower, therapy, or 
religious conviction.  Which 
comes closer to your view? 
1 = Born with AND/OR 
Homosexuality cannot 
be changed, 0 = Other 
factors AND  
Homosexuality can be 
changed, or Other 
Response 
CNN/Time 1998 Gays in the 
Military 
Do you favor or oppose 
permitting openly gays or 
lesbians to serve in the 
military? 
1 = Favor, 0 = Oppose, 
Other Responses 
CNN/Time 1998 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you happen to have a 
family member or close 
friend who is gay or lesbian? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
CNN/Time 1998 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
1) Do you think that 
homosexuality is something a 
person is born with, or is due 
to other factors such as how 
they are raised or to their 
environment?        2) Do you 
think that someone who is 
homosexual can change their 
sexual orientation if they 
choose to do so or don't you 
think so? 
1 = Born with AND/OR 
Homosexuality cannot 
be changed, 0 = Other 
factors AND  
Homosexuality can be 
changed, or Other 
Response 
Washington 
Post 
1998 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
In general, do you think 
homosexuals should or 
should not have equal rights 
in terms of job 
opportunities? 
1 = Should, 0 = Should 
not, Other responses 
Washington 
Post 
1998 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Do you yourself have a 
friend, family member, or 
acquaintance who is gay or 
lesbian, or not? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
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Washington 
Post 
1998 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
1) In your opinion, what is 
the main cause of 
homosexuality? Are people 
born homosexual, do people 
become homosexual because 
of their experiences while 
growing up, or do people 
choose to be homosexual on 
their own? 
1 = People are born 
homosexual, 0 = Other 
responses 
Newsweek 2000 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
Thinking again about what 
might be done to protect the 
rights of gays and lesbians, … 
Do you think there should or 
should NOT be … Equal rights 
for gays and lesbians in terms 
of job opportunities? 
1 = Yes,  0= No, Other 
responses 
Newsweek 2000 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Please tell me whether or not 
each of the following applies 
to you.  First, do you … a) 
work with someone you 
know is gay or lesbian, b) 
have someone in your family 
who is gay or lesbian, c) have 
a friend or acquaintance who 
is gay or lesbian? 
1 = Yes (any category), 0 
= No on all, or Other 
response 
Newsweek 2000 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
1) In your opinion, is 
homosexuality something a 
person is born with, or is 
homosexuality due to other 
factors such as upbringing or 
environment? 
1 = Born with , 0 = Other 
factors, or Other 
Response 
Washington 
Post 
2000 Job 
Protections for 
Gays 
Do you favor or oppose laws 
to protect gays against job 
discrimination?  
1 = Favor, 0 = Oppose, 
Other Responses 
Washington 
Post 
2000 Know a 
Lesbian or Gay 
Thinking of all the people you 
know, either well or even 
casually --- do you know 
anyone who is openly gay? 
(IF NOT) Do you know 
anyone who you think is gay? 
1 = Yes openly gay,  0= 
No, Other responses 
(including Yes, thought 
gay) 
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Washington 
Post 
2000 Born Gay or 
Cannot 
Change 
1) In your opinion, what 
causes someone to be gay? Is 
it something that people are 
born with, or is it something 
that develops because of the 
way people are brought up, 
or is it just the way that some 
people choose to live? 
1 = Something people 
are born with, 0 = Other 
responses 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 TREATMENT AND CONTROL CONDITIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 
 
 
“Obama” Treatment: 
Television has become the medium through which most citizens learn about politics.  We 
would like to show you a picture and a short transcript of an interview that took place on 
television a few months ago about the 2008 presidential election.  The interviewer here is 
Ellen DeGeneres, who is married to Portia De Rossi, and known for her role on a sit-com 
in the mid-1990s.  She interviews Barack Obama, one of the candidates for Presidency in 
2008. 
<next page> 
 
Figure AII-1: Image in “Obama” Condition 
 
Obama Talks Politics on Ellen    
 
Ellen: I’d like to welcome our very special guest today, Barack Obama.  He’s come a 
very long way to talk to us about the 2008 presidential election.  <Applause> 
Obama: I’m glad to be here, Ellen.  Thank you so much for having me.  After all this is 
one of the most important elections we’ve had in decades.  A lot is riding on it. 
173 
 
Ellen: What do you think has been the most important issue has been in this election so 
far?   
Obama: Well, I think a lot of people in Middle America today are suffering because of 
the way things are going in this country.  One of the most important things we can do is 
provide relief to people.  We have to fix the mess that has developed over the years in 
Washington.   
 
<next page> 
 
What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today? 
1. The Economy 
2. Healthcare 
3. Terrorism 
4. Iraq and Afghanistan 
5. Social Issues Such as Abortion and Gay Rights 
6. Energy 
7. Something Else 
8. Haven’t Thought Much about It 
 
“McCain” Treatment: 
 
Television has become the medium through which most citizens learn about politics.  We 
would like to show you a picture and a short transcript of an interview that took place on 
television a few months ago about the 2008 presidential election.  The interviewer here is 
Ellen DeGeneres, who is married to Portia De Rossi, and known for her role on a sit-com 
in the mid-1990s.  She interviews John McCain, one of the candidates for presidency in 
2008.   
 
<next page> 
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Figure AII-2: Image Used in “McCain” Condition 
 
McCain Talks Politics on Ellen 
 
Ellen: I’d like to welcome our very special guest today, John McCain.  He’s come a very 
long way to talk to us about the 2008 presidential election.     <Applause> 
McCain: I’m glad to be here, Ellen.  Thank you so much for having me.  After all this is 
one of the most important elections we’ve had in decades.  A lot is riding on it. 
Ellen: What do you think has been the most important issue has been in this election so 
far?   
McCain: Well, I think a lot of people in Middle America today are suffering because of 
the way things are going in this country.  One of the most important things we can do is 
provide relief to people.  We have to fix the mess that has developed over the years in 
Washington.   
 
<next page> 
 
What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today? 
1. The Economy 
2. Healthcare 
3. Terrorism 
4. Iraq and Afghanistan 
5. Social Issues Such as Abortion and Gay Rights 
6. Energy 
7. Something Else 
8. Haven’t Thought Much about It 
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“Ellen” Treatment: 
Television has become the medium through which most citizens learn about politics.  We 
would like to show you a picture and a short transcript of an interview that took place on 
television a few months ago about the 2008 presidential election.  The interviewer here is 
Ellen DeGeneres, who is married to Portia De Rossi, and known for her role on a sit-com 
in the mid-1990s.  She interviews Tom Brokaw, an anchor for a major television news 
channel.   
<next page> 
 
Figure AII-3: Image Used in “Ellen” Condition 
 
Brokaw Talks Politics on Ellen 
 
Ellen: I’d like to welcome our very special guest today, Tom Brokaw.  He’s come a very 
long way to talk to us about the 2008 presidential election.   <Applause> 
Brokaw: I’m glad to be here, Ellen.  Thank you so much for having me.  After all this is 
one of the most important elections we’ve had in decades.  A lot is riding on it. 
Ellen: What do you think has been the most important issue has been in this election so 
far?   
Brokaw: Well, I think a lot of people in Middle America today are suffering because of 
the way things are going in this country.  One of the most important things we can do is 
provide relief to people.  We have to fix the mess that has developed over the years in 
Washington.   
 
<next page> 
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What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today? 
1. The Economy 
2. Healthcare 
3. Terrorism 
4. Iraq and Afghanistan 
5. Social Issues Such as Abortion and Gay Rights 
6. Energy 
7. Something Else 
8. Haven’t Thought Much about It 
 
Control Condition:  
Television has become the medium through which most citizens learn about politics.  
We’d like to show you a picture and a short transcript of an interview that took on 
television a few months ago about the 2008 presidential election.  The interviewer here is 
David Letterman, who is married to Regina Lasko, and known for his role on a late-night 
comedy show.  He interviews Tom Brokaw, an anchor for a major television news 
channel.    
<next page> 
 
 
 
Figure AII-4: Image Used in Control Condition 
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Brokaw Talks Politics on Letterman 
 
Letterman: I’d like to welcome our very special guest today, Tom Brokaw.  He’s come a 
very long way to talk to us about the 2008 presidential election.    <Applause> 
Brokaw: I’m glad to be here, Dave.  Thank you so much for having me.  After all this is 
one of the most important elections we’ve had in decades.  A lot is riding on it. 
Letterman: What do you think has been the most important issue has been in this election 
so far?   
Brokaw: Well, I think a lot of people in Middle America today are suffering because of 
the way things are going in this country.  One of the most important things we can do is 
provide relief to people.  We have to fix the mess that has developed over the years in 
Washington. 
 
<next page> 
 
What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today? 
1. The Economy 
2. Healthcare 
3. Terrorism 
4. Iraq and Afghanistan 
5. Social Issues Such as Abortion and Gay Rights 
6. Energy 
7. Something Else 
8. Haven’t Thought Much about It 
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APPENDIX III 
 
 QUESTION WORDING FOR EXPERIMENTAL LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS 
SCALE  
 
 
A. Should same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or do you think 
they should not be allowed to marry? 
 
 1. Should be allowed 
 2. Should not be allowed 
 
B. How strongly do you feel about your position on same-sex marriage? 
 1. Strongly 
 2. Not Strongly 
 
C. Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, 
 homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt 
 children? 
 
 1. Should be allowed 
 2. Should not be allowed 
 
D. How strongly do you feel about your position on same-sex couples adopting? 
 1. Strongly 
 2. Not Strongly 
 
E. Should same-sex couples be allowed to form civil unions, or do you think they should 
not be allowed to form civil unions? 
 
 1. Should be allowed 
 2. Should not be allowed 
 
F. How strongly do you feel about your position on same-sex civil unions? 
 1. Strongly 
 2. Not Strongly 
 
G. Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job 
 discrimination? 
 1. Favor 
 2. Oppose 
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H. Do you favor or oppose such laws strongly or not strongly? 
 1. Strongly 
 2. Not Strongly 
 
I. Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in 
 the United States Armed Forces or don't you think so? 
 1. Homosexuals should be allowed to serve 
 2. Homosexuals should not be allowed to serve 
 
J.  Do you feel strongly or not strongly that homosexuals 
 should be allowed or should not be allowed to serve? 
 
 1. Strongly 
 2. Not Strongly 
 
  
180 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abelove, Henry, Michele Aina Barale, and David Halperin, editors.  The Gay and 
Lesbian Studies Reader.  Routledge. New York, NY 
Abramowitz, Alan. 2004. “Terrorism, Gay Marriage, and Incumbency: Explaining the 
Republican Victory in the 2004 Presidential Election.” The Forum 2(4): Article 3 
Available at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss4/art3 
Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida.  1989.  “Foreign Affairs and 
Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience?’” 
American Political Science Review 83: 123-141. 
Altemeyer, Bob. 1988. Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism. Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Altemeyer, Bob. 2001. “Changes in Attitudes toward Homosexuals” Journal of 
Homosexuality Vol.42(2): 63-75 
Althaus, Scott L. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys 
and the Will of the People.  Cambridge U Press. New York, NY 
Armstrong, Elizabeth A. 2002. Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San 
Francisco, 1950-1994. U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Bailey, Michael A. 2007. “Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions 
for the Court, Congress, and Presidency.” American Journal of Political Science 
51(3): 433-448 
Bailey, Robert W. 1999. Gay Politics, Urban Politics: Identity and Economics in the 
Urban Setting.  Columbia U. Press. New York, NY 
Bartels, Larry. 1991. “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The 
Reagan Defense Buildup.”  American Political Science Review 85(2): 457-474 
Bertelli, Anthony M. and Christian R. Grose. 2009. “Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory 
of Distributive Public Policy.” Journal of Politics 71: 926-945 
Bernstein, Mary. 1997. “Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by 
the Lesbian and Gay Movement.” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 3, 
pp 531-565 
Bowman, Karlyn and Adam Foster. 2006. “Attitudes About Homosexuality & Gay 
Marriage.” American Enterprise Institute Studies in Public Opinion.  
181 
 
Brewer, Paul R. 2003a. “Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion about Gay 
Rights: A Framing-Based Account.” Public Opinion Quarterly 67(2):173-201. 
Brewer, Paul R. 2003b. “The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion about Gay Rights.” 
Journal of Politics 6: 1208-1220. 
Brewer, Paul R. 2008. Value War: Public Opinion and the Politics of Gay Rights. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Bull, Chris and John Gallagher. 1996. Perfect Enemies: The Religious Right, the Gay 
Movement, and the Politics of the 1990s. Crown Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. 
The American Voter: Unabridged Edition.  Midway Reprint 1980. U. Chicago 
Press, Chicago, IL 
Campbell, David E. and J. Quin Monson. 2005. “The Case of Bush’s Re-election, Did 
Gay Marriage Do It?”  Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of 
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 7-10.  Available 
online at http://www.nd.edu/~dcampbe4/bush.pdf 
Carmines, E.G. and James A. Stimson. 1980. “Two Faces of Issue Voting.”  American 
Political Science Review 74(March): 78-91. 
Carmines, Edward G, and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and The 
Transformation of American Politics.  Princeton U Press. Princeton, NJ 
Clendinen, Dudley and Adam Nagourney. 1999. Out for Good: The Struggle to Build a 
Gay Rights Movement in America. Simon & Shuster. New York, NY 
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of 
Roll Call Data” American Political Science Review.  May 2004. Vol. 98, No. 2 
(355-370) 
D’Emilio, John. 1998. Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a 
Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970. 2nd Edition. U of Chicago 
Press. Chicago, IL 
D’Emilio, John. 2000. “Cycles of Change, Questions of Strategy: The Gay and Lesbian 
Movement after Fifty Years” in The Politics of Gay Rights. Edited by Craig 
Rimmerman, Kenneth Wald, and Clyde Wilcox.  U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Donovan, Todd, Caroline Tolbert, Daniel A. Smith, and Janine Parry. 2005. "Did Gay 
Marriage Elect George W. Bush?" Paper presented at the 2005 State Politics 
Conference, East Lansing, MI, May 14-15.  Available online at 
http://www.polisci.msu.edu/sppc2005/papers/fripm/dtsp_sppc05.pdf 
182 
 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Boston, MA: Addison 
Wesley. 
Druckman, James N. 2004. “Priming the Vote: Campaign Effects in a U.S. Senate 
Election.” Political Psychology 25(4): 577–594. 
Duberman, Martin 1993. Stonewall. Penguin Books. New York, NY 
Endean, Steve and Vicki Lynn Eaklor. 2006. Bringing Gay Rights into the Mainstream: 
Twenty Years of Progress. Routledge. New York, NY 
Engle, Stephen M. 2001. The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the 
Gay and Lesbian Movement. Cambridge U. Press. New York, NY 
Foucault, Michel. 1978. The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction. Vintage. New 
York, NY 
Fowler, Linda. 1982. “How Interest Groups Select Issues for Ratings Voting Records of 
Members of the U.S. Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 7:401-413 
Friedman, Paul. 2004. “The Gay Marriage Myth: Terrorism, Not Values, Drove Bush’s 
Reelection.” Slate, Nov. 5th, 2004. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1995. “Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex” in The Basic Writings 
of Sigmund Freud edited by Dr. A. A. Brill. Random House. New York, NY 
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of 
Antipoverty Policy. U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL. 
Gitlin, Todd. 2003. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and 
Unmaking of the New Left.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1996. The Mismeasure of Man: Revised and Expanded. W. W. 
Norton. New York, NY 
Gross, Larry. 2001. Up From Invisibility: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Media in the 
America. Columbia U. Press. New York, NY 
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 1999.  “Creating Change---Holding the Line: Agenda Setting 
on Lesbian and Gay Issues at the National Level” in Gays and Lesbians in the 
Democratic Process: Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Representation.  Edited 
by Ellen D.B. Riggle and Barry L. Tadlock.  Columbia U. Press. New York, NY 
Haider-Markel, Donald P, and Mark R. Joslyn. 2008. “Beliefs about the Origins of 
Homosexuality and Support for Gay Rights: An Empirical Test of Attribution 
Theory.” Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol.72(2): 291-310 
183 
 
Herek, G.M. 2002. “Gender Gaps in Public Opinion about Lesbians and Gay Men.” 
Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 66(1): 40-66 
Hertzog, Mark. 1996. The Lavender Vote: Lesbian, Gay Men, Bisexuals in American 
Electoral Politics. New York U. Press. New York, NY 
Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite 
Polarization.” 
 American Political Science Review Vol. 95(3): 619-31 
Hicks, Gary R. and Tien-tsung Lee. 2006. “Public Attitudes Toward Gays and Lesbians: 
Trends and Predicters.” Journal of Homosexuality Vol. 51(2): 57-77 
Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Todd G. Shields. 2004. “Moral Issues and Voter Decisions 
Making in the 2004 Presidential Election.” PS: Political Science & Politics 38(2): 
201- 208. 
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News that Matters.  Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Jagose, Annemarie. 1996. Queer Theory: An Introduction.  New York U Press. New 
York, NY 
Jennings, M. Kent and Richard Niemi. 1968. “The Transmission of Political Values from 
Parent to Child.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 62: 169-184 
Jennings, M. Kent and Richard Niemi. 1974. The Political Character of Adolescence. 
Princeton U. Press, Princeton, NJ 
Johnson, David K. 2004. The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and 
Lesbians in the Federal Government. U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Johnson, Valen E. and James H. Albert. 1999. Ordinal Data Modeling. Springer. New 
York, NY 
Kellstedt, Paul. 2003. The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes. 
Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and 
Democratic Ideals. U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Lewis, Gregory B. 2007. “Personal Relationships and Support for Gay Rights.” Working 
Paper 07-10.  Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series.  
Downloaded at http://ssrn.com/abstract=975975 
Loftus, Jeni. 2001. “America’s Liberalization in Attitudes toward Homosexuality, 1973 
to 1998.” American Sociological Review 66(5): 762-782. 
184 
 
King, Gary. 1997. A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing 
Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
Kinsey, Alfred C., Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin. 1949. Sexual Behavior in 
the Human Male. W.B. Saunders Company. Philadelphia, PA 
Kinsey, Alfred C., Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, and Paul H. Gebhard. 1953. 
Sexual Behavior of the Human Female. W. B. Saunders Company. Philadelphia, 
PA. 
Lewis, Gregory B. 2005. “Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election.” PS: 
Political Science and Politics 38: 195-199. 
Lewis, Gregory B. and Marc A Rogers. 1999. “Does the Public Support Equal 
Employment Rights For Gays and Lesbians?” in Gays and Lesbians in the 
Democratic Process, eds. Ellen D.B. Riggle and Barry L. Tadlock. New York, 
NY: Columbia.  
Levay, Simon. 1996. Queer Science: The Use and Abuse of Research into 
Homosexuality.  Cambridge U. Press.  New York, NY 
Loftus, Jeni. 2001. “America’s Liberalization in Attitudes toward Homosexuality, 1973 
to 1998.” American Sociological Review 66(5): 762-782. 
Luker, Kristin. 1984. Abortion & the Politics of Motherhood. U of California Press. 
Berkeley, CA 
Luskin, Robert C. 1987. “Measuring Political Sophistication.” American Journal of 
Political Science 31(4): 856-899. 
MacManus, Susan A. 1996. Young V. Old: Generational Combat in the 21st Century. 
Westview Press. Boulder, CO. 
Marcus, Eric. 2002. Making Gay History: The Half Century Fight for Lesbian and Gay 
Equal Rights.  Perennial. New York, NY 
Martin, Andrew, and Kevin Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999”. Political Analysis.  
Vol.10, No.2 (134-153) 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: the Electoral Connection. Yale: printed by 
BookCrafters, Inc.  Fredericksburg, VA 
Mazur, Michelle A., and Tara M. Emmers-Sommer. 2002. “The Effect of Movie 
Portrayals on Audience Attitudes about Nontraditional Familes and Sexual 
Orientation.” Journal of Homosexuality. Vol. 44(1): 157-174 
185 
 
McAdam, Doug. 1999. The Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970.  2nd Edition.  U of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL 
Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the 
Norm of Equality. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ 
Miller, Joanne M. and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of 
Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a 
Trusted Source.” American Journal of Political Science 44(2):301-315. 
Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” 
The American Political Science Review. Mar. 1963. Vol. 57. No. 1 (45-56) 
Mockabee, Stephen T. 2007. “A Question of Authority: Religion and Cultural Conflict in 
the 2004 Election.” Political Behavior 29(2): 221-248. 
Mucciaroni, Gary. 2008. Same-Sex, Different Politics: Success & Failure in the Struggles 
over Gay Rights. U of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clausen, and Zoe M. Oxley.  1997.  "Media Framing of a 
Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance."  American Political Science 
Review 91: 567-583. 
Nicholson, Stephen P. 2005. Voting the Agenda: Candidates, Elections, and Ballot 
Propositions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.  
Oakes, Penelope J., Alexander Haslam, and John C. Turner.  1994.  Stereotyping and 
Social Reality.  Blackwell. Cambridge, MA 
Olsen, Laura R., Wendy Cadge and James T. Harrison. 2006. “Religion and Public 
Opinion about Same-Sex Marriage” Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 87(2): 340-
360 
OpenSecrets.org.  2009.  “Human Rights Campaign.” website accessed on July 23rd, 
2009. 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?ID=D000000158&Name=Human
+Rights+Campaign 
Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro.  1992.  The Rational Public. U. Chicago. 
Chicago, IL. 
Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R Dempsey. 1987. “What Moves Public 
Opinion?” American Political Science Review Vol. 81(1): 23-44 
Peress, Micheal. forthcoming. “Small Chamber Ideal Point Estimation” Political Analysis 
Advance Access downloaded at mail.rochester.edu/~mperess/research.html on 
August 18th, 2009 
186 
 
Poole, Keith. 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting.  Cambridge. New York, NY 
Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of 
Roll Call Voting.  Oxford University Press. New York, NY 
Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology and Congress. Transaction 
Publishers. New Brunswick, NJ 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community.  Touchstone. New York, NY 
Riggle, Ellen D. B., Alan L. Ellis and Anne M. Crawford. 1996. “The Impact of ‘Media 
Contact’ on Attitudes Toward Gay Men.” Journal of Homosexuality. Vol. 31(3): 
55-69 
Rimmerman, Craig A. 2000. “Beyond Political Mainstreaming: Reflections on Lesbian 
and Gay Organizations and the Grassroots” in The Politics of Gay Rights. Edited 
by Craig Rimmerman, Kenneth Wald, and Clyde Wilcox.  U of Chicago Press. 
Chicago, IL 
Rimmerman, Craig A. 2002. From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movement 
in the United States. Temple U. Press. Philadelphia, PA 
Rimmerman, Craig A. 2008. The Lesbian and Gay Movements: Assimilation or 
Liberation? Westview Press. Boulder, CO. 
Russell, Glenda M. 2000. Voted Out: The Psychological Consequences of Anti-Gay 
Politics. New York U. Press. New York, NY. 
Scagliotti, John, Greta Schiller, and Robert Rosenberg, Directors. 1985. Before 
Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian Community. DVD. First Run 
Features Studio.  Produced by Before Stonewall, Inc.  87 mins.  
Schiappa, Edward, Peter B. Gregg, and Dean E. Hewes. 2006. “Can One TV Show Make 
a Difference? Will and Grace and the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis.” Journal of 
Homosexuality Vol. 51(4): 15-37 
Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Kryson. 1997. Racial 
Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations. Harvard U. Press. Cambridge, 
MA. 
Sherrill, Kenneth.  2004.  “Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and the 2004 Presidential 
Election.” New York, NY : National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute.  
Shilts, Randy.  1987.  And the Band Played: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic.  
St. Martin’s Press. New York, NY. 
187 
 
Simon, Bernd.  2004. Identity in Modern Society: A Social Psychological Perspective.  
Blackwell. Oxford, UK. 
Smith, Daniel A, Matthew DeSantis, and Jason Kissel. 2006. “Same-Sex Marriage Ballet 
Measures and the 2004 Presidential Election.” State and Local Government 
Review, 38( 2): 78-91. 
Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge. New York, NY 
Stimson, James. 1999. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, 2nd Ed. 
Westview Press. 
Stimson, James. 2004. Tides of Consent. Cambridge. New York, NY 
Strumer, Stefan, and Bernd Simon. 2004. “The Role of Collective Identification in Social 
Movement Participation: A Panel Study in the Context of the German Gay 
Movement.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Vol. 30(3):263-277 
Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour.” 
in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, S. Worchell and W. G. Austin, Eds. 
Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 7-24 
Tucker, Edmon W. and Miriam Potocky-Tripodi. 2006. “Changing Heterosexuals’ 
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals: A Systematic Review of the Empirical 
Literature.” Research on Social Work Practice. Vol. 16(2): 176-190 
Turner, John C. 1991. Social Influence.  Brooks/Cole publishing.  Pacific Grove, CA 
Turner, John C., M.A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, S.D. Reicher, and M.S. Wetherell. 1987. 
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Blackwell. 
Oxford, UK 
Treas, Judith. 2002. “How Cohorts, Education, and Ideology Shaped a New Sexual 
Revolution on American Attitudes toward Non-marital Sex, 1972-1998.” 
Sociological Perspectives. Vol. 45(3): 267-283 
Tropiano, Stephen. 2002. The Prime Time Closet: A History of Gays and Lesbians on TV. 
Applause Theatre and Cinema. New York, NY 
Vaid, Urvashi. 1995. Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian 
Liberation. Anchor Books. New York, NY 
Valocchi, Stephen. 2005. “Collective Action Frames in The Gay Liberation Movement, 
1969-1973” in Frame of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, 
eds. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes. Rowman and Littlefield.  
Villarroel, Maria A., Charles F. Turner, Elizabeth Eggleston, Alia Al-Tayyib, Susan M. 
Rogers, Anthony M. Roman, Philip C. Cooley, and Harper Gordek. 2006. “Same-
188 
 
Gender Sex in the United States: Impact of T-Acasi on Prevalence Estimates.” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 70(2): 166-196 
Voss, D. Stephen.  1996. “Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the 
New South.”  Journal of Politics 58(4): 1171-1180. 
Walters, Suzanna D. 2001. All the Rage: The Story of Gay Visibility in America. U of 
Chicago Press. Chicago, IL 
Wilcox, Clyde, and Robin Wolpert. 2000. “Gay Rights in the Public Sphere: Public 
Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Equality.” in The Politics of Gay Rights, eds. Craig 
A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago.  
Yang, Alan S. 1997. “The Polls-Trends: Attitudes toward Homosexuality” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 61:477-507 
Yang, Alan. 1999. “From Wrongs to Rights, 1973 to 1999: Public Opinion on Gay and 
Lesbian Americans Moves Toward Equality.” New York, NY : National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute.  
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York, NY: 
Cambridge. 
 
